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This study aims for the first time to operationalise managerial behaviour 
and to. produce a set of empirically-based statements of the differences 
in behaviour which determine managerial effectiveness or failure. 
Both the Management and Behavioural Science Schools have been singularly 
unsuccessful in doing this, and the work begins with an in-depth review 
of the main philosophies in each. 
The various sub-schools of managerial thought, including the writings of 
Learned et al (1969), Uyterhoeven (1973) and Newman and Logan (1976) are 
examined. It is found that whereas this school has made solid and 
valuable advances on the level of technique, on the strategic or overall 
policy level the teaching is normative, not based upon empirically validated 
principles, and is couched in Fayollian terms. 
The review of the Behavioural Science School begins with an outline of the 
work of Mayo et al (1927) and ends with the findings of Levine (1973) and 
Greene (1975) who demonstrated only a reciprocal causation between productivity 
and satisfaction under the influence of the leader variablei 
The various leadership theories are described from the early works of McGregor 
(1960), Likert (1961), Blake and Mouton (1964), to the later contingency 
models of Fiedler (1967) and Vroom and Yetton (1973). These too, are 
found to be prescriptive. The later Path-Goal theory of House (1971) 
which advocates "utmost flexibility" has only been partially validated 
by Orpen (1977). 
The only common thread found running through the various approaches of the 
management and behavioural science schools is that of 'role', and further 
impetus is given to a preliminary notion that one might integrate the knowledge 
from the various schools (and synthesise a better understanding of what it 
is that the manager does) by exploring the role concept when the writers 
belonging to the Social Systems School are examined: amongst these are 
Katz and Kahn (1966), Kast and Rosenzweig (1970) and Hunt (1972). All of 
them see the organisation as an open social system with the manager as central 
to a larger role system around which operates the other sub-systems. Although 
largely theoretical it is certainly a more accurate and complete representation 
of organisational reality. 
Building on the findings of earlier empirical researchers including Sayles 
(1964), Mintzberg (1968) undertook an observational study which culminated 
in a statement of managerial work in terms of 10 Roles: Three Interpersonal 
(Figurehead, Leader, Liaison), three Informational (Monitor, Disseminator, 
Spokesman) and four Decisional (Entrepreneur, Disturbance Handler, Resource 
Allocator and Negotiator). 
The validity of the Role Set as well as Mintzberg 1 s contention that all 
managers perform all ten ;roles in the performance of their work has been 
confirmed by Charan (1969), Costin (1970), Gingras (1977), and indirectly, 











Mintzberg's later empirical work on strategic decision-making (1976) and 
policy formulation (1978) supports the findings of cognitive researchers 
working in the area of information processing and is at variance with much 
of the accepted management views on strategy! decisions- are a·rrived at 
by progressing through successively limiting. cycles and policy is disjointed, 
fragmented and broadly speaking, consists of waves of change and continuity. 
An evaluation of the empirical literature suggests that management of the 
organisation is effected not by formal planning and overall objective 
definition, but by on-going reformulation of strategy in the light of 
(monitored} information about the results of prior implementation. This 
monitoring is done by the manager and is part of his role behaviour. 
As the success of any company can be measured in terms of the results of· 
its strategy implementation, the conclusion is drawn: role performance 
influences strategy formulation and implementation and conversely, 
implementation influences role performance. 
The preliminary contention is then made: the success or failure of any 
organisation will be mirrored in the role behaviour of its chief executive. 
A pi 1 ot study by observation and diary analysis ·of the activities of 2 men 
was undertaken as a preliminary test of the validity of this statement as 
well as to isolate the more crucial roles in Mintzberg's Role Set. At 
the same time, a set of assumptions was developed (Appendix 2} whereby any 
given managerial activity could be apportioned to one of the 10 roles. 
The results showed a strong correlation between time spent in the Leader 
and Monitor roles and indicated that the latter was pivotal to managerial 
success. 
A composite financial index .consisting of six balance sheet ratios was used 
to select the sample for the main study: Developed by a firm of Stockbrokers, 
the Risk Rating (RR) is a score out of 100 given on the basis of weighted 
analysis of these ratios. A high RR denotes low risk and a low RR denotes 
high risk. The measure has over the past 5 years shown excellent practical 
validity in predicting the failure of companies scoring a RR of 30 or less. 
Listed shares having a RR of 70 or more and 30 or less were matched into 
pairs according to industry sector and sphere of activity. Cooperation 
to participate in the study was obtained from chief executives heading 
Clothing, Food, Pharmaceutical and Steel companies. Thus 4 pairs of 
Successful and Unsuccessful subjects were isolated. 
Using this basis of selection and the system of role activity categorisations 
developed earlier, it was hypothesised: 
Hl Successful managers spend more of their time in direct leader role 
activity than do Unsuccessful mangers. 
H2 High Leader and total Monitor role activity are a feature of Successful 
managers. 












H4 Within the monitor role, Successful managers receive more unsolicited 
information from within their own organisations, and 
HS Successful managers spend more of their time in external information 
gathering than do their Unsuccessful counterparts. 
Data was collected from the executives by means of an expanded diary method. 
In a record covering 5 working days, they specified starting and stopping 
times, type of activity, its nature or purpose and the participants. The 
time taken for each work activity was recorded to the nearest 5 minutes. 
After-hours activities were listed separately. 
Preliminary analysis 'costed' each activity into time and apportioned it 
to a particular role according to the assumptions derived earlier. At the 
same time, the monitor role was split to distinguish between internal and 
external informational input and that which was solicited or unsolicited. 
In this way, the total working time of the managers was accounted for and 
expressed as percentages spent in each of the 10 roles. The mean time 
for the S and US group for each role was then calculated. The results 
were treated statistically, first to a Hotelling's Square analysis which 
produced a Tcalc value of 408,045. This was found to be significant at 
the 0,05 level when compared to a Tcrit·value of 17,361. 
Individual t-scores showed the results for Total Leader (8%:2%) and Total 
Monitor (31%:12%) significant at the 0,01 level and Unsolicited monitoring 
(4~:0,4%) significant at the 0,05 level. 
The scores for Total external (14%:4~) and Total internal (17%:9%) monitoring 
were found to be not significant. 
Hypothesis 2 was tested by calculating a combined t-score for Total Leader 
and Total Monitor. The tcalc for the S group was over 4 times less than 
for the US group. The result for both was significant at the 0,01 level. 
On the basis of these results, Hl and H4 were accepted. The validity of 
H2 was very strongly confirmed. H3 and H4 were rejected. 
It was concluded that the successful manager indulges in more Leader activity { 
(motivation and staffing), monitors more, and receives more unsolicited 
information from his subordinates than does his unsuccessful counterpart. 
Further, Leader and Monitor role performance are inextricably linked and 
are central to managerial effectiveness. 
The work characteristics, philosophies and performance in other roles were 
then analysed by inspection and several commonalities were identified: 
The S managers all presided over a decentralised formal structure and actively 
practised delegation of responsibility, the US group were highly centralised 
and resisted delegating - in some cases overtly. The S group encouraged 
team decisions, the US group did not. The S managers spent less time in 












The successful managers spent twice as much time in the Entrepreneurial 
role (11%:6%) than the US group and were twice as active in developing a 
network of outside contacts via Liaison (17%:9%) .. 
As the total external and total Monitor activity was not significantly 
different (rejection of H3 and HS), as time spent in Disseminator role 
·was almost identical {5,04%:5,22%), and as the total net working time for 
each group was also similar (8,25 and 7,51 hours per day respectively), 
there is a strong inference that the type and quality of dissemination 
for each group is different: that the S manager is a more skilled 
communicator of information. 
From these findings and from further derivative argument, a number of 
propositions were generated which advance a profile of the effective manager 
as a man who delegates responsibility for decisions to teams of subordinates, 
motivates them, and exhibits a high degree of flexibility in his leadership· 
style. He constantly scans his internal and external environment, makes 
adjustment, initiates improvement projects, and develops outside contacts. 
The quality of his dissemination is good and he maintains open channels of 
communication via the Monitor role. 
The conclusion is reached that successful policy-making by the organisation 
and the result of strategy implementation - its overall effectiveness -
cannot be divorced from managerial role behaviour: that each is part of 
the other. · 
After further argument, the overall conclusion is drawn that organisational 
psychology and organisational theory have reached the same stage in their 












"Psychology is, broadly speaking, the science of the mind. Art is the 
doing and Science is the understanding how to do, or the explanation of 
what has been done. If we are able to find and to express the psychological 
laws upon which the art of advertising is based, we shall have made a 
distinct advance, for we shall have added the science to the art of 
advertising." 
*Walter Dill Scott 
Address to the Agate Club, Chicago, 20 December 1901. 
With these words the new 'science' of industrial psychology was born with 
Scott (a disciple of Wundt) the founding member. It inherited principles 
from the learning, personality, and later clinical areas of psychology, and 
its activities proceeded through salesmanship, recruitment and selection 
until in 1919 it in turn spawned personnel psychology. 
Meanwhile Frederick Taylor's time and motion studies which had begun in 1895 
led to more sophisticated analyses of the physical work environment and found 
common ground with industrial psychologists in the aim of better selection of 
personnel. Engineering psychology came into being. 
With the divorce of James Cattell 1 s statistically-based psychometrics from the 
mainstream after World War II, industrial psychology continued with this 
fit-the-man-to-the-job and the job-to-the-man approach throughout the 1950 1 s, 
but there were increasing problems - problems which were multiple both in 
number and nature. 












Although industrial psychology had overcome the hurdle of being an 'applied' 
science rather than a 'pure' one (knowledge for its own sake and not for the 
practical use of man) it was nevertheless regarded as a science and had thus 
inherited a rigid adherence to a concern only with empirical observable fact. 
And because of this researchers were experiencing difficulties of 
(1) replication due to organisational and human complexity, (2) artificiality 
of the laboratory setting, (3) control of variables and (4) more serious, 
multiple causation because their methodology did not cater for this 
eventuality at all. 
Then there was the question of significant findings in other disciplines: 
Sociological findings of status, norms, roles, which became the basis of 
social psychology and of the Hawthorne Studies (from which derived industrial 
sociology) were all relevant to the study of human behaviour in the work 
environment. And yet how could industrial psychology accommodate inputs 
from disciplines such as anthropology and sociology which did not have 
(were not 'disciplined' by) a scientific method? 
Perhaps most serious of all was the result of industrial psychology's own 
endeavours: The focus had always been on individual differences (what effect 
will this particular situation have on him? Or when considering the group 
as a whole, what change will this cause on each of them?) and the organisation 
itself was merely regarded as the reservoir of information - of data. But 
due to the psychologist's systematic and scientific approach, the more he 
discovered the more he was drawn inward toward the dynamic complexities of 
the organisation itself. And in order to refine already-gained knowledge 
(to make 'truth more true') as well as to learn more he found himself forced to 
come to grips with organisationa·1 structure and functioning: a task for which 
his methodology simply did not equip him. 
Still the industrial psychologist struggled on within the confines of his 
straitjacket through the 50's and into the 60's, grounded in his repertoire 
of man-job - job-machine. The advent of general systems theory made no 
greater impact than is exemplified by Gilmer when he suggests that because 
.of his varied functions the industrial psychologist should be renamed the 












Then in 1965 the voice of sanity was heard for the first time when Edgar Schein 
proposed that if the organisation was indeed a complex social system, then 11 it 
must be studied as a total system if individual behaviour within it is to be 
truly understood" (1965:3). And so industrial psychology in its turn gave 
birth to organisational psychology. It would be useful to here briefly review 
the principles and approach of this field. Organisational psychology: 
1. views the organisation as a single psychological entity in dynamic 
co-existence with its environment 
2. thus recognises that a factor outside of the organisation can have 
an effect upon the individual in it (the industrial psychologist 
does not) 
3. integrates the microscopic and reductionistic approach of the 
industrial psychologist with the macroscopic approach of the 
sociologist which ignores psychological dynamics, and therefore 
overcomes the weakness of both 
4. is entirely functional. It attempts to look at the social system 
in terms of structure and process and function 
5. is wholistic in that it seeks to understand the relationships 
between the component units 
6. recognises the traditional areas of interest of the industrial 
psychologist but regards them as part of the truth, not all of it. 
Organisational psychology thus includes all industrial psychology. 
It is an extention of it 
7. thus recognises that theory building must take place on the level 
of the social group process, and in relation to the needs of 
individual employees, and with the interaction between the 
individual and the system · 
8. adopts as its methodology a belief that it can generate its own 
explanatory data from observation and test its own theories of 
humans in the work environment 
Simultaneously with the growth of organisational psychology there has been a 
build-up of a body-of knowledge which calls itself organisation theory. Pugh 
{1966) defines organisation theory as "the study of the structure and 
functioning of organisations and the behaviour of groups and individuals within 
them" {cited in Howell, 1976:13) which is hardly distinguishable from its 
psychological equivalent. This is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1. 
Blocked arrows show where the import of relevant knowledge from other 
disciplines has been stopped by the traditionalists. The difference comes 


















THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF ORGANISATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
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Because organisational theory is now so wide it has invited research and 
theoretical input from sociologists, political scientists, management workers, 
in fact from writers of almost every behavioural science discipline. 
If researchers had embraced this new approach then organisational psychology 
would by today have a number of useful findings standing to its credit and 
would be well on the way to enjoying the status of a mature field of endeavour. 
Unfortunately it has neither. The eclecticism combined {one feels sure) with 
the encroachment on a preserved domain have driven many researchers deeper 
into the mechanistic myopia of traditionalism. One example will suffice here. 
Schultz {1973) is quite certain that: 
"industrial psychology involves the application of the methods, facts, 
and principles of the science of human behavior to man at his work. 
{page 6) and again: 
"when an industrial psychologist observes the behavior of man at his 
work he does so objectively, dispassionately, and systematically" {page 12) 
As we 'shall see, other eminent writers demonstrate only a limited realism. 
* The field today lies fragmented, directionless, and one could say in disarray. 
Some elements remain ignored or under-utilised insofar as they have not been 
incorporated into human relations eachings. There are many loose ends : 
Workers research particular areas without taking cognisance of findings in 
directly related fields. Early findings are dismissed as invalid and research 
takes on a pattern of replication upon replication in a frenetic scramble to 
publish. And with each turn of the wheel workers dig deeper into an 
ever-decreasing number of variables - to little effect. 
The whole field has completely lost sight of its objective. Let us recall 
Scott's words: He said that Art was the doing and Science the understanding 
of how to do or of what had been done. Well the manager {at whatever level) 
has been successfully practising his art for the last 75 years. He does. 
The South African Psychological Association in recently defining its policy says 
it will "follow the rule of thumb that Industrial Psychology is what 'Industrial 
Psychologists' do 11 - PS,.:.RAM, 1977,17(1),21. 












What progress has the 'science' of psychology made in the meantime 
towards understanding how it is that he does it? What if we pose 
some very simple questions? What if we were to ask: What does a 
manager do? Why did he do what he did? Would we be rewarded with 
an answer, a partial explanation, even a tentative proposal? The 
answer is sadly, no. The whole field would be mute. 
Even organisational psychology which defined its parameters over 10 
years ago has failed to produce any sort of unified, working, or 
practicable explanation of organisational functioning. 














The approach to the study of managerial work by the Schools of 
Management and Behavioural Science have been very different. 
In this section we review the work in each and assess their 
contribution to our understanding of what managers actually do. 













THE MANAGEMENT SCHOOLS 
Introduction 
The first attempt to delineate managerial process and functioning was made 
by Henri Fayol in 1916 when he told us: 
"To manage is to forecast and plan, to organise, to command, to 
co-ordinate and control . 11 * 
Since then literally thousands of works on management theory have been written 
and the whole field is today confused by what one author calls the state of 
'jungle warfare. 1 There are contradictions in the meaning of words - even 
to the extent of what management theory is - and disagreement as to what 
methodology should be adopted for studying it. 
A venture into the jungle is doubly unrewarding. For not only does one not 
find the answer to the simple question "what do managers do?", but one also 
exits from the maze at exactly the same place that one entered: 
"Managing is so complex that ... we need to divide up the whole 
activity into parts. The total task of management can be divided into 
four elements: organizing, planning, leading and controlling." 
(Newman, Summer and Warren, 1972:12) 
Notwithstanding the confused state of the literature it is possible to identify 
various approaches which have become delineated. In order to understand why 
it is that we cannot glean a better answer to our questions it is .necessary 
to briefly outline the philosophy of each. 












THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS SCHOOL 
The founders of this school were of course Henri Fayal and Frederick Taylor. 
Later contributions came from Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick who expanded 
on the writings of Fayal and thus gave impetus to their further acceptance. 
This school is variously referred to in the literature as the operational 
school, the principles approach and the school of classical theory. The 
fundamental belief is in the universality of the management proce~s. Adherents 
to this approach seek first to identify the functions of management and then 
to distill these functions into principles and hence build a theory of 
management from that. Management theory is in turn looked upon as a way of 
organising experience so that practice can be improved through research, 
empirical testing of principles, and proper teaching of fundamentals. Further, 
they base their analysis of management on a set of fundamental beliefs amongst 
which is the firm conviction that much can be learnt from analysing the 
practical management experience: 
"long experience with managing in a variety of enterprised situations 
can be grounds for distillation of basic truths of principles having 
a clarifying and predictive value in the understanding and improvement 
of managing" (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1968:36) 
And so if this school attempts to anal~se practical management in terms of what 
managers actually do, then logically it should after some 60 years be able 
to provide us with an answer. It cannot. Whilst many of the original concepts 
from this school such as pyramipal form, the scalar principle, unity of command, 
and span of control are still used by us (and thus have applicability when 
talking about organisation structure), this school can do no more than provide 
us with general guidelines as to the f~nctioning of the management process. 
Newman et al's (1972) work is quoted above. His later book co-authored with 
Logan and with the impressive title of 'Strategy, Policy, anq Central 
Management' is in summary a checklist of q4estions which the aspiring manager 
must ask himself - a list of instructions that he must follow in order to 
analyse the outlook for a company, design the strategy, establish the policy, 












"with strategy, policy, and organisation decided the stage is set. 
Actual achievement, however, awaits the action ... Substantial 
amounts of time are necessary for this make-happen effort" (1976:10) 
The following quotation will give the reader some idea of the tone in which 
the book is written. Under the heading 'Distinctive Task of Central 
Management' we read that: 
"members of central management have supervisory duties just like every 
executive. They must guide, motivate, and control their immediate 
subordinates and they will have some ordinary tasks like signing 
papers or greeting visitors ... 11 (1976:403) 
Nowhere are we told how these functions are to be performed. 
THE EMPIRICAL SCHOOL 
This school analyses management by a study of experience. By analysing case 
studies the student of management can learn from others' past mistakes.· There 
is often little attempt to draw generalisations but merely to transfer the 
experience to the student. In a sense then the empirical school is similar 
to the operational school. 
Unofficially this school might be termed the 'policy by case study school' 
and it is characteristic of writers out of Harvard. In its pure form the 
case study method is theory-free. But more lately there has been a trend to 
introduce discussion based upon theory as a preface to each set of cases 
which are organised into groupings according to which topic is being dealt with. 
Typical of this type of work is Learned et al's 'Business Policy', and in 
the introduction they state: 
11 The choice of objectives and the formulation of policy to guide action 
in attainment of objectives depends upon many variables unique to a given 
organisation and situation. It is not possible to make useful 
generalisations about the nature of these variables or to classify their 
possible combinations in all situations. Knowledge of what, in general, 












The main emphasis of the book is on strategy formulation and implementation 
and the authors identify three main aspects of leadership: 
(1) as the architect of strategy where 11 to be a leader in the activities 
of searching out and analysing strategic alternatives and finally making 
or ratifying decisions among competing choices, the general manager must 
be an analyst" (page 760) 
(2) as the implementer of strategy where he must supply leadership: 
"the chief executive finds himself in the role of mediator and integrator. 
That is, he must deal with conflict among special interests ... He 
must balance the desirability of uniformity against the requirements for 
flexibility (page 761) 
(3) as a personal leader where "different kinds of personal leadership 
may be characterised in various ways, ad infinitum ... The effort to 
relate personality traits to executive effectiveness is no longer pursued 
as naively as it once was. Business leaders generally are likely to be 
characterised by such qualities as drive, intellectual ability, initiative, 
creativeness, social ability and flexibility" (page 764) 
The essence of the authors' advice is that "the manager must play multiple 
roles to adapt his leadership to the changing requirements of the situation" 
(page 763). But apart from the roles mentioned above we are not told what 
other roles make up the multiple set that the manager must use nor are we 
told exactly how it is that he should perform in them. 
Also out of the Ha.rvard School is Uyterhoeven et al 's 'Strategy and Organisation. 1 
A somewhat later work, it takes care to point out in the first paragraph of 
the preface that general management skills are not only required by the chief 
executive but are also needed by executives at functional operating levels. 
In other words it is a book about management in general. More particularly 
for our purposes: 
"The text is oriented to the practitioner, describing a conceptual 
framework for strategic and organisational action. It is not intended 
to be a theory of the firm. Rather, as an operational guide, its purpose 
is to help in application" (1973:v) 
It thus promises not only to answer our question of what managers actually do, 
but to give us an operational description of exactly how they do it. How 
closely does the fact match up to the promise? Well, the authors see general 












"General management is not an exact science. Those striving for clarity, 
purity, and certainty will never acquire a general management point of 
view. General management is fuzzy, complicated and imprecise. Balancing 
the many elements of the total company equation requires trade-offs, 
compromises, and accommodations .... General management skills, therefore, 
are not just analytical, they are judgmental and political as well." 
( 1973 :4-5) 
After having been promised so much we are soon disappointed. The value though 
in the Uyterhoeven work lies in the way that they conceptualise the general 
management function: They see it as consisting of two broad roles - the 
manager as Strategist and as Organisation Builder. And each of these role 
categories requires the possession of certain skills. As strategist he needs 
the skills of identification, prediction, evaluation, innovation, and 
decision-making. These skills are combined with a number of elements of the 
firm and together they comprise the "strategic process." 
In his role as organisation builder the man ger is seen as facing the task of 
(1) "Building and constantly adapting his organisation to the demands of his 
strategy, (2) ensuring that his strategy takes into account organisational 
constraints, and (3) recognising the organisational inputs which influence 
the strategic process" (page 72). (And in this respect goes beyond Learned 
et al who do not see a reciprocating influence upon strategy). As builder 
the manager is seen as taking action in order to translate a paper strategy 
into reality: 
"Organisational action focusses on how he manages. Typically the general 
manager uses three tools: . 
(1) he acts as architect to the use of organisational structure 
(2) he manages the various systems which have been designed ... and 
(3) he manages through his direct dealing with people. 
The general manager uses these three tools simultaneously." (1973:78) 
The rest of the text is an amplification of how these tools should be used at 
various levels in the organisation. Altogether an extremely valuable work from 
many points of view but it simply does not tell us how the practising manager 













THE DECISION-MAKING SCHOOL 
In classical economics the assumption is made that when faced with a decision 
the manager will act in a formal systematic and rational {'based upon 
reasoning') manner. Further, the assumption is made that he has complete 
knowledge of all the alternatives open to him and that he can order or rank 
the consequences of choosing each of these alternatives. He thus merely 
evaluates the consequences and chooses the best one. (Miller and Starr, 1967) 
From this early view of economics the decision theory school of management 
has grown up. Gaining tremendous impetus from the development of the computer 
over the last 25 years, this school tends to see decision-making as the central 
focus of management with the other variables of management theory surrounding it. 
The decision theorists, together with their colleagues the operations researchers 
in the mathematical school, have given us models of just about every 
conceivable process. However, these are of programmed decisions whereas most 
of the decisions facing the manager are unprogrammed. In other words it is 
not possible for him to know all the alternatives open to him simply because 
the open environment in which he works contains too many variables. The basic 
assumption of the decision school is a closed system: 
"The most commonly used and accepted analytical framework for choice 
behavior or decision-making in organisations is the closed decision model 
Many of the widely accepted decision models in management science assume 
a kind of administrative rationality similar to that prescribed for the 
ideal rational man. These models are structured in closed frameworks. 
They are closed because they give little weight to the environment of 
the decision-maker and to the complexity of the act of choice as such" 
(Alexis and Wilson, 1967:149-150) 
The Carnegie Group 
In contrast to the economist's view of decision-making there are those of 
Herbert Simon and his co-workers James March and Richard Cyert who together 
formed what has become known as the Carnegie Group based at what is now 
Carnegie-Mellon University. 
Herbert Simon is a management writer turned cognitive psychologist and his work will 
again be discussed in Part 3. Taken as a totality, the work of Simon, March, and 
Cyert take a social systems approach to the firm. 
To the extent that their views on decision-making have been accepted by many (not all) 












Firstly, there is no doubt in Simon's mind as to where decision-making fits 
into the whole scheme of management. He views the two as being synonymous: 
"I shall find it convenient to take mild liberties with the English 
language by using decision-making as though it were synonymous with 
management. 11 ( 1960: l) 
But whereas he sees all management activities as compr1s1ng decision-making, 
he does not see it in the economists' terms. Their model was that of an 
economic man who in his dealings with a complex world selected a course from 
all those available to him in order to maximise his returns. Simon and his 
colleagues maintain that this is not possible due to the manager's own 
cognitive limitations - that there are limits to human rationality. In 
other words, maximisation is not possible. The manager does not seek to 
maximise profit but merely to make adequate profit. 
Looked at another way choices are made by the manager not to maximise 
objectives but rather to satisfy constraints. In other words, they 'satisfice' 
rather than maximise. 
These limits to the manager's rationality coupled with the (maintained) 
impossibility of his knowing all the relevant factors in the environment 
pertaining to a particular problem led Simon (1966) to postulate that the 
individual would seek to so construct his environment that he would approach 
as close as practicable to rationality but that he could not attain it: 
his rationality was 'bounded': 
"Our world is a world of limited, serial information processors dealing 
with complexities that, for all practical purposes, are infinitive 
in comparison with their information-gathering and computing powers. 
It is a world peopled by creatures of bounded rationality. Because 
we cannot simultaneously attend to everything that is potentially 
relevant, we must have processes that determine the focus of attention." 












Most decisions which the manager has to face are complex. They are unprogrammed --, in that most of them are novel and unstructured in that there is no obvious 
single 'right' method for solving the problem. This can either be because 
the exact situation has not been ·faced before or because the decision to be 
taken is particularly important. Simon proposes a basic framework consisting 
of three steps for the decision-making process: 
"The first phase of the decision-making process - searching the 
environment for conditions calling for a decision - I shall call 
intelligence activity (borrowing the military meaning of intelligence) 
The second phase - inventing, developing, and analysing possible courses 
of action - I shall call design activity. 
The third phase - selecting a particular course of action from those 
available - I shall call choice activity. (1960:2) 
Closely allied to the decision-theory school is that of the mathematical school 
- the operations researchers who sometimes call themselves "management 
scientists." Broadly speaking this group believe that if management or 
organisation or planning or decision-making is a logical process (and here 
they lean heavily towards the traditional concepts of rationality) then it 
can be quantified and expressed in mathematical symbols. From these symbols 
and relationships models can be built. Thus the focus of this school is on 
modelling of the various decision processes which are expressed in terms of 
the desired goal. 
The computer has aided these analysts tremendously in their work. It has 
helped them to produce an almost endless number of models and programmes, 
some of which are highly complicated. But because the computer is so closely 
associated with the work of the operations researcher and because so many 
people stand in awe of this machine, it has also helped in the production 
of a certain cult which has grown up around the analysts' work. This cult 
makes it appear at times as if mathematical modelling is synonymous with the 
whole area of management. It is not. 
Firstly, most of the work of the operations researchers deals with programmes 
of structured decision-making where all the constraints are known, the ~ariables 












managerial decision-making is (as we have seen above in discussing Simon's 
work) unstructured and novel. Secondly, where the operations researcher has 
attempted to build models of unstructured decision processes he has made the 
basic assumption that all the constraints can be quantified. They cannot be. 
Thus OR modelling of this type simply does not reflect reality. 
There is no doubt that the operations researcher has been and is of tremendous 
benefit in that he has given the manager a number of highly useful techniques 
(such as PERT, CPM) which can be used by him for the production of 
information, but the end result of using one of these processes remains 
just that - information - and it does not constitute a decision by itself. 
The manager still has to make the choice. It does not necessarily follow 
that he is going to automatically base his decision upon this isolated 











The Newer Approaches 
The Eclectic Schools 
16 
Advocates of this approach deem it •eclectic' because it consists of the 
best of that which is •selected' from a variety of other disciplines -
psychology, anthropology, mathematics, economics - impinged upon traditional 
principles philosophy. 
An excellent example of this type is Summer and O'Connell's 'Managerial Mind' 
(1973) principally because of the excellent theoretical papers reproduced 
before each set of cases. These are both non-directive and cover a wide 
variety of concepts. However there is no attempt at theory construction 
and management's functions are again prescribed. 
Most recently, there is George Terry's 'Principles of Management• in which 
he presents what he calls the 'Modified Management Process School' which takes 
11 the best from what is available in management thought and works it into 
a single theory moulded around the process framework as the central core 11 
(1977:39). This is very useful as far as it goes, but we know that we 
cannot look to this school for the answer to our question when we read the 
definite statement that: 
11 These (people, ideas, resources, and objectives) are basically what a 
manager works with, but not what one does, which ... are the 
fundamental functions of planning, organising, actuating, and 
controlling 11 (1977:5) 
The Management Information System (MIS) 
This seems to be a convenient place to discuss the form and structure of the 
management information system as advocated by the formal management schools. 
Although not constituting a school or separate body of thought in its own 
right it is necessary that we discuss these approaches to its structure in 
order that we can re-evaluate it in the light of empirical evidence to be 











Figure 2 Important acti'!ities of each fundamental function of management 
Planning 
1. Clarify, amplify, and cleter-
mine objectives. 
2. Forecast. 
3. Establish the conditions and 
assumptions under which the 
work will be done. 
4. Select and state tasks to ac-
complish objectives. 
5. Establish an overall plan of 
accomplishment, emphasiz-
ing creativity to find new and 
better means for accomplish-
ing the work. 
6. Establish policies, p~oce­
dures, standards, and meth-
ods of accomplishment. 
7. Anticipate possible future 
problems. 
8. Modify plans in light of con-
trol results. 
Source: Terry (1977:35) 
The work of the manager 
Organizing Actuating 
1. · 6reak down work into opera- 1. Practice part_icipation by all 
tive duties. affected by the decision or 
act. 
2. Group operative duties into 2. Lead and challenge others to 
operative positions. do their best. 
3. Assemble operative positions 3. Motivate members. 
into manageab:e ~nd related 
units. 
4. Clarify position requirements. 4. Communicate effectively. 
5. Select and place individual 5. Develop members to realize 
on proper job. full potentials. 
6. Utilize and agree upon proper 6. Reward by recognitiOi1 c1nd 
authority for each manage- pay for work well done 
ment member. 
7. Provide personnel facilities 7. Satidy needs of empioyecs 
and other resources. through their work efforts. 
8. Adjust the organization in 8. Revise actuation efrort5 in 
light of control results. iight of control results. 
Controlling 
1. Comprtre results with plans in I ..... general. ........, 
2. App:·aise results against per-
formance standards. 
3. Devise effective media for 
measuring operations. 
4. MakP. known the measuring 
mccfia. 
5. Trunsfer detailed data into 
fo~m showing comparisons 
and variances. 
6. Sug')8St corrective actions, if 
ncecled. 
7. Inform responsible members 
of i:1terprctations. 













With the advent of the computer the management information system was initially 
held to consist of electronic data processing (EDP). Nowadays it is 
generally recognised that data processing is merely one of the basic tools 
or inputs to the total information system~ What then is an MIS? 
Writers concerned with this area of management are mainly operations researchers 
and again a cult has developed to the effect that information system (MIS) 
is synonymous with decision-making - even with management itself. The title 
of Ross (1970) is 'Management by Information System' (could it be that we will 
find our answer here?), and inter alia he examines information as it affects 
each of the major functions of planning, organising, and controlling. No 
further detail on the management process itself is offered and all data 
pertaining to both the internal and external environment of the organisation 
is held to be quantifiable and able to be fed into the information system. 
Figure 3 shows this in diagrammatic form. 
But one does learn how to set up the "information-decision system", what 
processing methods to use, where to locate it within the organisation, and how 
to protect the manager from information overload by only providing him with 
information relevant to his decisional needs. The MIS has proved tremendously 
useful - indeed indispensable - in today's modern organisation on the 
operational and tactical levels. But on the strategic (managerial) level 
it is only an aid to decision-making and a monitor of the consequences of 
the decision once it has been made. It can tell us little of the management 
process itself nor of managerial decision-making. The name 11 information-
decision system" is an unfortunate misnomer. 
A recent work by Prince (1975) contains a small but not insignificant change: 
The analyst is urged to approach the information problem not from the standpoint 













TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE MIS 
Moior Steps in 
Management 
Process 
RECOGNlllON OF A 
PROBLEM OR AN 
OPPORTUNITY 
DEFINE PROBLEM OR 
OPPORTUNITY AND DEVELOP 








Moior Information Needs 
(1) Performance against pion 
(2) Environrnentol, competitive, and 
internal information concerning 
problems and opportunities 
Evaluation of (1) and (2) in order 
lo make o prediction or estimate of 
ollernotive courses 
Prediction of results for olternotiv!! 
courses of action 
Communicate details of pion and 
control standards 
Performance against pion 
REPORTS 
. ~ /PRODUCTS ~ t 
. ENGINEERING l ! PURCHASING 
RESEAR~ ::---....._ ~ /~ M~NUFACTURING 
I~ ~ \ 
FINANCE M I s INVENTORY 
\ ~ ~I 
PLA\ ~ / ! I~ o/TR1suT10N 
PERSONNEL SALES 
~ FORECASTS/ 












In sunmarising the contribution of the traditional decision-making, operations 
researchers, and management information theorists towards a cohesive theory 
of managerial functioning, the following quotation of Herbert Simon is 
particularly pertinent: 
"Except in matters of degree (e.g., the operations researchers tend to 
use rather high-powered mathematics), it is not clear that operations 
research embodies any philosophy different from that of Scientific 
management •.. no meaningful line can be drawn any more to demarcate 
operations research from scientific management or scientific 
management from management science" (1960:14-15) 
The Empirical School 
The work of the empirical school which is founded on a belief in empirical 













THE BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE SCHOOL 
The revolution in the study of organisations away from the formal structure 
to the study of the human aspects of organisational life began with the 
Hawthorne Experiments. In reviewing the work of the many researchers who 
have contributed to this body of knowledge I should like, at risk of boring 
the reader, to begin with a brief outline of Elton Mayo's work. 
The first part of the Experiments were conducted in the Relay Assembly Test 
Room between 1927 and 1932, although the findings were only published by 
Roethlisberger and Dickson in 1939. In manipulating the work conditions 
and periods in the Relay Room, Mayo and his co-workers found that output 
(productivity) rose to progressively higher levels regardless of how bad they 
made the work conditions. They concluded that the reason for the high morale 
(satisfaction) was that the girls felt special because they had been singled 
out for a research role. This selection showed that management thought them 
to be important. They developed good relationships with one another and with 
their supervisor because they had considerable freedom to develop their own 
pace and manner of work, and the social contact and easy relations (communication) 
amongst the girls made the work generally more pleasant. 
In reviewing this stage of the Experiment Homans {1941) says that the girls 
reported that the work "was fun" and that in the absence of the old supervisory 
control they could work freely and without anxiety. The events recorded in 
the Bank Wiring Room (which formed the second part of the Experiment) showed 
that if a worker is asked to accommodate himself to changes which he does 
not initiate then: {l) these changes deprive him of the meaning and significance 
which he attaches to his work, (2) frustration and an almost irrational 
exasperation is developed by the individuals who then (3) band together to 












Mayo and Roethlisberger conclude that this part of the Experiment showed that 
because of the social customs which had developed amongst them, the employees 
were unable to accommodate themselves to the rapid technical innovations 
which were introduced. 
Of course the Hawthorne Experiments had originally not been designed to study 
group dynamics but they showed that such groups were continually being formed 
amongst workers. In each a complex set of forces is at work and these 
findings drew the attention of theorists and practitioners to the importance 
of the informal system. 
In 1950 George Homans published his book 'The Human Group' which inter alia 
reviewed all the findings of the Hawthorne Experiments and proposed a system 
whereby the dynamics of the group could be analysed as an open system. 
Detailed analysis and discussion of this model is out of place here but 
I would merely point out that he shows a number of background factors (inputs) 
into the group and that two of the consequences (or outputs) are productivity 
and satisfaction of the group at large and the individuals within it. Since 
publication of Homans work as well as that of Cartwright and Zander (originally 
published in 1953} practically every aspect of the workings of human groups 
has been investigated. Researchers have concentrated on status mobility 
absolutes and congruence, power, the effects of leadership as well as 
structural characteristics. Hare (1962) in his 'Handbook of Small Group 
Research' lists 2000 such works. 
The next work of significance was performed by Jasinski who in 1956 
investigated the questions of satisfaction and communication amongst automobile 
assembly line workers. He found that increased opportunity to communicate 
correlated significantly with job satisfaction (interest). 
This was followed by Zaleznik, Christensen and Roethlisberger (1958) who 
studied aspects of group membership in relation to satisfaction and productivity 
in a manufacturing company. One of their findings was that both productivity 
and satisfac_tion were related to group membership in that regular group 













The original Assembly Line finding that general supervision was associated with 
high productivity was confirmed by Katz, Maccoby and Morse's research in a life 
insurance company in 1950. They found that a close or punitive style of 
supervision resulted in a high productive output. Similar research was 
conducted by Day and Hamblin in 1964 but in addition they were able to link 
productivity, satisfaction and supervision. Low productivity and 
dissatisfaction were positively correlated with a punitive supervisory style. 
An index of group cohesiveness was developed by Seashore (1954) and 
administered to a group of men working for a heavy machinery company in an 
effort to find a relationship between their cohesiveness, anxiety, and 
productivity when measured against the background of how much trust the groups 
had in management. The major conclusion was that greater group cohesiveness 
is associated with less anxiety, with higher productivity when confidence in 
management is high, and with lower productivity when this confidence is lacking. 
In other words there was a positive relationship between cohesiveness, 
productivity, and satisfaction (meaning trust of and support in management) 
and the absence of anxiety by the group. 
About this time some workers began to question the direction in which human 
relations research was going. They felt that in the same way as traditional 
scientific management had over-emphasised the importance of the formal system 
and structure, so the present work was beginning to over-emphasise the 
importance of the informal or psycho-social system. In an attempt to link 
the two, workers such as Trist and Bamforth (1951) working out of the Tavistock 
Institute developed a limited open system of organisation in which they 
attempted to link the social with the technological. In their coal-mining 
studies they arranged the formal structure of work so that it was physically 
impossible for the men to form meaningful informal relations and so satisfy 
their emotional needs. Freedom of communication was also severely curtailed. 
As could be predicted by earlier studies, the new technology (mechanical 












Meanwhile other workers had concentrated on the individual within the 
* organisation. Possibly the best example is Abraham Maslow whose 'Motivation 
and Personality' appeared in 1954. This emphasis on the individual's 
hierarchical needs led to talk of "people versus pyramids" - the individual's 
satisfaction in conflict with the dictates of the formal organisation - and a 
curious development began to take place in the literature. This development 
is best illustrated by highlighting the work of two writers, Chris Argyris 
and Warren Bennis. 
Argyris (1957) draws heavily on the findings of traditional psychology as 
well as the work of Maslow. He says that aspects of structure such as unity 
of command, span of control, and hierarchy merely served to "compound the 
felony 11 of making the individual feel inadequate and that individuals within 
an organisation are asked 11 to produce under conditions tantamount to 
psychological failure. 11 
Further, if these formal structures are to remain and if the individual is 
striving for a level of self-actualisation (Maslow) then conflict between the 
organisation and the individual is inevitable. He dismisses the human relations 
movement as a 11 fad 11 and does not see it as the answer to resolution of this 
conflict. His is therefore a pessimistic view. He asks: 
11 How is it possible to create an organisation in which the individuals 
may obtain optimum expression and simultaneously in which the organisation 
itself may obtain optimum satisfaction of its demands? 11 (1957:156) 
Elsewhere he accepts the conclusion of the Hawthorne Studies (that increased 
productivity is a function of improved human relations) when he says that 
11 the research by Mayo, Roeth l i sberger and Di ck son presented concrete evidence 
showing that productivity and human relations were intimately tied up. Poor 
human relations, wrote the authors, creates low production. 11 And he goes on 
to suggest three possibilities which, whilst not solving the dilemma, might 
enhance the work and lead to greater potentiality. These are (1) job enlargement, 













(2) employee-centred leadership {precisely what the human relations movement 
* stood for) and (3) reality leadership. 
In contrast to this pessimistic view Bennis prevents a viewpoint which might 
be described as 'qualified optimism.• Identifying with other writers such 
as Abraham Zaleznik, Mason Haire, Herbert Simon, and Alvin Gouldner {whom 
he calls 'the revisionists'), he says that their viewpoint is held mainly 
as a result of new research findings and 11 some reality considerations": 
11 In general they share a common concern for revising the native, 
unsubstantiated, and unrealistic aspects of the human relations approach 
without sacrificing its radical departure from traditional theory. 
The revisionists then, recognised clearly that organisational theory 
must take into account such factors as purpose and goal, status and 
power differentials, and hierarchy" (1966:69-70) 
And almost in answer to Argyris 1 question, Bennis says that 11 it is my contention 
that effective leadership depends primarily on mediating between the 
individual and the organisation in such a way that both can obtain maximum 
sati sfaction 11 ( 1966 :66) 
Open Systems Theorists 
Kenneth Boulding's general systems theory had appeared in 1956. Now, prompted 
by this work and by the writings of the revisionists, a number of authors 
proposed theories of open system models for organisations. We have already 
seen those of George Homans as applied to the group and that of Trist and 
Bamforth. The two social psychologists, Katz and Kahn, in 1966 published 
** their overlapping role set in which they see roles as the "building blocks" 
of the 11 contrived 11 social system. In fact these two writers \almost seem to 
* It is interesting to note that Mason Haire (1959a) defines 'reality leadership' 
as "flexible leadership tailored to the situation, not too directive, not too 
non-directive, not too employee-centred, but firm where it should be firm. 11 












be echoing Bennis' words when they suggest that the psychological approach had 
generally ignored or had not dealt effectively with the facts of structure and 
social organisation. They, like Kast and Rosenzweig (1970), use systems 
concepts to develop an integrated model to try and overcome the short-coming. 
All these models have in common an acceptance that the organisation does not 
exist in isolation but rather is part of a dynamic environment and that the 
sub-systems within the organisation are all mutually interactive. All also 
seek to combine the informal and formal - indeed all organisational phenomena -
into an integrated whole or gestalt. They are however merely models or 
perspectives - ways of viewing the organisation - rather than precise 
experimental predictions as to how it will behave. They are theories. 
INTERIM SUMMARY 
Perhaps we could pause at this stage and summarise the empirical findings of 
the early human relations researchers up to the middle 1950 1 s. These findings 






Interaction opportunity (communication) and productive output 
are both positively correlated with satisfaction 
Both productivity and satisfaction are outputs of group 
interaction 
Communication is related to positive job satisfaction 
Both positive productivity and satisfaction are features of 
cohesive groups 
Increased cohesiveness is associated with high productivity 
when confidence in management is high. 
In addition a belief in open systems theory would carry with it an acceptance 
that there are environmental, technological, and leadership factors which 
would affect various aspects of organisation functioning. Any degree of 













From these findings alone we might conclude that group satisfaction, 
communication, cohesiveness and productivity are all related to one 
another in some way. 
In completing this section of the review I should like to mention the 
work of the sociologist Gouldner who first published his theory of the 
Norm of Reciprocity in 1960. In essence this states that neither the 
organisation (management) nor the worker is there to be exploited by 
the other but rather that both inherit rights and obligations: Each 
is under a tacit unwritten psychological contract. This he calls the 
norm of reciprocity which must remain stable if the organisation itself 
is not to be undermined: - "Social System Stability, then, presumably 
depends in part on the mutually contingent exchange of gratifications. 
That is, on reciprocity as exchange." (1975:237). 
More importantly for our purposes he takes pains to point out that this 
functional reciprocity is not equal: "While the survival defined as 
the extreme case of a complete lack of reciprocity may be rare, the 
larger class of unequal exchanges, of which survivals are a part, is 
frequent. The tacit conception of survivals as entailing no reciprocity 













THE LATER RESEARCHERS 
What empirical studies and findings have there been in the last 15 years? 
Logically one would expect that the work of the early theorists would have 
been built on. Unfortunately things were not that simple. Interest in the 
area was running high and the number of research findings had literally 
exploded. Locke in 1969 counted over 4000 articles and at the same time 
noted that "the understanding of the causes of job satisfaction has not been 
advanced at a pace commensurate with research effort. 11 
In addition there was another unhappy development: no agreement could be 
reached on the exact meaning of 'satisfaction. 1 The literature tried to 
distinguish between 'overall job satisfaction' and satisfaction with a 
particular facet of the job. There were definitions that talked about 
'direct affect ratings' and those which were statements about the causation 
of satisfaction. Wanous and Lawler (1972) reviewed 9 different operational 
definitions of job satisfaction. At the same time they noted that both 
theory and research were needed to detail the relationships between the 
different ways of measuring satisfaction and 'the number of independent and 
dependent variables.• 
1970 marked a turning point in the job satisfaction research when Locke 
published a paper in which he argued that both satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
were properly conceived of as the outcomes of action, but the effect of 
performance on satisfaction is viewed as a function of the degree to which 
performance entails or leads to the attainment of the individual's important 
job values. Locke acknowledged that emotions such as satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction were important incentives to action in that they entailed 
approach and avoidance tendencies, but he did not see them as determining 
action. He rather postulated that performance was the direct result of the 
individual's specific task or work goals and that these goals were in turn 
determined by the individual's values, knowledge and beliefs in the context 












Locke's work was theoretical but from this conceptual analysis Nathanson 
and Becker (1973) were able to 9erive three hypotheses which they tested on 
103 physicians working in clinics. The correlational data supported the 
hypotheses and indicated that Locke's analysis was substantially correct. 
8ut these findings - the pattern of association between satisfaction and 
performance - were the result of testing a professional group of people 
where the individual has internalised a well-defined set of job values. 
Would the findings hold true for non-professionals, for workers on lower levels? 
In a study conducted into the relationship between contingent and non-contingent 
rewards, job satisfaction and task performance, Cherrington et al (1971) 
proposed that there was no inherent relationship between satisfaction and 
productivity and that the relationships between these two variables were 
dependent performance-reward contingencies. {This hypothesis in direct 
contradiction to the findings of Zaleznik et al in 1958). However, 
significant positive correlations were found between satisfaction and 
productivity whilst the correlations for non-contingent rewards were 
significantly negative. 
Hamner and Harnett lent further support to Locke's 1970 theory when in 1974 
they examined the effects that goals have on performance and the effects 
that this performance has on purported levels of satisfaction in a structured 
task under competitive conditions. Their results indicated that the most 
immediate and direct motivational determinant of task performance was the 
subject's goal. Both satisfaction and performance were found to be strongly 
related to the point where a person exceeds his goal or his 'reference person's' 
outcome. This reference person is normally a person performing the 
leadership role. 
RESEARCH INTO THE CAUSALITY OF THE SATISFACTION-PRODUCTIVITY RELATIONSHIP 
In 1974 Wanous obtained data from 80 female telephonists and conducted a 
causal-correlational analysis of the job satisfaction and performance relationship. 












positive for overall job satisfaction and performance, did not clearly 
indicate the direction of the causality .. When job satisfaction was split 
into extrinsic and intrinsic components the data suggested that performance 
caused intrinsic satisfaction (satisfying higher needs) and that extrinsic 
satisfaction (the reward system) caused performance. This aspect of the 
study supported the view already held by Porter and Lawler (1968), Locke (1970) 
and Sutermeister (1971), namely that performance was a much stronger cause 
of satisfaction than was the reverse. 
Wanous tentatively concluded that the data was in general agreement with a 
reciprocal causation view of satisfaction and performance, and this in turn 
was in agreement with the findings of Greene (1973) who had investigated this 
direction of causal influence in the relationship between merit pay satisfaction 
and performance. The hypotheses that merit pay caused increased productivity 
was not supported, but Greene's results had suggested the possibility of a 
reciprocal causation between satisfaction and productivity. 
Reflecting similar concern for the lack of understanding of the causes of 
performance Staw (1975) stated that the research supporting most organisational 
theories was based upon correlational data and contained ''hypothesised 
independent variables which can ei her be the cause of performances, the 
effects of performance, co-variates of third variables, or the result of a 
network of reciprocal causation.'' 
Staw held the view that the resolution of the "ambiguity in causal inference 
is one of the most pressing problems in the field" and thus set out in his 
paper a general alternative interpretation of the correlational findings 
which were said to link perceptual or questionnaire methods to the data on 
performance. He postulated that organisational participants possess theories 
of performance just as organisational researchers do and that these respondents 
will use their knowledge of performance as a cue by which they attribute 
characteristics to themselves, to their work group, and to their organisation 
as a whole. According to this attributional hypothesis, self-report data on 
organisational characteristics may actually represent the consequences rather 












Staw tested this alternative interpretation in an experiment in which knowledge 
of the group performance was a manipulated independent variable and the result 
indicated that this independent variable affected the level of influence, the 
cohesiveness, as well as the communication, motivation and openness to change 
attributed by members to their work group. 
I 
At about this time it became apparent to these researchers that if they were 
to progress further in their investigation of the relationship between 
satisfaction and productivity then they would have to consider leader behaviour 
as well. (Naturally). Also, work on the leadership variable itself was 
beginning to generate data on satisfaction and productivity. This in turn 
had caused the satisfaction-productivity workers to re-examine their own work 
and realise that the research findings (which we have reviewed above) had been 
conducted under varying situational conditions and that they had 
by-and-large taken the form of an examination of the relationship between 
differing leadership styles, moderated by a variety of variables on either 
satisfaction or performance. 
* And so Kerr et al (1974), noting that the Ohio State Leadership Studies had 
been criticised on the grounds that they lacked a conceptual base and had 
failed to take the situational variable into account, published an article 
in which they reviewed the published literature involving the leader behaviour 
dimensions of 'Consideration' and 'Initiating Structure.' They concluded 
from their review that amongst the variables found by researchers to 
significantly moderate the relationship between leader behaviour, satisfaction, 
and performance were, inter alia, (1) the subordinates need for information 
(2) the job level (3) the subordinates expectations of leader behaviour (4) the 
perceived organisational independence (5) the leader's similarity of attitudes 
and behaviour to managerial style of higher management (6) the presence of 
external stress and (7) the degree of autonomy. 
The Ohio State Leadership Studies concepts of 'Consideration' and 1Initiating 












And in a review of similar consideration, initiating structure and organisational 
criteria, Kerr and Schriesheim (1974) noted that the knowledge concerning 
the nature of causality between leader behaviour predictors and satisfaction, 
morale, and performance was still far from complete because 'we still know 
almost nothing about the conditions under which leader behaviour is the cause 
of subordinate outcomes and those where leader behaviour is largely the result.' 
They also said that the static correlational analysis which had been continually 
utilised by all but a few of the studies was not in their opinion an adequate 
technique to shed further light on this issue. 
No doubt prompted by this explicit self-doubt as to the direction in which 
the research was progressing, Greene (1975) investigated the direction of the 
causal influence in the relationships between the leader and follower variables 
in order that he might possibly answer questions such as : Does a manager's 
leadership style (in particular consideration and initiating structure) have 
greater effect on his subordinates' performance and satisfaction or is the 
opposite direction of causality stronger? To what extent are the relationships 
between these variables reciprocal in nature? 
In a somewhat mammoth study Greene administered a Leader Behaviour Description 
Questionnaire to 103 first-line managers spread over three organisations. 
Simultaneously 2 subordinates of each manager completed a 4-item Work 
Satisfaction Questionnaire. Two subordinate peers rated each subordinate's 
performance, and these measures were taken on three separate occasions one 
month apart. The results of the cross-lagged correlations on consideration and 
subordinate satisfaction indicated that the 1 consideration-causes-subordinate-
satisfaction1 co-efficients were relatively strong, significant, and 
considerably stronger than the corresponding •satisfaction-causes-consideration• 
co-efficients. The static correlations were consistently of a lesser 












Greene concluded that his study provided indications that consideration 
caused subordinate satisfaction and that conversely, subordinate performance 
caused both leader consideration and structure across conditions. When 
the relationship between initiating structure and subordinate performance 
was moderated by consideration, there was evidence of reciprocal causation. 
By implication then we have a circular causal relationship where satisfaction 
is generated by achieving performance goals, which in turn are determined 
by the individual knowledge, values and beliefs in the context of the 
situation as perceived by the subordinate. 
The reciprocal cause-and-effect relationship suggested by Wanous (1974), 
and Greene (1973) and supported by the work of Levine (1973) and Greene (1975) 
had been confirmed. 













THE LEADERSHIP THEORISTS 
Introduction 
In reviewing the leadership literature one is immediately struck by the lack 
of consensus as to just what it is that these theorists are studying and the 
meaning of the words that they use to describe. their work: Definitions are 
myriad and words such as 'influence•, •power', and 'authority' are used with 
an abandon which leaves the reader in no doubt that they are indeed not sure 
of exactly what they mean. 
Fiedler cites nearly a dozen different definitions and concludes that a leader 
is 'the individual in the group given the task of directing and co-ordinating 
task-relevant group activities or who, in the absence of a designated leader, 
carries the primary responsibility for performing these functions in the 
group• {1967:2). 
Leadership is defined by Davis as 1 the. ability to persuade others to seek 
defined objectives enthusiastically .. It is the human factor which binds a 
group and motivates it towards goals' (1972:100). Katz and Kahn conclude 
that 'leadership appears in social science literature with three major meanings: 
as the attribute of a position, as the characteristic of a person, and as a 
category of behaviour• (1966:301) and they cite the five types of power 
outlined by French and Raven (1950) as being the means by which he exerts 
this influence. 
One can thus see that leadership, although a vague concept, must be created and 
sustained by that person who is in a position to exert influence over others. 












therefore be looked upon as 'followship.' Three elements are involved: the 
leader himself, the led, and the particular situation. 
THE PERSONALITY TRAIT THEORISTS 
The earliest investigations into the nature of leadership was by the trait 
theorists who sought to isolate those characteristics which separated the 
effective from the ineffective manager. It is of course strictly incorrect 
to call these researchers theorists as their work generally resulted in the 
compilation of long lists of characteristics. Nor did they investigate 
leadership as such but rather management: all their investigations were 
performed on practising managers and executors. 
Beginning with the work of Bernard (1926) and prompted by the results of the 
Hawthorne Experiments of 1927 and the subsequent publication of 'Management 
and the Worker' by Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), this approach has 
attracted many proponents to its ranks. No doubt they have been encouraged 
by the rise of the entrepreneur and the growth of big business in America as 
well as the continued acceptance by military commanders of this type of 
prescription. Indeed, in reading the lists of supposedly effective traits 
one gets the picture of a combination between a power-mad business tycoon and 
a somewhat egotistical fearless fighter. 
The earlier work tended to concentrate on physical characteristics but the 
conclusion is that no universal physical trait can be described: 
"The general consensus today is that leaders cannot be identified by 
whether or not they are tall or short, fat or skinny, blonde or brunette, 
black or white. Although many individuals who are physically big or 
strong seem also to have an awesome mystique associated with their person, 
such characteristics should not properly be envisioned as prerequisites 
of leadership ability" {Sikula, 1976:120) 
Turning their attention from the physical to psychological variables, this 
school suggested traits such as honesty, loyalty and ambition. They were in 












possess high degrees of these particular traits: a person did not have to be 
loyal or intelligent or ambitious in order to be a good leader (manager). 
Although over a hundred 'essential' traits of the s~ccessful leader have been 
identified, no consistent relationship has been found between these trait 
descriptions and leadership behaviour (Sank, 1974:423). In examining extensive 
reviews, Fleishman et al (1955) assert that "one is struck by the diversity of 
personal traits which distinguish leaders from non-leaders. Moreover, traits 
imputed to leaders in one study often characterise non-leaders in another 
study. The general result of this one-sided approach to leadership has been 
to demonstrate the absence of consistent general traits." (underlining mine) 
Work by two later researchers in this field merit specific mention: Ghiselli 
(1959) produced a list of key traits consisting of 'intelligence', 'initiative', 
'supervisory ability', 'self-assurance' and 'perceived occupational level' 
(the latter referring to where on the socio-economic scale a person sees 
himself as belonging). Ghiselli has been able to show that these traits are 
possessed in different measure by leaders at different levels in the 
organisation. 
More recently Rupert (1967) conducted an international survey amongst leaders 
of commerce in Britain, the United States and South Africa by simply asking 
his select sample to write to him outlining those characteristics which 
they felt were essential in a top management position. From these missives 
he constructed a leadership check-list (most of which is predictably the same 
as earlier work) but two features stand out: for the first time there is 
mention of 'the need for flexibility' and a strong consensus that the 
development and maintenance of open channels of communi ca ti on are necessary. 
Generally the trait theorists have not produced very clear-cut results because 
they have not considered the whole leadership environment: they consider 
one part (personal traits) and ignore the group that constitutes the followers 
and the situation. The conclusion reached by the trait theorists themselves 
is that traits which are important in some situations are not important in 












identify ·leadership ability in some environments but such characteristics 
are not universal in all situations•• (1976:122). 
THE BEHAVIOURAL STYLE THEORISTS 
One-Best-Way Theories 
The theories of McGregor, Blake and Mouton, Reddin and Likert have been 
referred to by Stogdill (1974) as the Humanistic Theories because they view 
the worker in the organisation - which is by nature structured and controlled -
as being a motivated organism. They therefore see the function of 
leadership in terms of providing freedom for the individual to realise his 
own motivational potential for the fulfilment of his own needs whilst at 
the same time contributing towards the accomplishment of organisational goals. 
Douglas McGregor (1960) classifies managers according to two basic leadership 
styles, Authoritarian and Egalitarian, which he calls respectively Theory X 
and Theory Y. Theory Xis based on the assumption that people are passive 
and resistant to organisational needs. Theory Y assumes that people already 
possess motivation as well as a desire for responsibility and therefore attempt 
to arrange organisational conditions to facilitate the fulfilment of their 
own needs whilst directing their efforts to achieve organisational objectives. 
McGregor sees Theory X assumptions (a legacy of Taylor's Scientific Management) 
as outdated and no longer applying to Western man who lives in democratic 
societies with rising standards of living and an increasing level of 
education. His Ideal Manager holds to a Theory Y assumption and will thus 
structure the work situation to the mutual benefit of the employees and the 
organisation (this prescriptive approach of McGregor's reminds one in 
particular of the work of Chris Argyris). 
Likert 1 s (1961) approach to leadership is based on his view that management 
of the human component of the organisation is the manager's most important 












He identifies four leadership styles ranging from System l (exploitative) 
System 2 (authoritarian) System 3 (consultative) and System 4 which he labels 
the participative approach. Using his Organisational Profiles which relate 
to various organisational characteristics, individual managers can plot the 
effect of the respective power styles on organisational effectiveness. He 
concludes that the participative style is the best approach to leadership. 
"System four is 'appreciably more complexed than other systems. It 
requires greater learning and appreciably greater skill to use it well 
but it yields impressively better results which are evident whenever 
accurate performance measurements are obtained" (1967:46) 
Blake and Mouton (1964) have conceptualized leadership in terms of a 9,9 
Managerial Grid on which Concern for People represents one axis and Concern 
for Production the other. They identify 5 management styles which are placed 
on the Grid. Four of them have come to have the common names of Humanist, 
Autocrat, Compromiser and Abrogator and their Ideal Leader is one who 
consistently displays the highest regard for both people (process) and 
production (structure). 
Criticism 
One general criticism which can be levelled at all the One-Best-Way Theorists 
is that to varying extents they fail to take account of the situational 
variable which must exist in any leadership environment. McGregor, in 
proposing an 'either - or' choice, is simply being unrealistic when one 
thinks of the different situations which a manager has to face in any given day. 
For this reason it is often felt that Blake and Mouton's ideas are a somewhat 
better proposition than McGregor's because they point out that there are not two 
extremes to the type of leadership styles (the manager is not faced with an 
either-or choice) and he may thus be high on both production and employee 












However, the 9,9 style assumes that conflict between employees and organisational 
objectives are not inevitable,whereas such conflicts are present in any 
organisation. The Grid attempts to attack this problem first by presenting 
a behavioural model of the 9,9 manager ( one who uses candour, teamwork and 
participation) to construct a framework of mutually agreed-upon goals and 
secondly, by providing a detailed step-by-step strategy for helping managers 
to learn how to use the 9,9 style. 
These explanations have not been sufficient to satisfy opponents of the Blake 
and Mouton model. Gordon, in a very fair and objective evaluation of the 
Grid states: 
11 In the matter of conflict resolution, i.e. how decisions are made, how 
power is distributed, how open people are with each other, Blake has made 
a very important contribution to management thinking. If all Blake had 
offered was a framework that would be the end of it but he went one better 
than that. He devised the first most complete package for those who 
wished to study 00 11 ( 1970: 44) 
Concerning the training programme, Gordon feels that Blake and Mouton have 
offered a framework that is too stringent - that the time spent on debates 
boils down to one of five arguments - and he says that this is so because the 
instruments of the training course and the time pressures ensure that the 
di_scussion seldom deviates from the group itself. In other words one is forced 
to choose from amongst one of the given styles. If what Gordon says is 
true then it could be said that participation in Grid training results in 
a certain element of brainwashing: that the Grid restricts peoples' thinking 
so that they end up espousing the same ideas as one another. One of the 
desirable behaviours of the 9,9 style is open and candid communication and Gordon 
feels that this can certainly not be achieved by a restrictive set of ideas 
to refer to: "the indoctrination ·is infectious ... {the subject) feeling 












A few theorists have attempted to modify the Grid concept in order to overcome 
its critics. The most prominent of these is Reddin (1970) who has merely 
added a time dimension. The best manager now becomes the 9,9,9 because 
of his maximum concern for production and people and because this dual 
concern is consistent or lasts indefinitely through time instead of being 
temporary. Although this improves the Grid concept slightly it does not 
alleviate Gordonism nor does it begin to approximate to the real life 
situation of the manager. 
Likert's theory had been empirically tested inter alia by Butterfield and 
Farris (1974} who tested System 4 on 13 Brazilian development banks and 
found that although the employees were most satisfied with a participative 
group management system, the theory of management systems measured by the 
Organisational Profile was only partially supported. 
This finding is not surprising when one considers that in certain situations 
(and when dealing with certain people) it may be necessary to employ the 
autocratic type of power style. It is essential that a leader realises 
the limitations of the participative style so that he does not use it regardless. 
Both autocratic and participative styles have advantages and disadvantages 
to their usage. Whilst the former are obvious we can perhaps list bri.efly 
some of the disadvantages of participation in certain situations: It can 
be enormously time-consuming and therefore inefficient. Some managers use 
participation as a way of avoiding responsibility and use of this style 
can degenerate into a complete loss of managerial control. In addition, 
employees resent the invitation to offer recommendations in those situations 
where such recommendations cannot be implemented or where their knowledge 
patently precludes them from making a meaningful contribution. 
THE THEORY OF DAVIS 
Davis (1972) has also attempted to synthesise and integrate much of the 
literature pertaining to power styles of leadership into a four-fold 
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He has thus incorporated the theories of McGregor, Blake and Mouton, as well 
as the need hierarchy of Maslow (1954) and the two-factor theory of Herzberg 
(1966). But unlike Likert, Davis has a matrix of terms and phrases that 
correspond to one of the four types of power styles which he h~s termed 
' depends on. ' 
The relationship between Davis' theory and other leadership ideas is shown 
in Table 1. 
The advantage of Davis' system is that the various power styles of leadership 
can be compared, constrasted and analysed with reference to what are 
currently considered to be important concepts such as teamwork, self-realisation, 
participation and maintenance of group process etc.. It thus has value. 
But it still does not deal adequately with the situational variable so 
that it can be applied to the real world problems of the manager. 
OHIO STATE LEADERSHIP STUDIES 
The Ohio Studies - work at the University Bureau of Business Research began 
in the late 1940's and continued up until approximately 1965. Numerous books 
and many articles have been written on the research findings of this group. 
It is therefore not possible to present anything like a comprehensive 
review of this work but much of it shows a common methodology. This 
consisted of three basic steps: 
1. An extensive list of statements was compiled. Frequently this was 
in excess of 500 items and was designed to cover all the aspects 
of the job which was to be studied. These stat~ments came from 
many different sources including job de~criptions, management 
literature, the subjects themselves as well as the personal 
experiences of the researchers. 
2. Questionnaires. The list of statements was administered to the 
subjects and each statement was presented in a Semantic Differential 
form. 
3. Isolation of basic factors. The qvestionnaires were then analysed 
statistically (usually by factor analysis) and sets of related 













This research method was used over the years to study many different types of 
managers from supervisors to military personnel to labour union leaders, and 
the aspects of the jobs have ranged over responsibility and authority, into 
personal activity, job satisfaction, and managerial style. A typology of 
managerial functions was compiled (initially of 14 functions and later reduced) 
but these functions were alwa~s expressed in Fayollian tenninology such as 
planning, co-ordination, evaluation, etcetera. 
Perhaps two of the Ohio Studies merit more detailed consideration. Those of 
Fleishman (1953) and Hemphill (1959 and 1960). 
Fleishman started off with a list of 1800 statements which he then reduced 
to 150. From these he distilled 9 dimensions of leadership behaviour 
(integration, communication, production emphasis, representation, fraternisation, 
organisation, evaluation, initiation, and domination). After a first 
administration in which he found that the items on the questionnaire lacked 
independence, Fleishman readministered it to a number of groups of subjects: 
300 airforce crew members were asked to describe their commanders, 220 foremen 
were asked to describe their supervisors, and 394 workers were asked to 
describe their foremen. The results were then factor analysed and Fleishman 
came to the conclusion that 'practically all variations could be accounted 
for by •.• two major dimensions' (1953:4). 
Consideration, or the extent to which the leader was "considerate of his 
workers' feelings. This reflected the 'human relations' aspects of 
group leadership. 
Initiating Structure which reflected the extent to which the leader 
facilitated group interactions towards goal attainment. He was said 
to do this by planning, communicating, scheduling, criticising and 
trying out new ideas (1953:2). 
The title of Fleishman's (1953) paper is "The Description of Supervisory 
Behavior" and therefore one eagerly anticipates some sort of enlightenment 
as one patiently reads through the description of the mammoth list of items, 
the administration to hundreds of subjects, anq the detailed (statistically 
pure and correct) analysis of the data, only to be told at the end that all 
work can be described in tenns of 'consideration• and 'initiating structure. 1 
See also Fleishman et al (1955), Fleishman and Harris (1962). Further, Woodward's 













A more recent study is that by Hemphill (1959 and 1960) who began by compiling 
a list of 1500 statements culled from the literature, from interviewing 
executives, and by extracting terms from job descriptions. From these 
statements he selected 575 of them and this revised list of statements was 
~, administered to 96 executives in 5 different firms who were spread over 
3 levels (upper, middle and lower management). They were asked to rate the 
extent to which each statement applied to their job. Responses from 93 
of the original sample were evaluated against each other and no statistically 
significant differences or similarities amongst the 5 companies or across 
the 3 levels could be found. Similarities only began to appear when responses 
from subjects occupying 5 functional areas were separated. In other words 
people occupying the same functional position appeared to show similarities. 
Hemphill then performed a factor analysis and from this isolated 10 1 clusters 
of statements' or different types of jobs. He then tabulated the 10 factors 
against the three management levels and the 5 functional areas. 
His findings indicated that upper management tended to rank highest on items 
such as human affairs, planning and broad power, whilst the lower levels were 
more concerned with work supervision and technical products and markets 
regarding the functional areas. Rand D appeared strong on staff services, 
planning, technical products, and services, whilst manufacturing and 
sales were strong on business control. 
In an even later study Mahoney, Jerdee and Carroll (1963) of the University 
of Minnesota used the Ohio classification to study 452 managers by interview. 
The subjects studied came from a wide range of company types and covered 
supervisors to presidents. They were asked how they allocated their time 
amongst the 8 categories of supervision, planning, co-ordinating, evaluating, 
investigating, negotiating, staffing, and representing. 
The results showed that 50 per cent of their time could be accounted for by 












Generally speaking there has been little interest shown in the Ohio Studies 
outside of that band of disciples which has seen fit to carry on with this 
line of research. Considering the amount of time, expenditure and effort 
which have gone into them for so many years it is indeed a pity that their 
results could not have been more meaningful. 
But Fleishman's (1953) over-simplistic reduction to the two factors of 
consideration and initiating structure sparked an avalanche of research. And 
notwithstanding Campbell et al 's remarking that: 
"The many studies using questionnaires and checklists for rating and 
describing managerial job behavior led, through factor analysis, to just 
two basic dimensions of managerial behavior. Certainly, this must be an 
over-simplification of the characteristics and full range of behaviors 
demanded by managerial jobs!" (1970:85) 
this type of research became an unfortunate and unwanted legacy - a legacy 
which persists right up to the present day. 
Cri ti ci sm 
Two severe criticisms can be identified: 
1. The Choice and Term nology of the Statements 
Whilst the statements to be administered were very numerous they were always 
· expressed in the vague traditional terminology of 'function' inherited by 
Fayal. Also, very little care went into the actual choice of statements. 
They were collected from almost every conceivable source but with very little 
regard for what aspect of managerial work might have been left out: There 
was no check as to whether the list was complete. The managerial subject 
was therefore forced into responding to a list of statements which (according 
* to his mind) might not have described all that he did and was expressed 
in terminology with which he might not have agreed. 












2. Methodology of Administration 
There was no way in which the Ohio Researchers could check that the data which 
they got from the managers was correct because what it reflected was the 
managers perception of the job rather than the job itself. In other words 
there is a vast difference between what he actually does and what he thinks 
* he does. 
THE SITUATIONAL THEORISTS 
In an attempt to overcome the criticism of 'it depends' levelled at the 
behavioural theorists, contingency models of leadership have been generated 
by Fred Fiedler and by Vroom and Yetton. 
FIEDLER'S CONTINGENCY MODEL 
Fiedler's model is by far the most widely known and it holds that the 
effectiveness of the leader is contingent upon (1) the leader's motivational 
pattern and (2) the degree to which the situation gives the leader power and 
influence. 
Fiedler and his associates worked out a leadership motivation measure which 
they called the 'esteem for the least preferred coworker' or LPC for short. 
In very simplified terms the person who describes his least-preferred coworker 
in relatively favourable terms is held to be basically motivated and to have 
close interpersonal relationships with others. By contrast, the person who 
rejects someone with whom he cannot work is basically motivated to accomplish 
or achieve on the task and he derives satisfaction from being recognised as 
having performed well on the task. In other words he is a 'task-motivated 
person' (1967:46). 
There is empirical evidence for this See inter alia Burns (1954), Horne and 












Classifying The Leadership Situations 
In trying to find a solution to the problem of 'what style when?', Fiedler 
devised a method that has the underlying assumption of leadership being 
essentially a work relationship involving power and influence (1974:119). 
The argument put forward for this assumption is that it is easier to be a 
leader when one has complete control than when one's control is weak and 
dependent upon the goodwill of others. Therefore Fiedler classified 
situations in terms of how much power and influence the situation gives to 
the leader and identified these situations on the basis of three variables: 
Leader-member relations- which he felt was the most important of the three 
(1967:143) - Task-structure and Position-power. 
Using this classification Fiedler then roughly ordered the groups as being 
high or low on each of these three dimensions. 
The practical implications of the theory for organisations suggest three 
approaches to getting the job done: Firstly, the leader's Position-power 
can be changed by giving him more or less power depending on his style. 
Secondly, the Task-structure could be altered to fit his style or thirdly, 
the Leader-member relations could be modified by either increasing or decreasing 
the homogeneity of the group. 
Criticism of the Model 
Fiedler's model has possibly generated more heated debate and criticism 
(both on methodological and non-methodological grounds) than any other. 
First to enter the debate were Graen et al (1970) who analysed the model and 
its supporting research from both a strategic and procedural prospective. 
They concluded that although antecedent probability based upon previously 
published reports appeared to be greater than zero, the evidential 
probability approached zero and thus cast grave doubt on the plausibility 












Fiedler, who had admitted that there were problems with the model when he 
originally published it .(1967:148) now leapt to defend his theory (1971) 
against Graen's attack. He pointed to specific precautions that must be 
taken if the validity of the model was to be accurately assessed. As a 
result of the specificity of his outlined precautions, Ashour (1973b) 
charged Fiedler with redefining the model in a 'method-bound-fashion' in 
order to protect it from the evidence of its invalidity. 
Ashour (1973b) in a comprehensive paper refuted the model on methodological 
and empirical grounds. He analysed Fiedler's (1971) cumulative results 
using Fisher's method of combining correlations. These results indicated 
that 6 out of 8 situational conditions failed the validity test. Ashour 
thus concluded that the empirical evidence bearing on the model had produced 
'contradictory results most of which l~cked statistical significance and 
·suggest that the model requires examination and monitoring of leaders' 
~ehaviour and group behaviours in different situational conditions, 
investigation of possible intervening linkages, as well as the possibility 
\ 
of short and long-term influences of different situational variables on 
· '' ;,!the different linkages' (1973a:353). He further suggested that larger 
1
.samples be used so as to clarify the lack:1of statistical significance. 
The most recent and methodologically r'igorous study of the Model has been 
by Vecchio (1977) who used 48 four-man groups of airforce enlisted personnel 
to conduct an examination of the validity of group performance predictions 
generated by the model. The results of univariate and multivariate·analyses 
of variance for a 2+2+2+2 factorial design failed to support the model. 
Vecchio concludes that it might not be valid. 
THE VROOM AND YETTON MODEL 
In or9er to increase the number of situational variants Vroom and Yetton (1973) 
developed a model which is somewhat similar to Fiedler's, but rather than use 
somewhat vague concepts such as 'participative' and 'democratic' leadership 
styles they distinguished seven behavioural approaches to decision-making which 












they believed had the potential for producing different outcomes under 
various conditions. They are therefore able to logically derive some 14 
distinct kinds of problems which are presented in the form of a decision tree. 
It is meant to have practical implication for the manager in that he can 
diagnose any problem facing him, ask questions in the correct sequence in 
order to define the problem, and to select the appropriate set of behaviours. 
Comment On The Contingency Models 
Besides the comments which have .been noted above, the contingency models can 
be criticised on other grounds which although not empirically validated are 
nevertheless no less significant. 
Both the Fiedler and Vroom-Yetton models vastly over-simplify the situation 
which the real world manager must face and overcome in the effective performance 
of his task. No manager can classify his problems into 8 (or 14) types. 
The combinations and permutations - the situational variants - are almost 
countless. In addition the Vroom-Yetton model is purely prescriptive. It 
describes what manager should do in various circumstances and does not begin 
to answer the question 9f what he should do in the event of not achievin~ 
the desired result. 
We can therefore safely conclude that the contingency models do not provide 
for effective leader role behaviour or effective task accomplishment. Davis 
(1972) summarises the situation very well when he says: 
"As society has learnt more about leadership it has become increasingly 
evident that strong leadership is a result of effective role behavior. 
Leadership can be shown by a person's acts more than by his traits. 
Traits influence acts, but so do followers, goals, and any environment 
in which the act occurs. It follows that organisational leadership is 
role behavior which unites and stimulates followers towards particular 













The theories on leadership which we have considered up to n6w have all centred 
around the leader's effectiveness. But because of the lack of progress in 
this direction and also because of contradictory findings (particularly on 
leader consideration and initiating structure), House (1971) returned to 
* Valence-expectancy theory of motivation and attempted to adapt it to leader 
behaviour. This they called the Path-Goal Theory of Leadership. It is similar 
to VIE theory in that it is based upon various situational factors. 
Briefly Path-Goal Theory holds that (1) leader behaviour is acceptable and 
satisfying to subordinates insofar as they see it as instrumental in achieving 
their goals and (2) leader behaviour helps to motivate the subordinates to the 
extent that it makes pay-offs (rewards) contingent upon performance and thus 
assists the subordinates in achieving this good performance, mainly by 
reducing job-role ambiguity in the subordinate. 
Another branch of Path-Goal Theory sees leadership as the independent variable 
and subordinate attitude and behaviour as the dependent variable. Leader 
consideration has been shown to be positively related to subordinates• satisfaction 
when performing highly structured unambiguous tasks but less related to 
satisfaction under conditions of uncertainty - where the task is unstructured. 
This finding is consistent with Path-Goal predictions. However, the relationship 
between leader initiating structure and subordinate satisfaction was more 
positive under conditions of high task structure than under conditions of low 
task structure. This contradicts the basic Path-Goal Theory (Stinson and 
Johnson, 1975). 
It can be seen that Path-Goal Theory closely resembles both the Fiedler and the 
Vroom-Yetton models of leadership in its structure but differs chiefly in 
terms of the variables that it considers to be more important in the postulation 
of the underlying processes through which these variables operate. It appears 
to be less explicit than the Vroom-Yetton model but more explicit than Fiedler. 
For a discussion on the nature and limitations of Valence-instrumentality-expectancy 
(VIE) theory, see Vroom, V.J., 'Work and Motivation', New York: Wiley, 1964, in 
Huse and Bowditch (1977:101-105) and Lawler, E.E., and Suttle, J.L., 'Expectancy 
theory and job behavior', Organisational Behaviour and Human Performance, 1973, 












From the findings of House (1971), Stinson and Johnson (1975) as well as 
others, Orpen ( 1977) argues that 11 the prediction that the more structured the 
task the more positive the relationship between consideration and satisfaction, 
will hold for subordinates with strong and weak needs for independence and 
achievement. 11 He goes on to generate four additional hypotheses suggested 
by the Path-Goal model: 
1. 11 Under unstructured task conditions the re 1 ationshi p between 
consideration and subordinate satisfaction will not differ 
significantly for subordinates with strong needs for achievement 
and independenc~ and for subordinate with weak needs. 
2. Under structured task conditions the relationship between 
consideration and subordinate satisfaction will not differ 
significantly for subordinates with strong needs for achievement 
and independence and for subordinates with weak needs. 
3. For subordinates with weak needs for achievement and independence 
the relationship between consideration and subordinate satisfaction 
will be significantly more positive under structured task 
conditions than under unstructured task conditions. 
4. For subordinates with strong needs for achievement and independence 
the relationship between consideration and subordinate satisfaction 
will be significantly more positive under structured task conditions 
than under unstructured task con di ti ons. 11 ( 1977:23) 
Orpen then tested these hypotheses by means of a questionnaire containing 
the various measures administered to 156 low-level managers spread over 4 
manufacturing firms. 
The predicted effect was only shown to hold true under structured task 
conditions, whereas initiating structure was positively related to satisfaction 
under unstructured conditions 11 irrespective of individual differences. 
This is very reminiscent of Fiedler's original (1963) finding which showed 
that under unstructured conditions where group member relations were good 
(Condition 3) a directive style of leadership was called for because in its 
absence "the group is likely to fall apart and the leader's active intervention 













AN INTERIM EVALUATION 
The reader will have noticed that the information in preceding Chapters has 
been presented with very limited comment and (largely) only that criticism 
which appears in the literature has been discussed. This has been deliberate. 
Because it is obviously not possible to discuss all the literature I have 
attempted to pick out some of that which is relevant to the topic and at the 
same time to convey a 'feel' of the philosophy predominating and the type of 
work being done in each. Whilst there has been a selection this has in no 
way been done to 'fit the case': on the contrary, the concentration has been 
on the mainstream and the principal works in each school. 
How then can we evaluate the contribution to our knowledge of managerial 
functioning? 
The Management Schools 
Great strides have been made by the management school even in very recent 
years, and as a result the manager has many more sophisticated (and much needed) 
tools at his disposal to help him in his work. However, the really solid 
progress has all been on what might be called the level of technique -
marketing, finance, operations research - where quantification is easier. 
But this type of useful knowledge always stops just short of the actual 












And in their rush to quantify everything (data fever) a certain objectivity 
has been lost. The computer remains an 'intellectual moron' in that it can 
only deal with numerical data and yet the majority of information which 
management needs for decision-making is non-numeric in nature. Not only is 
it unquantifiable but it remains just a 'feeling'. Some of it is not even 
describable. Whilst the decision school has given us tremendous aids to 
management it cannot ever be a substitute for a management process. Schoderbek 
puts it well: 
"There is to date no single system in operation that is truly integrated 
for complete management control .... management needs not only internally 
generated data but also all kinds of externally generated data (political, 
economic, social, legislative and the like)." (1971:311) 
While integrated management has not yet arrived neither has integrated systems. 
The prescriptive attitude of what 'ought to be' is such that they do not 
even ask how it is in fact done. No attempt is made to check the relevance 
of what is prescribed, they ignore the complex reality of the manager's world 
and, besides the long and often impressive list of 'how to' steps, there is 
no theory building. Galbraith sums it up: 
"Few subjects of earnest inquiry have been more unproductive than study 
of the modern large corporation. The reasons are clear. A vivid image 
of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the 
image then prevents pursuit of the reality" (cited in Mintzberg, 1977a:4) 
This preoccupation with prescription has resulted in two other severe and 
crippling barriers to further knowledge about the management process. Firstly, 
it has ensured that managerial functions go on being described in vague 
Fayollian terms which have thus become enshrined as part of the grand plan. 
Why? Koontz and O'Donnell: 
"This pattern (of classification of managerial functions) avoids 
artificial terminology, so that students and business men need not 
learn new definitions - rather, they may be forced to use terms with 
greater precision. It is also hoped that managers, using common tenns 
with ordinary meanings, will be encouraged to adopt an increasingly 
scientific approach to their important task ... 
The most useful method of classifying managerial functions is to group 
them around· the activities of planning, organising, staffing, directing 
and control. This classification is a helpful and realistic tool for 












Secondly, although the management schools have progressed insofar as they 
* have for many years included basic behavioural science findings within their 
framework - motivation, informal group functioning, communication - the overall 
approach sees these findings minimised and relegated to a poor second place. 
Acceptance is limited to the extent to which they fit the prescription and 
as a result advances in this area are ignored. Learned et al: 
"We have made room, to be sure, for the general manager's personal 
values, aspirations, and sense of social responsibility and in this 
respect we have gone beyond traditional organisational theory" (1969:759) 
It does indeed seem strange that the management school which is (by definition) 
so close to the real world does not venture out into the marketplace to 
find out how it is done, but should rather be content to pontificate from 
its lofty perch on the sidelines. 
·Sayles and Strauss' 'Human Behaviour in Organisations' (1966) first published 












The Behaviourist and Human Relations Schools 
The section on human relations has been similarly brief. It is just not 
possible to review some 50 years work and do justice to all of it. I have 
thus had to be selective. For example, research on job evaluation, wage and 
salary administration and many other aspects of personnel psychology such as 
training and development have not been dealt with. Findings in this area 
have been practically useful and have thus found some degree of acceptance 
in managerial practice. 
The work of the last 15 years on productivity and satisfaction was presented 
in some detail in order to follow the trend of the research as well as to 
compare these findings with those of the 'classical' research in this area. 
How do they compare? 
We have seen how the Mayo/Roethlisberger studies represented a breakthrough 
in organisational theory by identifying the existence of the informal structure. 
Their findings on the nature and inter-relatedness of various aspects of 
group dynamics and leadership behaviour were confirmed by subsequent workers 
{Zaleznik, Seashore and others) until by the late 1950's after publication 
of Homans' work a store of knowledge around the satisfaction-productivity-
cohesiveness-communication axis had been built up. This later research was 
all conducted in organisations and the importance of the leadership behaviour 
variable with its atte dant power and authority considerations was never lost 
sight of. Still later there was at all times a consideration of the 
environmental variables such as structure and technology. In short the 
experimental condition was treated in an open system manner. As a result 
much of this early research came to be accepted by the management school and 
in turn the importance of the informal structure had some impact upon 
organisational life and functioning - although as Feldberg says: 
''The majority of behavioral scientists would themselves be the first to 
admit that universal acceptance of many of even the most basic concepts 
is lacking ... Behavioural science's contributions to the business 
world are often, at best, speculative; it is not, therefore, surprising 
that some business executives regard behavioural scientists' proposals 












In contrast, the later researchers simply denied reality by studying the two 
variables of productivity and satisfaction in isolation. Only much later 
(circa 1970) did it become apparent to them that they would have to include 
the leadership variable if their research was to proceed further. Even then 
they 'compounded the felony' (to borrow Argyris' tenninology) when many of 
the workers concentrated on either satisfaction or productivity. The findings 
on communication and cohesiveness were in the majority of cases incidental 
to the main stated purpose of the research. Finally, not all of this research 
* ( particularly in the area of group dynamics ) was conducted within an 
organisational setting. 
This latter point merits special consideration. For what is true of diads 
and triads in a laboratory setting cannot simply be transferred on a macroscopic 
level to an organisation in the expectancy that the findings are going to 
hold true. The results of such experiments might have some use for social 
psychologists but their value to the organisational psychologist is almost nil. 
They do not contribute very much to our knowledge of organisational functioning. 
Let me substantiate this by briefly considering the subject of lateral 
communication: 
Everyone knows that communication takes place between departments in an 
organisation at all levels. Communication is not only upwards and downwards 
but also across. This we might look at as a 'fact' of organisational 
functioning. Modern organisation theory accepts this and calls it lateral 
** communication. Further, many empirical studies within organisations have 
shown that more communication takes.place laterally/horizontally than it 
does vertically. 
*Two Chapters in Cartwright and Zander (1960) are entitled "Communication in 
Experimentally created hierarchies" and "power relations in three-person groups. 11 
** For instance see J. Galbraith (1973) 'Designing Complex Organisations, as 












As a result of this lack of perspective the researchers are morassed in a sea 
of findings and a confusion of definitions. One cannot help but be struck by 
the incessant bickering which goes on in the literature. 
Because of all this the state of findings is almost the same as it was 15 years 
agp. I truly believe that the period 1960-1975 will go down as being the 
least productive in the history of behavioural science. 
Leadership Theories 
In the beginning the behavioural style theorists were switching the emphasis 
away from what a leader is and attempting to answer the question what does 
the leader do? We will see that they were unsuccessful in this because 
the inflexibility of style advocated by these workers did not provide for 
the changing situational variable in which the leader finds himself. Whilst 
these theories might not have been able to solve the riddle of leader 
effectiveness, they did shed a lot of light on the issue. They provided 
us with a very useful descriptive vocabulary and Blake and Mouton's theory 
in particular became widely used as a training tool. They called the attention 
of practising management to behavioural styles which if employed would 
improve human relations and can thus be thought of as an adjunct to the early 
human relation findings. In addition they have been accepted by the management 
school and by the more progressive practising manager. 
The existence of the category of the "depends on" in Davis' theory (originally 
published in 1967) more or less coincided with Fiedler's model which he 
published in the same year. Detailed consideration of Fiedler's work with 
its 8 situational variants as well as the Vroom-Yetton model with 14 led to 
the conclusion that the number of choices available to the leader to deal 
with the circumstances operating at the time were too narrow. In short one is 
left after reviewing all this research only with the knowledge that leadership 
consists of the three elements of leader, 1 ed, and situ a ti on, the correct 
'stance' or behaviour for the leader to adopt in order to be effective depends 
upon the situation, and this in turn depends upon the particular combination 












theoretically infinite. How then can a leader ensure that he is effective? 
The path-goal theory of House (1971) which looked like a promising avenue 
for leadership research when it was first proposed has generated a number of 
hypotheses, only some of which had been validated by the very latest research. 
Reviewing more than 5000 studies of leadership research which had been 
undertaken in the last 40 years, Stogdill {1974) suggests that "some topics 
and research designs have been overworked while other important questions 
remain relatively unexplored." He also notes that there has been "wasteful 
repetition of testing shopworn hypotheses accompanied by a general disregard 
for negative results 11 : Negative results which, considering the nature and 
direction of the research and the findings to date, I would suggest might 
hold more promise than the positive ones - a case of the least likely 
hypotheses being of most worth. 
We have seen that the earlier theorists set o~t to propose theories of 
leadership effectiveness in order that they could better understand 
managerial effectiveness. Later theorists have confused the two. This is 
incorrect, for although there is some disagreement as to what leadership 
is, there is agreement as to what it is not. Leadership is not managing. 
Kast and Rosenzweig say that: 
"Emphasis on co-ordinating task-oriented group activities seems to 
indicate that leading is synonymous with managing. Typically, however, 
management is considered to be a more broadly based function including 
activities other than leading. 11 (1970:321) 
Davis is even more definitive in isolating managerial functions from leadership: 
"Leadership is a part of management, but not all of it. A manager is 
required to plan and organise*, for example, but all we ask of the leader 
is that he gets others to follow ... Leadership is the ability to 
persuade others to seek defined objectives enthusiastically. It is the 
human factor which binds a group together and motivates it towards goals. 
Management activities such as planning, organising, and decision-making 
are dormant cacoons until the leader triggers the power of motivation 
in people and guides them towards goals. 11 (1967:96) 
In the same way as Human Relations has influenced Managerial School thinking, so 
the influence has been reciprocated. Hence Davis 1 Fayollian terminology which as 












And if we bear in mind the open system (which the organisation is) then 
the managerial subsystem is generally spoken of as pervading all the other 
subsystems. Its influence is felt everywhere and at all levels. Katz and 
Kahn say that 11 the managerial subsystem interpenetrates the other subsystems" 
(1966:211) and that 11 the managerial subsystem and the structure of authority 
are i nseparab le 11 ( 1966 :203). 
But the"effective manager (and leader in this case) gives orders. He decides 
what should be done according to the way he perceives the ever-changing 
environmental circumstances at a particular time. This would seem to indicate 
that effective management and effective leadership requires the utmost 
flexibility. 
It also means that a strong leader could be a weak manager - because he is weak 
in planning or some other managerial duty that is required of him. Thus 
the strong leader might motivate his group to accomplish goals but not in a 
direction that would serve organisational objectives. 
This in turn suggests something which is even more foreign to the human relations 
leadership theorists, namely that the prescription for effective management 
could include making decisions (and giving orders) which might be detrimental 
to group relations from time to time. Is it possible that after so many 
years of accepting that a leader should never perform any act which would harm 
relations with his members but should rather at all times behave in a manner 
which will foster these leader member relations, we should find that the key 
to effectiveness forces us to advocate a transgression of this code? Fiedler 
has this to say on the subject: 
"The effectiveness of the leadership act is not dependent on the 
leader-member relations, rather it depends upon the appropriateness 
and wisdom of the suggestion or order which the leader has given. 
There is no reason to believe that the well-liked leader will give 
better or wiser orders and directions than the less-liked leader." 












To boil the question down to its fundamentals, are we as human relationists 
more interested in the liking or the effectiveness: is it more important 
that we isolate and promote those conditions under which people will co-exist 
liking one another as much as possible, or is it more important that we seek 
to produce a set of psychological variables which impinge upon people in their 
working environment in order that we might better help the organisation to 
reach its goal. The answer is obvious. 
But then how do we reconcile these new thoughts with the stated intention of 
every Humanistic theorist, namely the development of effective as well as 
cohesive organisations? The purists will see a conflict, the pessimists such 
as Argyris would say that it was not feasible. But if we truly accept the 
reciprocal cause and effect relationship between satisfaction and productivity 
then it should not be difficult to see that leadership action which from time 
to time appears to be detrimental to group relations will in the long run 
feed back as a positive influence - providing that it is effective, goal-
attaining, and thus productive. 
This would entail rejection of the type and direction of the research presently 
being done because it is unlikely to produce any meaningful results: Research 
which to date has told us a lot about what the manager 'ought' to do but very 
little about what managers actually do do, research which has focussed on what 
makes a man effective in a particular kind of position, research which has 
begun to confuse leadership with management (and thus has lost sight of its 
own original objective), and finally research which is badly lacking a more 
eclectic approach. 
Stogdill (1974) states that the only way to move towards a general theory of 
leadership effectiveness and away from the 11 bewildering mass of findings 
testing shopworn hypotheses" is to generate 11 a considerable amount of empirically 
valid research. 11 He feels this is critically needed. At the same time he 
believes that a theoretical model of the contingency type is a hinderance 
rather than a help to the development of the field of leadership, and that 
this critically needed information can only be produced by "feeding new 
combinations of variables into research designs (that have been) demonstrated 












What both the management and behavioural science schools are trying to do 
is of course to marry - to integrate - the formal {structural) component 
of the organisation with the informal {human relations) aspect - each from 
its own limited perspective. The traditional school cannot deny the 
existence of the informal dynamic and tries to integrate it into its 
from-the-top-downwards viewpoint. The human relationists look from the 
* bottom upwards and strive for a similar result. Both fail. 
The state of our knowledge about managerial work remains poor and there is 
little we can learn from the accepted body of literature. Between the 
management school and real world functioning there is a gap which prescription 
cannot bridge, and the gulf between it and the state of behavioural science 
explanation is a yawning chasm. 
But in these apparently so different approaches is there no common element? 
Is there no thread to be followed in the hope of greater clarity? 
On re-examination we find that each sub-school or approach has concentrated 
on just one part, one aspect, of management and in each (without fail) 
there appears the single common word: role. In the next Chapter we 
look at the open system theories and further explore the possibility of 
using the role concept as a vehicle for integration. 
This is because as we shall see in Chapter 6, integration simply cannot be 

























THE SOCIAL SYSTEM SCHOOL 
There remain those theorists who see the organisation neither from the 
limited structural viewpoint of the management scientist nor from the 
limited individual viewpoint of the behavioural scientist, but rather 
as an integrated open system in which they strive to take all the variables 
into account. 
The body of writers who adopt this approach is large and they come from 
many disciplinary backgrounds. They do not all agree on the composition of 
the groups (or •systems') of var ables to be included, their relative 
importance, or on the dynamics of the interaction between them. Some 
writers draw actual models of organisational functioning whilst others merely 
present the variable interactions verbally. Parsons (1951), Bakke (1959), 
and Leavitt (1965) are included in this school. There is James Thompson's 
(1967) classic 'Organisations in Action' and more recently Kast and 
Rosenzweig (1970) and Huse and Bowditch (1977} are just some examples 
* of this type of theorist. The work of March and Simon (1958) has already 
been discussed briefly. 
At this point I should like to consider two of these models in a little more 
detail - one comes from psychology, the other from the management stable. 
It is a measure of the worth of these writers that they can rightfully be placed 












Katz and Kahn's Overlapping Role Set (1966) 
These eminent social psychologists believe that the only way to overcome the 
weaknesse~ of both the micro and macro approaches to organisational functioning 
is to combine the psychological findings with sociological concepts (which 
have been 'translated' into micro concepts) within an open systems framework. 
They say that this can be done because in general the two levels are dealing 
with the same type of fact about human behaviour. 
They view the organisation as a 'contrived' social system - insofar as it is 
man-made and does not exist naturally - consisting of the patterned activities 
of a number of individuals. These activities are complementary or interdependent 
with respect to some shared outcome. 
The point is made that the maintenance of process within the system as a whole 
not only depends upon energy import but also upon the communication flows 
within it. The simplest example of this flow is negative feedback which 
returns in a cyclic manner to provide renewed energy input. 
Three major components of the social system are identified: (1) Norms or 
* standards of expectation which prescribe and sanction the (2) role or 
standardised pattern of behaviour of the people in a given functional 
relationship and (3) values or ideological justifications and aspirations of 
the individual. These social components form the bases for integration of the 
various sub-systems within the total organisation. Five of these are identified. 
1. Production or technical (process of material) 
2. Supportive (procurement) 
3. Maintenance (availability of human resource) 
4. Adaptive (responses to environmental stimuli) 
5. Managerial (insuring a co-ordinated pattern of behaviour amongst individuals) 
* For a discussion of the basic concepts of Role Theory in Social Psychology see for 
example Roger Brown (1966:154) or Secord and Backman (1964:451) 













These sub-systems are not in a serial or hierarchical relationship to one 
another but are rather dynamically interlocked and interdependent. Also, each 
individual in the organisation acts (behaves) in response to the other members 
of his role set. Because of this, the total organisation is seen as an 
overlapping set of roles. 
John Hunt's Integrated Role System 
This model differs in several respects from the one above. Hunt draws on a 
great number of empirical findings and theoretical works from a wide variety 
of disciplines, but he is essentially a management writer who leans heavily 
towards application. In fact he is quick to state in the preface that: 
"Model building is of little purpose if there is no transfer to reality 
. • . and 
most of what I know about organisations has come from discussing 
research findings with the practitioners" (1972:x) 
Hunt's conception is one in which the environmental inputs feed into a unit 
comprising four sub-systems: formal structure, informal structure, individual 
needs, and the technology. Central to the unit is a role system which in its 
turn is governed by four integrator variables: 
Action 
This refers to that part of the individual's role performance which contributes 
to the goals of the organisation. Some of it may be prescribed, some might be 
unspecified. It includes informal problem-solving, creative thinking, indeed 
any action which contributes to organisational survival. 
Communication 
This is the means by which the members' roles are interlocked. Hunt sees 
"three interlaced networks. 11 One network approximates the formal structure, 
another links informal relationships, and a third links members and non-members 
in the environment. As structure is a process of sharing values, then 










































































Oeci s ion-Making 
Decision-making is seen as the vital link between environment, structure, people, 
and output. Decisions must be made where the values, expectations, or attitudes 
of members pose alternative courses of action or conflict. 
Tension 
This term is used to describe the frustration of an individual's needs. Hunt 
feels that unless the values of a formal structure are sufficiently tension-
producing then the member might not make any effort to comply with requirements 
and expectations because tension is "the energiser" {or stimulant to action). 
Finally he states that "without any tension human systems would cease to exist" 
(1972:25). 
The Means of Integration 
The means by which the role system is integrated is by the managerial or 
leadership style. In other words the leader role is central to the whole system. 
{Figure 4). 
Of course, open systems is a framework rather than a theory as such and as a 
* result does not readily lend itself to hypothesis generation but it does provide 
us with a theoretical perspective which helps to integrate the many diverse 
aspects of organisational functioning. 
And in spite of the completely different origins and orientations of these 
two theories - one entirely theoretical, the other based upon research 
findings - we can isolate a number of pertinent commonalities. Both theories 
hold that: 
1. Role structure is crucial to the organisation's process. For Hunt 
roles are central and 'communication is the life-blood.' Katz and 
Kahn conceive of roles as the 'building blocks'and - to carry on 
the analogy - communication is then the 'cement' which holds them 
together. 
Regression analysis done on the results of surveys of 50 firms has validated certain 
propositions which Hunt made ·concerning changes in individual variables such as 
satisfaction and conflict as a result of manipulating other elements of the model 
{formal and informal structure, technology). The model in its entirety has not been 












2. Even the objectives (roles) of the system are determined by on-going 
interaction with the environment - a view very different from that of 
the prescriptivists. Only through continuous information feed-back 
can the organisation determine whether it is moving toward attainment 
of its goal. 
It therefore follows that strategy must continually be altered (shifted) in 
the light of information received. This information is of two types 
(1) concerning the performance of the sub-systems - how well they are 
functioning as a single unit - within the process and (2) from the environment 
at large. 
Since the manager is the integrator (Katz and Kahn) and is seen as the 
central co-ordinator to the system (Hunt) one can reason that the extent to 
which a manager monitors both internally and externally is going to be a 












THE NEW THINKERS 
Some Empirical Underpinning 
In this Section we review studies of managerial work and 
specialised aspects of it which have an empirical basis. 
The title does not refer essentially to recent work: the 
research covers · 













MANAGERIAL WORK CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTENT 
It would seem that to find out about managerial work - what it ·is that 
managers actually do - the most logical thing to do would be to ask them. 
We have already seen in Chapter 3 how the Ohio Researchers did this by 
way of questionnaire and interview with very limited success. We now 
consider the work of another group who used the diary method in their 
studies. 
THE DIARISTS 
The first significant empirical study of this type was done by the S\11ede, 
Sune Carlson who in 1951 studied nine Swedish managing directors. In 
the introductory Chapter he outlines what he hoped to achieve in the 
study :. 
11 The purpose of this ·study has been neither to develop any normative 
rules as to how executives should behave, nor to describe their 
"typical" or "average" behavior. But by studying a series of 
individual cases I have hoped to find certain common behavior 
patterns and some general relationships which characterize these 
patterns." · · , .: 
(cited in Mintzberg, 1973:202*) 
* Material on the Diarists (with the exception of Stewart (1967 and 1976) 
as vie 11 as the work of Ponder ( 1957), Guest ( 1956), Jasinski ( 1956) and 













Over the next 20 years Carlson was followed by a number of other diary 
researchers. Many hundreds of subjects have been studied at a number of 
different levels in the organisational hierarchy. The subjects have ranged 
from senior managers to shop foremen and the focus of interest of the studies 
has ranged over different aspects of managerial work. The period of time 
of the study has varied from one day to one month. 
However all of these diary studies share a common methodology: The subject 
has either been provided with a precoded diary pad·simil~r to the one used 
by Carlson {reproduced below) or they were asked to record their responses 
under a number of predetermined headings. Now this procedure can be criticised 
on a number of grounds: firstly, one is asking for the manager's perception 
of how he does his job rather than finding out about the job itself - and 
managers have been shown to be poor estimators of their own activities. 
Secondly, the headings under which the diarists sought information were almost 
invariably expressed in traditional terminology of "function" which are 
precisely those categories about which one is trying to develop new information. 
In other words this method of precoded diary page can only produce 
information {for example about time distribution) when the job factors 
are known. The methodology can be criticised then on almost exactly the 
same grounds as the Ohio Studies can. Mintzberg puts it well when he says 
that one cannot make the subject the researcher: He cannot be "expected 
to translate complex reality into meaningful abstraction." {1973:222) 
Rather than discuss the work of each diarist separately I have extracted the 
main findings and looked for corroboration or commonalities between them. 
In addition, the methodology of the diarists is contrasted with that of later 
researchers in summary form and presented in Table 2. However, before moving 
on to a discussion of these findings we must differentiate between two 
different types or categories of managerial work and so explain the title 












FIGURE 5 SUNE CARLSON'S DIARY PAGE 
Date: ,;,, ,,., Telephone: 1nD OutO 
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It we seek information from the manager on questions such as 'where does 
he work' or 'with whom does he work' or 'what media does he use' (for 
example does he write a lot or use the telephone) or 'with what sort of 
people does he liaise' or 'how long does he spend doing a particular job' 
or 'how long does he spend perfonning a certain activity', then we are 
asking questions which refer to the characteristics of his work. 
Work Content 
If on the other hand we seek to enquire what activities the manager carries 
out and why he does so (we enquire the purpose of his carrying out a particular 
action) then we are enquiring about managerial content, and it is only the 
answer to this type of question which can lead us to any sort of meaningful 
(empirically based) statement of managerial functioning or role. It is only 
in this way that we will get away from the vague traditional list of 
11 functions 11 such as analysing, planning, co-ordinating and so forth. In 
addition (and probably most important) it is only in this way that we will 
be able to build up any sort of theory about managerial work in general. 
It is therefore obvious that the diarists concentrated on managerial 
characteristics. Nevertheless they provided us with a number of novel 
and interesting findings. 
In an effort to depart from the self-reporting method of the diarists 
some researchers began to study their subjects directly. These early 
observationists either used the method of random sampling where the subject 
is briefly observed say once every two hours (Wirdenius 1958) or minute-by-minute 
observation. Here the period of observation varied between a single day 
{Guest and Jasinski, 1956) and a period of 16 hours spread over 4 months 
(Ponder, 1957). All of these studies whether by random sampling or 
' continuous observation were of foremen with the exception of Landsberger 











TABLE 2 RESEARCH METHODS USED TO STUDY MANAGERIAL WORK 
METHOD SUBMETHOD 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW 








Large sample possible 
Large sample possible 
Easy analysis 
Time inexpensive 






Method is purely inductive 
Researcher can ask questionF-
of the subject 
Induction coupled with the 
structure of systematic 
recording 
Detailed comprehensive record 
Consistent standard possible 
Both work characteristic and 
content can be studied 
DISADVANTAGES 
Very unreliable: 
Relies on subjects' own 
perception of time usage 
Empirical evidence that 
managers are poor estimators 
of their own activities 
Limited scope and content 
Onlv time distribution 
between known job factors 
can be determined 
Managers' interpretation of 
the categories varies 
Similar to diary method 
Anything apnroaching 
replication is impossible 
Selective perception by 
the researcher 
Observer may be excluded 
from confidential meetings 
Observer presence effect 
Sample siz~ very limited 
Very time-expensive 
RESEARCHER 




Mahoney, Jerdee and 
Carroll 1963 
Carlson 1951 
Burns 1954 + 1957 
Copeman et al 1963 
Dubin and Spray 1964 







Kelly 1964 + 1969 
Sayles 1964 
Hodgson, Levinson 
and Zaleznik 1965 
Mintzberg 1968 
Choran 1969 
Two other research methods are described in the literature: (1) Secondary Sources where the data to be analysed 
must be very comprehensive and (2) Critical Incident. In both, the researcher has no knowledge of what data is missing. 

















All of these researchers recorded the activities of their subjects into 
predetermined categories in much the same way as the diarists had, and so 
it was not possible to develop any new categories or dimensions of 
understanding of what it is that the manager did or what the manager's 
job entailed from them. Thus the advantages and disadvantages of this 
method over that of the diarists are the same (see Table 2) and "the only 
real difference was that recording was done by the researcher instead of 
the manager. 11 (Mintzberg, 1973:227) 
We can now ~eview the main findings of the researchers with which we have 
dealt so far in this section 
Carlson (1951) was the first to report that most of the managers' time was 
spent in the company of other people. He commented that the time spent 
alone was "too little for sustained thinking. 11 Kelly's finding that two 
thirds of the m~nager's time was spent with other people (1964 and 1969) 
compares very closely with that of Stewart (1967) who found that 60% of 
the time was spent in discussion. Here we also have the findings of Burns 
(1957} whose sample of senior and middle managers had a discussion time of 
42 - 80% whilst Horn and Lupton's (1965) middle managers spent most time 
talking 11 face-to-face. 11 
Ponder (1957) conments on the considerable discontinuity in the manager's 
job and Dubin and Spray (1964) report that his time is spent on many 
different activities. Stewart summarises the effect of the interruptions 
and the discontinuity when she said in a later study (1976) that the manager 
has "no time to think. 11 
It is perhaps the communication patterns which result from this interruption 
that are most interesting: Because of the amount of time spent in discussion 
one is not surprised at the findings of Carlson (1951) and Horn and Lupton 
(1965) that communication is by informal and verbal means rather than 
written. In fact Stewart (1967) reports that 43% of the discussion was 
informal. But. contrary to the hallowed "truth" that conmunication in an 














.fashion, Burns {1957) found that more time was spent by the manager in lateral 
communication than in talking to his imnediate subordinates: 
"The accepted view of management as a working hierarchy on 
organisation chart lines may be dangerously misleading. Management 
simply does not operate as a flow of information up through a 
succession of filters, and a flow of decisions and instructions 
down through a succession of amplifiers . 11 (cited in Stewart, 1967:14) 
Landsberger (1962) goes even further than this and states that in his 
opinion the chain of command is actually 11 cross-wise 11 whilst Dubin and 
Spray (1964) found an increasing tendency for the higher level manager to 
spend his time in horizontal relationships. Thomason (1966), commenting 
on the results of studies carried out by his students, concludes that 
"the communication structure may look •.•. like a patchwork quilt of 
centres and lacunae ...• with a cyclic pattern of·communications 
extending down the hierarchy. 11 (cited in Mintzberg, 1973:206) 
{As early as 1951 Carlson reported that in his opinion one of the greatest 
difficulties which the manager had in performing his job was in "keeping 
himself informed. 11 One can thus at this stage ask to what extent is the 
communication pattern as found by these researchers a matter of choice: 
Conscious development by the manager in order to try and overcome this 
difficulty). 
And so before we are tempted to dismiss the work of the diarists and early 
observationists either because they studied characteristics and not functions 
or because their predetermined categories were in ••vague and old-fashioned 
terms of functions 11 , or for any other methodological reason, we must 
remember that their findings exploded many of the 11 myths 11 of managerial 
functioning. These misconceptions which Sayles (1964) refers 
to as 11 the old wives tales of management theory 11 have been taught and 
accepted and are still held to be true. We should also note that all these 
findings have been confirmed and substantiated by later Researchers to 












STUDIES IN UNSTRUCTURED OBSERVATION 
The Work of Leonard Sayles 
The first attempt to break away from the stereotyped categories which had 
bedevilled all the descriptions of managerial work up to this point was • 
made by Leonard Sayles in his study of 75 middle and lower managers in a 
single division of a large American corporation. 
Sayles simply "lived", observed, and recorded in as purely an inductive 
manner as he could. On the first page of his book 'Managerial Behavior' 
(1964) he explains: 
"The fie 1 d work was conducted by techniques of anthropo 1 ogi ca 1 
studies: The researcher endeavours by living within a culture 
for extended periods of time to comprehend significant relationships 
and attitudes - even those which may depart from his predispositions 
and expectations" (vii) 
It was not possible for him to analyse this data in the normal sense of the 
word simply because there is not one piece of empirical evidence reported. 
Again he explains: 
11 We make no pretence of having conducted a scientific experiment, 
so we are not proposing scientific hypotheses backed by 
systematically collected validating data. Rather, we have looked 
and pondered for a long time and then developed a scheme of 
analysis, by which we mean simply that minimum number of concepts 
that would 11 exp 1 ai n11 what was happening. Thus our study goes 
beyond mere description 11 (viii) 
Sayles was interested in the relationships and inter-relatedness of the 
various managerial acts and the 11 scheme of analysis 11 which he describes 
provides us with several new dimensions of understanding of the complexity 
of management. He proposed that managerial work could be described in terms 
* of three 11 categories. of activity. 11 These he ca 11 s programs. He sees the 
manager as: 
Sayles uses the term 'Program' in preference to 'Role.' This preference is shared 
by Mintzberg who however points out: 'Role is a fuzzy concept. P1·ogram is a 
better concept, but it demands a greater understanding of the subject than we 












1. A participant in external work flows 
2. A leader 
3. Monitor 
l. PARTICIPANT 
Sayles lists thirteen patterns which he was able to discern from his 
observations and from these he categorises seven relationships which the 
* manager has with people who are outside of his immediate responsibility. 
In other words they are peers rather than subordinates. 
Trading Relationships: The manager enters into 11 buying 11 and 11 selling 11 
arrangements with other members of the organisation. In order to get his 
own work done he has a large number of 11 customers 11 and a wide variety of 
11 tenns of trade" to negotiate. 
Work Flow Relationships: These refer to the contacts which he must make 
concerning the work which precedes or succeeds that which is carried out 
in his own department. 
Service Relationships: Many organisational facilities are centralised and so 
the manager must give service or support to other divisions in order that they 
can get their own work done. Similarly, he receives such services from other 
departments. 
Advisory Relationships: This refers to the giving of advice to the manager 
by (staff) experts. 
Auditing Relationships: Refers to the receipt of infonnation by the manager 
about matters which he has neither the time nor the skill to evaluate for 
himself. He thus relies on other specialists to act as 11 his eyes and ears." 
By 'external' Sayles means outside of the nonnal hierarchical (vertical) 












Stabilisation Relationships: He must maintain adequate contact with those 
other people in the organisation who are in a position to limit or curtail 
his own decisions in order to secure the best for his own division. He 
here acts as a.lobbyist. 
Innovative Relationships: Groups such as research and development which 
represent the extreme of professionalisation in the organisation are usually 
totally divorced from the normal line function and the manager must maintain 
contacts with these groups in order to provide for the future of his 
department or organisation. 
In outlining these work-flow relationships Sayles stresses that their 
maintenance is extremely time-consuming and depends more upon negotiation 
than on the employment of any sort of authority. Furthermore the need for 
their existence in the first place is "because of the division of labour 
imposed on the modern organisation. The manager rarely controls all the 
resources needed to do whatever has been assigned to him (i.e. he and his 
subordinates together do not have all the pieces required to make a whole 
unit of work}" (1964:58) 
2. LEADER 
Sayles' manager engages in activities which relate to his subordinates in a 
hierarchical (vertical) fashion as opposed to the horizontal or lateral 
relationships which we have described above. Thus the manager (1) directs 
the activities of his subordinates (2) responds to subordin'ates who are 
seeking aid or support and (3) intervenes on behalf of the subordinates in 
their relations with other parts of the organisation. Sayles admits that his 
view of the leadership role is somewhat "narrow" (page 53). 
3. MONITOR 
It is in the description of the Monitoring Program what we gain a new 
perspective of managerial work. The manager is seen as constantly scanning 












situations which require his intervention. Six inter-related stages of 
Monitoring activity are described: 
l. Methods of detecting disturbances in the work systems in which 
the manager participates 
2. Development of criteria for evaluating the significance of 
disturbances that are detected 
3. Patterns of corrective action to be applied and the assessment 
of their effect 
4. Detection of continuing (resistant) sources of disturbance in 
the work systems and their analysis 
5. Formulation of strategies of organisational or structural change 
to cope with these 
6. Implement~tion and validation of these structural modifications 
pages 53-54). 
Sayles stresses that in his opinion monitoring is not a question of quantifiable 
results but rather measurement of the progress of the work through the 
total system. 
This study is therefore remarkable not only for its unique methodology but 
also because for the first time we have some formal appreciation of just how 
complex the manager's job is. Sayles sees the total organisation as: 
11 A dynamic system of mutual inter-dependence ... and the manager must 
first be able to identify (its) structur.e. In other words he must do 
more than recognise that everything depends upon everything else. 11 (page 56) 
This theme is developed throughout the book until, in discussing action 
interventions by the manager which are necessary if the organisation is to 
cope with changes in its external and internal environment, he summarises 
the managerial job thus: 
"The manager's objective, then, is not a static system of human relations, 
Rather, he is seeking a dynamic type of stability, making adjustments and 
readjustments to both internally generated and externally imposed pressures. 
By these responses to variations in the environment, he hopes to maintain 
a moving equilibrium.* 
This conceptualisation is very much akin to Schein's {1965) theoretical notion 











STUDIES IN STRUCTURED OBSERVATION 
THE WORK OF HENRY MINTZBERG 
79 
Mi ntzberg 1 s work was prompted by seeking answers to exactly the same sort 
of question with which we have been concerned up to now: questions such 
as "what does a manager do? 11 "what activities does he indulge in? 11 
"what is the purpose in his doing so?" In examining the work of the 
Diarists and early Observationists he noted that content was assumed and 
so only evidence of work characteristic resulted from these studies. 
Sayles' research broke away from these artificial structural constraints 
and produced new and valuable findings about work content, but the 
methodology was so loose that replication was impossible. More important, 
this meant that Sayles' method would not lead to development of a theoretical 
framework which could subsequently be validated and refined. 
Mintzberg was essentially interested in: studying content of the managerial 
job {rather than the man) and isolating similarities rather than 
concentrating on differences. This meant that his research had to be 
"inductive because the purpose was t  describe what we did not know . 
comprehensive to capture not what might interest me ... , but the whole 
job of managing And intensive in that it had to probe deeply." 
(1973:230-231) 
What follows is a summary of the methodology which led to the development 
of Mintzberg's Ten-Role Set as well as his further comments on the use of 
structured observation {see Box). 
Methodology 
The subjects were the chief executives of five organis~tions each engaged in 
a completely different sphere of activity: Manager A was the chairman of an 
international consulting firm, Manager B was the president of a firm 
producing high technology industrial products, whilst Manager C was a hospital 
director. Manager D headed a firm producing consumer goods and Manager E 












Preliminary to the observational data collection Mintzberg collected 
information about the organisation, about the manager, and about his usual 
pattern of activities from his diary. In this way he familiarised himself 
as much as possible with the manager's whole environment and the people with 
whom he was likely to interact during the period of observation. 
Each manager was observed for one week and during this time two types of 
data were collected. The first of these was 11 anecdotal 11 in nature -
interesting or critical incidents were described in detail and copies of 
actual correspondence were collected. These anecdotes were not only for 
purposes of interesting ill u~trati ons but "were ~sed to facilitate coding 
and to develop and support some of the theory. 11 {page 232). 
COMMENTS ON THE USE OF STRUCTURED OBSERVATION 
"The study used structured observation but with one important 
distinction from previous uses. The categories were developed during 
and after observations. An attempt was made to describe the 11 purpose 11 
of each of the events observed in the words that seem appropriate at 
the time of observation. The formal categorisation was carried out 
at a later time, when all data were in and when there was time to do 
it carefully. This approach retained the basic aovantage of the diary 
method - systematic recording of field data - but also maintains the 
flexibility to develop content categories inductively." {page 25} 
"Such an approach can offer the pest of bQth worlds - the inductive 
power of observation coupled with the structure of systematic 
recor<;ling. 11 {page 227) 
"This method necessitated walking a tight-rope between using structure 
and excluding it. Too little structure would have resulted in an 
inability to record much of the important data, tabulate the findings, 
and reproduce the research. Too much structure could have led to the 
problem inherent in diaries - an inability to develop an understanding 
of the things we knew nothing about. 11 (page 231) 
11 I straddled two objectives - the provision of clear description to 
the general reader interested in understanding managerial work, and 
the establishment of a scientifically valid framework for further 
research. One objective required simplicity, and the other precision. 












The second type of data collected was 11structured11 and three types of 
record were used to capture this data: (1) the Mail Record described all 
incoming and outgoing mail, the sender, its purpose or nature, as well as 
the action taken. (2) the Contact Record accounted for each verbal contact 
which the manager had. This might be a scheduled or unscheduled meeting, 
a telephone call, or interaction whilst on a tour. Again the purpose was 
recorded as well as the participants, who initiated the activity, the place 
where it happened, and its duration. (3) the Chronology Record contained 
cross references to the Mail and Contact records and noted the nature and 
sequence of each of the activit~es for every minute of the working day. 
During the initial recording on all three of these records activities and 
occurrences were noted down in whatever words seemed appropriate at the time: 
no attempt was made at this stage to develop any sort of consistent 
terminology. Each evening entries on each of the three records were 
tabulated and again during this initial rewriting no categorisation took 
place. It was only when the research was finished that all the records 
were written and re-written and an attempt was made to produce 11 accurate, 
tidy, and concise categories" (page 233). Analysis of the Chronology and 
Mail record resulted in categories of information which produced much new 
evidence about the manager's work characteristics: besides obvious thing$ 
such as the total number of hours worked, Mintzberg was able to compute 
the amount of time he spent working at his desk, how many telephone calls 
he made and of what duration, and the number of scheduled meetings in which 
he took part. 
It was essentially the analysis of the Contact and Mail Records which were 
responsible for the categorisation of the manager's work content. By 
constantly questioning why the manager engaged in a particular activity 
- by asking the purpose in his attending a meeting or talking to a 
subordinate - a collection of categories began to appear. The analysis 
was repeated for 368 verbal contacts and for 890 pieces of mail, and this 
categorisation of purpose led to the statement of managerial roles. The 















THE METHODOLOGY OF MINTZBERG 
Preliminary Data 
One month of 
scheduled activity 
The organization 





















Categorization of Managerial Work" 
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r----- ----, 
1 Results of the I 
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Source: (1973:265) 
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Science and the 
Managers' Work' 
11 It should be noted that the essence of the inductive process is in 
the successive iterations of the processing of raw field data -
recording, tabulating, coding and re-coding, analysing these results 
- until meaningful conceptualisations appear." (page 233) 
From the Mail Record twelve categorisations of purpose emerged and from the 
Contact Record there were thirteen 11 a few of which parallel directly those 












Regarding the characteristics of managerial work, Mintzberg outlines six 
categories (see Box) some of which the manager is forced into, others which 
he chooses. All of these characteristics are supported by the findings of 
the Diarists which we reviewed earlier in this Chapter. 
THE TEN-ROLE SET 
The result of this painstaking and exhaustive analjsis was a statement 
of managerial functions in terms of 10 roles which Mintzberg saw as falling 
into three groups: Interpersonal, Informational, and Decisional. From 
his position of formal authority the manager derives a unique status and 
the combination of his authority and status places him in a position of 
command regarding the development of interperso~al relationships within 
the firm. Performance of the interpersonal roles {Figurehead, Leader, 
Liaison) in turn place him in a unique position of having access to 
information. In carrying out the informational roles {Monitor, Disseminator, 
Spokesman) he gains information and this information together with his 
authority and status place him at the very centre of the organisational 
system in which decisions are to be made. In performing these roles 
·(Entrepreneur, Disturbance Handler, Resource Allocator, Negotiator) he 
commits the resources of the organisation. 
A short description of each of the roles follows. Mintzberg's 
propositions about the nature of the roles is contained in Appendix l. 
Interpersonal Roles 
* Figurehead ( inside and outside) 
Because of the manager's formal authority and status he must represent the 
organisation on formal occasions. He must therefore attend ceremonies, 
make speeches, and receive important visitors. He is also charged wi.th the 
responsibility of attending to completely inconsequential requests from 
outsiders who believe that they will get the best attention by going to 
the head man. 













Within the organisation he must attend to various routines such as signing 
legal documents and cheques. 
Leader (inside) 
If leadership involves the relationships between the leader and the led, 
then in his leader role the manager is responsible for the production and 
maintenance of the organisational climate. In general then, the leader role 
involves br1nging about an integration between individual needs and 
organisational goals so that an efficient cooperative unit will result. 
In relating to subordinates he guides, motivates, encourages, criticises, 
and praises. This includes solving employees' personal problems as well 
as requesting them to carry on with {follow up) work where the intent is 
not work production but rather encouragement and motivation. It also 
includes a 'special class' of staffing: hiring, firing, training, and 
promoting. 
Concerning work procedures or operations, the manager fulfils his leadership 
role in checking to see what is going wrong, identifying problems in need 
of attention, and generally identifying procedures which in some way require 
change. 
In describing the leader role, Mintzberg readily concedes that leadership 
permeates almost all activities and that the manager often performs a 
leadership function when he is engaged in activities which have other basic 
purposes - to transmit information or to make strategic decisions (page 61). 
Liaison (outside) 
The Liaison role refers to the manager's build-up of a web of horizontal 
relationships with a wide variety of groups outside the organisation. This 
he does in a variety of ways and with many different types of groups and 












MANAGERIAL WORK CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Much Work At An Unrelenting Pace 
The Manager has little free .time during the day and rarely has breaks. 
Almost every minute of every working day is accounted for by some 
activity - even coffee and lunch are taken during working sessions. 
More important, because of the open-ended nature of his job, the 
manager is never in a position to say 11 1 have finished 11 and so he can 
never escape from it. He takes work home, or has duties after hours, 
or finds himself thinking about it. 
2. Activity Characterised by Brevity, Variety, And Fragmentation 
The vast majority of the manager's activity are of very brief duration. 
The work'is fragmented and interruptions are frequent. Half of the 
activities were completed in less than nine minutes, and only 10% took 
more than an hour. Apart from a few minor. exceptions, no sequence in 
the pattern of acti vi ti es could be found: 11 It cannot be argued that 
mornings differ from afternoons that certain activities took place at 
special times of the day or that certain days of the week differed from 
others. 11 (page 31) · 
Because of the constant pressure the manager is not able to spend much 
time on any one issue. But there was also evidence that to some extent 
at least this fragmentation of his workload was of his own doing and 
that he preferred the brevity. 
3. Preference for Live Action 
The manager prefers the current, the specific, the 111-defined and the 
non-routine activities. He thrives on current information (gossip, 
hearsay, speculation and 11 scraps 11 of information). For this reason 
attention to his mail is regarded as a chore because the information 
that it contains is old and the immediate feed-back element is lacking. 
In scheduling his time he shows a concern for the definite, the 
concrete, and the specific rather than the general issue. 11 The pressure 
of the job does not encourage the development of a planner, but of an 
adaptive information manipulator who works in a stimulus-response 
















4. Attraction To .The Verbal Media 
The manager's job can be seen as consisting of a mixture of verbal .and 
written contacts. He has 5 media to choose from: mail (written), 
telephone (verbal), unscheduled meetings (informal and verbal), scheduled 
meetings {formal and verbal) and tours (observational). The manager shows 
an obvious preference for the three verbal media by spending 67% of the 
activities and 78% of his time in verbal exchange. The informal means of 
communication - telephone calls and unscheduled meetings - are used to 
transmit pressing information and to deliver informal requests. Scheduled 
meetings are only used for formal information exchange and requests mainly 
involving a number of people. The manager shys away from written media 
- be they external mail or internal memora.nda: 
"Unlike other workers, the manager does not leave the telephone or the 
meeting to get back to work. Rather, these contacts are his work ... 
The manager's productive output can be measured primanry in terms 
of verbally transmitted information" (page 44) 
5. Between'his organisation and a network of contacts the manager 
communicates with three groups of people - his superiors, his subordinates, 
and a group of outsiders. He can be seen as standing between his own 
organisation and a network of these outside contacts. Communication with 
·people outside the organisation consumes up to one half of his time~ 
There is thus a strong indication that 11 contacts between managers and 
outsiders have been underestimated (as to time allocated) and over-
simplified in the traditional literature. 11 (page 44). Time spent with 
subordinates consumes between 33/o and 50% of the manager's time whilst he 
only spends some 10% of his contact time with superiors. 
Subordinates request authorisation, information, and advice from the 
manager but they also bring him a great deal of 11 instant communication 11 
which he needs as part of his internal information system. Thus the 
manager interacts with a wide variety of subordinates. These communication 
lines did not correspond with the formal lines on the organisational chart, 
and there was some evidence that the manager actually encouraged 
subordinates to communicate with him directly - again bypassing formal 
channels. 
6. Blend of Rights and Duties 
The literature traditionally gives us two views of the manager. One as 
conductor - as the chief executive he is in control of his own affairs -
and the other as puppet - he is the only man in the whole organisation 
whose complete time is at the disposal of ~nd controlled by others. The 
manager's job is therefore seen as a blend of rights and duties. But the 
study suggests that there are two areas where he can exercise choice: 
It is his right to control initial decisions, but once taken he incurs 
an obligation to carry out the associate activities. Also, he has choice 
in determining those activities in which he must engage - he can take 
advantage of his obligations by, for examp.le-:-OOtaining information 
when forced to perform a certain activity. ·In short, he has the 
opportunity to turn his disadvantages into advantages. 












He may attend conferences or join external boards where he will make and 
maintain social contact with his peers. He may also indulge in public service 
work and attend social ~vents where he will again build useful relationships. 
The purpose of indulging in this activity is to build a sufficient 
number of contacts which will provide him with information and also with 
sources of access and influence which would otherwise not be open to him. 
The manager thus links his organisation to a large number of outside 
individuals and groups by performance of the liaison role. 
Informational Roles 
Monitor (inside and outside) 
In order to perform his job adequately the manager must apprise himself of 
events taking place both within his organisation and in the wi~er environment. 
He must gain information about internal and external events and so build 
up a 'store of knowledge' in order that he will be able to coordinate the 
activities of the various units within his organisation and guide the total 
·organisational effort in a way which is in keeping with the external events. 
His place in the organisation puts him in a unique position to do this: 
Whilst he knows less detail about each of the specific operations within 
his organisation, he alone is the one who knows about all functions. This 
internal information comes to him in the form of formal reports and memos 
along the usual channels, but also (as we have seen) a tremendous amount 
of it is in the form of an ad hoc input via informal channels. 
We have also seen that the manager encourages and prefers this verbal 
informational input in the form of gossip and 'scraps' of information. 
His information about events external to his firm come to him from competitors, 
clients, and suppliers and as a result of contacts made in performance 
of his liaison role. 
Monitoring is then information-gathering which the manager does from a wide 













From the vast amount of information which reaches the manager he must sort 
out that which is relevant and that which can be ignored as being either 
incorrect or of no use. Two types of information are transmitted: factual 
(those pieces of information which the manager has decided are correct) and 
value (statements of either his or somebody else•s preference which must 
be transmitted to subordinates). 
Thus from the vast amount of information reaching the manager from both 
outside and inside sources he must decide who in the organisation can make 
use of this information and he must disseminate it to the appropriate part 
of the firm in a form which (in his judgment) best suits it. 
Spokesman (outside) 
In contrast to the disseminator role which focusses on the transmission of 
information inside the organisation, the spokesman role focusses on 
transmission of relevant information to the outside world. Because of his 
unique ,access to information he is 1 ooked upon as an expert not only in the 
functioning of his own organisation but in many. cases as a spokesman for 
the industry (or sector) in which his organisation is involved. Thus the 
manager must inform the Board of Directors, Suppliers, Customers, of 
information relevant to them. He may perform a lobbying function on behalf 
of his firm (or the industry in which it is involved) with the Government, 
Trade Organisations, or merely the public at large. In all these activities 
he is speaking as an expert and is informing these groups of his organisation's 
plans, policies, and performance. 
Decisional Roles 
Entrepreneur (inside) 
Through performance of his monitor and liaison function the manager is 
constantly scanning the wider environment looking for opportunitie's for and 
threats to his organisation. Within the organisation itself he looks for 
opportunities for improvement. In those areas which he considers to be a 













to take action (to cha~ge in some.way) in order to exploit the opportunity 
or to avoid the threat. He therefore introduces an 'improvement project' 
which refers to 'a sequence of activitie$ designed to improve a particular 
organisational situation (exploit an opportunity, solve a problem)'. The 
manager may decide to delegate responsibility, to supervise the work himself, 
or to authorise others to do so whilst retaining responsibility for the 
choice-making phase of the project himself. 
The entrepreneurial role then, sees the manager initiating and designing 
programs of controlled change and it involves those activities 'where· the 
manager makes changes of 'his own free will' in advance of a pressing necessity 
to do so. 
Disturbance Handler (inside) 
ln this role the manager deals with situations which have been brought about 
wholly or partially due to circumstances beyond his control. In contrast to 
the entrepreneurial role where he acts in a pro-active way to initiate change 
of his own choosing, disturbance handling is reactive, as he steps in to 
correct situations which have already arisen. He attends to crises. 
These crises can be as a result of unforeseen events or of problems previously 
neglected which should have been attended to. Generally they are of one of 
three types: disagreements or inabil.ities involving subordinates, exposure 
difficulties between one organisation and another, and threats of resource loss. 
As disturbance handler, 'the manager acts because he must ... A disturbance 
occurs, a correction is necessary.• 
Resource Allocator (inside) 
In this role the manager is deciding where his organisation must expend its 
efforts. This is 'the heart of the organisation's strategy-making system' 
for through it the manager determines which departments or activities will 
grow and which will diminish.· Besides the allocation of the more obvious 
resources such as manpower, material, time, and equipment the manager also 
makes decisions involving the organisation's reputation and, probably most 
The Decision-making roles in relation to Simon's (1965) trichotomy of 












important of all, the allocation of his own most precious resource, his 
personal time. This will determine what gets attention and what does not. 
In deciding what is to be done the manager, by assigning work to his 
subordinates, in effect programs their work. Resource allocation is closely 
linked with the entrepreneurial role particularly where the manager 
authorises actions on improvement projects which are being supervised by 
his subordinates. In this case he is adding his approval to decisions 
already taken by his employees. Budgetting forms a large part of resource 
allocation in that the manager is constantly bombarded with a series of 
requests for authorisation and he must allocate the scarce resources of 
the firm amongst competing units which require them for widely differing· 
purposes. 
Negotiator Role (outside) 
This refers to participation by the manager in non-routine negotiations 
with outside organisations, groups, or individuals. On these occasions the 
manager is essentially trading the resources of his organisation for the 
resources of the opposing party. Examples of this activity are takeovers, 
mergers, acqu.i s iti ons, and contract negotiations of one sort or another. 
This role is a hybrid insofar as it contains elements of three other roles: 
The manager participates in these discussions because, as Figurehead his 
presence adds credibility to the proceedings. As Spokesman he represents 
his organisation 1 s information and value system to outsiders. But most 
important, as Resource Allocator, the manager has the authority to commit 
organisational resources: He alone has the authority to commit resources 
without reference to any superior. 
The strength of Mintzl;>erg 1 s work is that "each role is observable although 
some activities (such as those pertaining to leadership and negotiation) 
may be accounted for by more than one role. And all the observed contacts 
are accounted for in the role set 11 (page 57). Thus no action in which 
the manager takes part has to be excluded because it cannot be accorTmodated 
by the theory. Mintzberg therefore is able to· claim that all managers 












in terms of the ten-role set. However, in making this claim he emphasises 
that: 
'These ten roles form a gestalt - a whole. In essence, the manager is 
an input-output system .... (and thus) one cannot arbitrarily 
remove one role and expect the rest to remain intact' (page 58). 
The set of roles incorporates all the findings of the Diarists and 
Observationists. It contradicts none of these empirical findings but 
rather underscores and adds to them the dimension of relational and wholistic 
meaning. More specifically, we find an empirically-based role description 
of managerial work which is in keeping with the theoretical frameworks of 
* advocates of the Systems School such as Katz and Kahn (1966) and Hunt (1972) 
which were discussed in Chapter 5. 
It builds on the roles described by Sayles, confirms the importance of roles 
such as entrepreneur and negotiator (previously ignored or considered 
non-managerial), it dispels a number of myths such as the upward-downward 
interaction pattern and highlights the importance of horizontal and lateral 
communication. In doing this it emphasises just how narrow the focus 
of the Traditionalists has been. 
Thus the greatest significan~e of Mintzberg's Role Set is that for the 
first time since publication of Fayol's work in 1916 we have been provided 
with an alternative statement of managerial functions. 
Validation of Mintzberg's Work 
We have seen that Mintzberg's work is based upon the observation of the chief 
executives of large companies. In other words, the type of job (top 
management) and the size of the organisation were held constant. In spite 
of this one of the fundamental claims which Mintzberg makes about his role 
set is that, whilst forming a gestalt, it is universal: All managers in 
all types of organisations at all levels perform all ten roles. 
The theories of Mintzberg and Hunt are unrelated: the former completed his 
empirical work for a Ph.D. dissertation in 1968, the latter in 1969. They were 
unaware of one another's existence prior to publication of their works in 1973 












However, in spite of the restricted nature of his sample, he has good grounds 
for making this universal claim: Firstly, his subjects were drawn from both 
the public and private sector. Secondly> his theory was developed with 
all other pertinent research on managerial work very much in mind. 
Thirdly, his results - the actual observational data - corroborated rather 
than contradicted the empirical work of the Diarists {whose work had been 
done at many levels and in many types of industry) as well as that of the 
early Observationists. These researchers had found more similarities than 
differences in managerial work. 
But whilst he had reasonable grounds for making this claim, what evidence 
do we have for the universal applicability of the role set? Will the job 
of manager of a small organisation differ from that of a large one, and if so, 
how? What differences will there be between a manager of a public 
organisation and that of a private one? How, if at all, will a middle 
manager differ from a supervisor in terms of role performance emphasis? 
In short, to what extent has Mintzberg's work been validated? 
In developing his 'Contingency View of Managerial Work' Mintzberg analysed 
work differences in terms of the similarities and id~ntifies 4 'nested' sets 
of variables, the interaction of which will together produce a given manager's 
role requirements and basic work characteristics~ These will in turn 
determine a single manager's work: 
1. Environmental Variables: the organisation itself - its size (large 
or small), its industry, and the sector in which it operates (private 
or public). 
2. Job Variables: the level in the hierarchy and the function .which is 
supervised. 
3. Person Variables: individual differences - the manager's values, 
personality,and personal style. 
4. Situational Variables: changes in the work behavior over time. 
These can be periodic (annual budget preparation or year-end 
accounting) or of a longer cyclical nature as when a period 
of entrepreneurial change (mergers and acquisitions) is followed 



































Varied external contacts 
Brevity of activity and 
fragmentation of work 
Very informal media of 
co:mnunica ti on 
Unscheduled meetings 
Informal communication 
Brevity, variety and 
fragmentation 
More time soent in 
formal activity and 
scheduled meetings 
Less brevity, variety 
and fragmentation 
More continuity 
Concern with daily 
09erating problems 
Brevity + fragmentation 
increases 
More time with subs. 
Fragmentation + variety 
Recu~:rent trouble-shooting 
More time soent alone: 
Less variety, more routine 

















































There is more 
'Professionalism' 






operational issues Choran (1969) 
Lack of staff 
Instant information 




involved result in 
committee conserv. 
Less competitive 











Less compet tion 
& more stab lity 
Concern with the 
maintenance of 
work-flows 
Concern with the 
maintenance of 
work-flows 
He is an 'expert' 
serving as a nerve-
centre between his 
clients and other 

























The evidence from a number of sources of differences in managerial jobs 
is summarised in Table 3. These relate mainly to the job itself - level 
and function - as well as size and sector. The reader will notice that 
although we are here interested in isolating differences of {functional) 
managerial role performance, a number of work characteristics appear in 
the Table. This is because characteristic and content (or function) are 
inseparable because each depends upon the other. 
Four of the studies mentioned in the Table are of particular importance 
in evaluating the validity of Mintzberg's roles because they are to a 
greater or lesser extent based upon his work: Irving Charan (1969) attempted 
a partial replication of Mintzberg's work amongst the chief executives 
of small companies, whilst Andre Costin (1970) and Andre Gingras (1977) 
used the Role Set as a basis for their research. Rosemary Stewart (1976) 
used data 'generated by the Mintzberg study in her investigation of a 
variety of different jobs. These four studies are discussed below. 
The Work of Irving Charan (1969) 
Choran's study at the same time served as a validation of Mintzberg's 
methodology and provided us with much new information about managerial 
behaviour. In contrast to Mintzberg's chief executives of large companies, 
Charan chose to study the Presidents of three small companies - a producer 
of industrial chemicals, a manufacturer of consumer cosmetics and a 
restaurant operator. 
The object of the study was to answer questions such as Do managers' 
roles and activities differ between large and small companies? How much 
time does a manager of small firms spend in his various activities? 
Which are his predominant roles and activities? What additional 
activities and roles (if any) does he perform? In summary, what does a 












Mintzberg's methodology and analysis was exactly duplicated with these 
subjects who were each observed for a period of two days. Analysis also 
paralleled that of Mintzberg and on the basis of the results obtained, 
Charan concluded that the managers of small firms perform all ten roles 
and that their work showed the same characteristics {brevity, preference 
for live action and verbal media) as had been described for managers of 
1 arge firms. 
However, against the background of similarity, a variety of very interesting 
differences both in characteristic and content could be seen. Compared 
to the chief ·executive of a large company, the small firm president 
engaged in many more activities per day. This meant that the fragmentation 
and discontinuity of his work was greatly accentuated and the brevity of 
his contacts was very pronounced. The increase in the number of activities 
was not in scheduled meetings but rather in unscheduled and ad hoc contacts 
with subordinates and outsiders. The small firm manager showed a greater 
preference for informal contacts - particularly in his use of the telephone. 
Most of the contacts made by the small company manager were for the express 
purpose of receiving and transmitting information. Mintzberg 1 s description 
of the manager as a 'nerve centre• is underlined by Choran 1 s manager 
who showed a distinct appetite for instant communication gathering (monitor). 
Once gathered, 76% of the contacts which the manager made were for the 
purpose of passing along this 1 hot 1 information {disseminator). The manager 
spent most of his time in his office either on the telephone or in unscheduled 
meetings. Scheduled meetings, when held, were of extremely short duration. 
Not only did the managers do the same things, but in many cases the 
proportion of their activities were similar. They all interacted mainly 
with subordinates, suppliers and customers - in contrast to the managers 
of large companies who interacted with directors, peers and other outsiders. 
Thus the .figurehead and liaison role although performed by the small firm 
manager does not have as great an importance· as it does for the manager of 












Whilst the chief executive of the large company spends much of his time 
coordinating the activities of subordinates to whom he has delegated 
responsible tasks, the manager of the small firm is far closer to the 
operating level and must therefore be in possession of more detailed 
information on a wider variety of subjects. He spends more time making tours, 
motivating and encouraging his staff (leader) and seeking information on 
inventory levels, orders received, and the state of work in progress. 
The only way in which he can accommodate this wide variety of activities 
into the number of hours in the working day is to adopt an informal mode 
of operation, and above we saw evidence of this in a number of unscheduled 
meetings and short telephone calls. Charan concludes that the leader and 
information processing roles (within the finn) are more significant for 
the ma~ager of a small firm. 
Another way of looking at this is to see the manager of the larg·e firm 
with his diversified outside network of contacts, increased formality, 
and formal meetings as being 'professional', and the manager of the smaller 
firm with his greater informality, restricted network, and ad hoc meetings 
as being more 'entrepreneurial': a view shown in a study by Stieglitz 
(cited in Mintzberg 1973:107) who polled 48 chief executives and found 
that the heads of large firms thought of themselves as being 'professionals' 
whilst the managers of the small firms saw themselves as 'entrepreneurs'. 
This difference between managers of large and sma 11 fi nns in the degree 
of formality is not so much a matter of choice but of necessity. The 
manager of a small firm simply does not have subordinates at his disposal 
to whom he can delegate important tasks. His work within the crganisation 
therefore takes on a more multi-facetted appearance. Charan states that 
this gravitation of the small firm manager towards operator roles is simply 
due to the 'limited availability of human resources' (lack of delegation). 
This view had been proposed by Rosemary Stewart in her earlier book when 
she stated: 
Additional information comparing the results obtained by Mintzberg, Charan, 












PManaging in a large company has important differences from managing 
in a small one. For instance, both the amount of specialisation and 
the type of contact with staff will vary." (1963:66) 
In overall summary we can conclude that the managers of both large and 
* small firms perform similar work and that the differences both in 
characteristic and in role performance are more a matter of degree or 
emphasis than in real content. More particularly, Choran's study adds 
weight to Mintzberg's work, helps to validate the existence of the 
ten-role set, and at the same time highlights the differences between 
management of a large and small firm. 
The Work of Andre Costin (1970) 
We recall that Mintzberg's sample of chief executives was a mixture of 
private and semi-public (education and health) subjects. And that he 
found that the liaison, spokesman, and negotiator roles were apparently 
more important for the latter group than for the business man at top 
level. Costin set out to ascertain whether this held true with managers 
at lower levels. 
Related to this, Charan describes 2 additional roles which he saw his small-
firm managers performing: Specialist and Substitute Operator. The manager 
acts as Specialist when he performs a particular function in addition to that 
of his job as manager. He does this when he believes that he is the most 
capable person in the organisation to undertake this function. Examples 
cited by Choran are implementation and subsequent operation of an inventory 
control system and acting as the purchasing agent for supplies (this role thus 
has improvement project or entrepreneur overtones). He acts as substitute 
operator when some sort of crisis necessitates it. Examples here are 
absenteeism of a key employee, or any situation where an extra hand is 
temporarily needed. This role therefore has very strong Disturbance Handler 













He accepted the existence of the ten-role set and constructed a questionnaire 
which was designed to monitor the frequency with which a given manager 
performed each of the 10 roles in the set. For example,, in extracting 
information about the disseminator. role he asks how much. time the manager 
spends 'passing on information from outside your organisation to your 
subordinates. 1 
The questionnaire was mailed to 500 middle managers in business and 
government, and 100 replies from each group were subjected to a paired 
correlational analysis. Firstly, all the respondents from both groups 
were able to describe their job in terms of all the ten roles. Secondly, 
there was no significant difference between the two groups in their rating 
of their importance of 9 of the 10 roles. Thus it appeared that the relative 
importance of the Liaison, Spokesman, and Negotiator roles in the public 
organisation was more a feature of top management than middle or lower 
management: at the middle management level this difference had disappeared • 
. The one exception to the role similarity of jobs was in performance of the 
entrepreneurial function. The manager in the public organisation which is 
operating in a more stable and less competitive environment than his private 
sector counterpart has less need of involvement in improvement projects and 
innovation in general. Costin summ~rises this part of his study thus: 
11 It may be concluded that the roles which managers are called to perform 
are qualitatively and quantitativelj similar ... However, the 
activities of the two groups differ in one critical respect ... 
A significantly greater proportion of businessmen are involved in a 
more active search for new ways to involve their organisations and 
in improvements which they can bring to their organisations." (1970:39) 
And because the public manager exists in a relatively stable environment 
he has. less need of instant and up-to-date information than the private 
manager and therefore makes less use of informal communication channels. 
This force.towards greater formality is added to by the fact that the public 
manager is.dealing with issues which involve the public interest - which 
· Mintzberg describes as more 'politically sensitive'. The whole 












Rosemary Stewart (1976) 
This analysis involved investigation of 16 jobs covering a variety of 
functions across 3 levels in a number of companies using a questionnaire-
and-diary. The development of this instrument followed a number of stages: 
initially data on job characteristics from her earlier study (1967) as well 
as from a number of other authors was collected and a questionnaire was 
improvised. Here Stewart relied heavily upon all the data not only on 
job characteristic but also that on function developed by Mintzberg {1973). 
Validation of the questionnaire was accomplished by means of discussions . 
with pilot interviewees, comparison with known.job descriptions, and by 
discussion with students at managerial courses. Lastly, the questionnaire 
was given to managers 'in comparable jobs' to test for differences. This 
testing and retesting for reliability naturally caused a number of changes 
to be made, and after 14 different versions of the questionnaire had been 
written the final form was agreed upon. A sample page of this is reproduced 
in Figure 7 below. · 
The questionnaire was designed as a diary for self-completion by the manager, 
and the methodology followed was, briefly, to have him complete it over a 
three-week per4od. This self-completion was reinforced by one of the 
researchers in the team observing the manager for 3 days in the 3-week period. 
A different day of the week was chosen for observation in each of the 3 
weeks: "This had 'the merit of giving us a potentially wider sample of the 
manager's work and of acting as a check on his diary keeping ... it had.the 
demerit of providing no continuity of observation." (page 152) 
A comparison was made between .the self-recording on the diary and the 
observational data. The main difference found here was that managers tended 
to be bad estimators of their own time expenditure: 11we discovered a common 
tendency to underestimate the amount of time spent with other people, or 
conversely to overestimate the time spent on paper work. 11 (page 153) Finally, 












21. How much of your time is spent on tasks that 
anyone else in the job would have to do? 
(e.g. supervise staff, see customers, attend 
meetings, meet visitors, interview job applicants, 
write reports, prepare budgets, carry out specific 
technical tasks.) 
If you score below 6, what do you do that would 
not have to be done by anyone else in the job? 
22.* Does your job require you to respond to the 
problems, requests, or instructions of others? 
23.* Thinking of the activities of your day, how far can 
these be dealt with using the procedures, or 
generally recognized methods, of your 
profession/organization? 
Comments ............................ . 
...................................... 
24. a) If you have a serious problem are there people 
(e.g. boss, colleagues, specialists) whom you can 
rnn..:u/t? 
Source: Stewart (1976:130 - 131) 













These questions are also on a 7-point scale, but please answer in terms of 
Importance; the extent to which it is a significant aspect of the job, so: 
1 = No, not at all . 
2 = Marginal importance, applies to a small and unimportant extent. 
3 
4 = Midpoint, moderate importance in the job. 
5 
6 = Important, a significant characteristic of the job. 
7 = Very important, a major characteristic of the job. 
IMPORTANCE 
0 -0 "'~ 
~ Relationships 
25. In your job do you have to actively seek the 
cooperation of people inside the organization over 
whom you have no authority? (Exclude bosses.) 
Examples ...............•.............. 
26. In your job are you involved in trade union or staff 
association negotiations? 
27. In your job do you personally have to bargain with 
people external to the organization? (that is try to 
get better terms for a service or product you are 
buying or selling) 
Example .............................. . 
28. Jn your job must you deal with people outside any 
part of the organization whose job objectil'eS con-
flict with those of your job? (Exclude customers, 
suppliers and trade union officers.) 
If so, please give examples ............... . 
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From the analysis 12 types of contact pattern and 4 types of work pattern 
were identified. The contact patterns (which referred to the amount and 
nature of internal versus external contact that a given job holder had) 
categorised the jobs by level, whilst the work patterns (in terms of 
characteristics such as fragmentation of work, time span of problem solving, 
recurrence of job activity) were analysed by function. 
Generally all the results supported the findings of earlier work including 
that of Mintzberg. None contradicted it. This statement is true for 
level, function, and the size of organisation as shown on Table 3 above. 
For instance on the managerial level we find the predicted brevity, variety 
and 'fragmentation• of work pattern. A type of activity which Stewart calls 
'the grasshopper method. 1 Further, Mintzberg•s contention that the manager 
actually prefers this method of working and will therefore allow himself to 
be interrupted in order to receive 'instant• information (that his preference 
is for 'moving media') is borne out: 
11 Managers typically switch their attention every few minutes from one 
person or subject to another . . . The explanation . . . seems to be 
that many managers find it easiest to deal with each problem as they 
think of it. Our observations show that the amount of fragmentation 
was, for some of the managers, more a reflection of their personal style 
than of the demands of the job.' (page 38) 
As we shall see in the following section, Miss Stewart does not regard 
Mintzberg•s roles as being a useful conceptualisation of managerial work, 
and yet in discussing the results of the study a terminology is developed 
which very closely parallels the role categorisation. For example she 
speaks about the manager 11 dealing with disturbances" and of his work being 
characterised by "interruptions for trouble-shooting." Both of these are 
disturbance handling. Her top managers are "concerned with the design of 
systems and with their modifications. 11 This is entrepreneurship. They 
have demands placed upon them to develop a set of external contacts: they 
have a "need to develop personal relationships and to establish goodwill". 
as well as to maintain good "public relations." This is all performance of 
the Liaison role. There is also a demand for 11 bargaining 11 (negotiator role). 
There is naturally also a recognition of the manager's need to indulge in 
monitoring activity: 11 the manager monitors to ensure that the targets are 












The Study of Andre Gingras 
Further information about the work of managers in public organisations is 
provided by a recent study by Gingras {1977). After spending some considerable 
time on a detailed review of Mintzberg's work and exploring a number of 
possible avenues for further research, Gingras finally reaches the conclusion 
that: 
"Thanks to Mintzberg, viable and valid classification (of managerial 
work) have been established ... and it would be better to now 
collect as much data as possible in this area in order to validate, 
invalidate, or alter the conclusions given by Mintzberg. 11 (page 58) 
And "It would be better to take the existence of these roles and their 
viability in a managerial context as given, to operationalise them 
and to test their importance amongst various types of managers and 
in various types of organisation." (page 59)* 
Gingras decided to use a questionnaire consisting of three parts, each of 
which contained a different type of question: The first was designed to 
test the manager's conception of his function or role in the organisation 
and was of the true/false type. The second tapped the managers' time 
employment - the amount of time he spent performing each of the ten roles 
in the set. Here definitions of certain terms were included "to facilitate 
response and to assure uniformity with Mintzberg's research." The third 
section of the questionnaire was of a semantic differential type and was 
designed to detect the frequency of performance of some of the activities -
to gain information on certain of the characteristics such as brevity, 
variety and fragmentation. 
After a pretest validation to exclude ambiguities, the questionnaire was 
submitted to 136 subjects who came from a dozen ministeries in the Quebec 
Provincial Government. These respondents were selected so as to balance 
The original of this work is written in French. Whilst I am only in 
possession of a partial translation, I have no reason to assume that it 












the sample between directors and heads of services of small and large 
missions who were engaged in both staff and line functions. The data from 
71 returned questionnaires (representing a return rate of 51%) were first 
coded and then analysed by means of a 'statistical program for the social 
sciences' (SPSS) computer package. 
In analysing first of all the characteristics of the public manager's 
work, Gingras notes that 'at first sight' the same kind of task as 
Mintzberg's manager is perfonned but that there is less brevity and 
fragmentation, more continuity and consistency, and that each activity 
lasted longer. This he ascribes to the bureaucratic aspect of public 
organisations which also prescribes a greater formality on the manager's 
task, and effectively prevents him from working on 'what is moving.' Thus 
his communication contacts are less verbal and more written in the form of 
letters and internal memoranda. 
However, what the public manager actually does is not what he would like to 
do: Gingras reports that the data indicates that the manager would prefer 
to make more use of informal communication media such as telephone calls 
because of "swiftness and effi ciency 11 but the more formal communications 
such as written memoranda and scheduled meetings are "forced upon him 
because of the structure of the organisation." Here the findings of 
Costin are strongly confirmed. 
The public manager is also seen as being a central figure in a network of 
contacts but "we must emphasise that this network of contacts is mostly 
dominated by contacts with intra-organisational activity 11 (page 99}. In 
other words the public manager spends more of his time in information 
processing relating to matters within his own department than does the private 
sector manager. And it is in Mintzberg's work characteristic of rights and 
duties that the public manager appears to differ most from his private counterpart. 
The conclusion is that the public manager's work can still be seen as being 












And what of the content of the public manager's work? What about his role 
performance? Gingras sees him performing the Figurehead role only 
infrequently (as when asked to speak on behalf of his organisation) but 
this performance as almost incidental ("accidental") to his total managerial 
function. On the other hand the pub 1 i c manager is seen as "fully" performing 
his Liaison role. It is in his role as Leader that the public manager 
appears to encounter the most difficulty in performing an adequate 
interpersonal function: Because of the formal set of rules and regulations 
"prescribed by the bureaucratic organisation", the public manager does 
not get much opportunity to exhibit leadership and appears to perform the 
Leader role "occasionally." Further, it seems that "this role is more 
often played in front of peers or subordinates and very rarely in front of 
hierarchical superiors" (page 102). 
Gingras sees the public manager as quite 'fully' performing all three 
information processing roles. It is a pity though that having given us 
fairly comprehensive information and comment with regard to the characteristics 
of the monitoring media, he does not go into more detail in describing each 
of the Monitor, Oisseminator, and Spokesman roles. In this section, beyond 
seeing the public manager as "a sort of catalyst and agent of information" 
(equivalent to Mintzberg's Nerve Centre) and saying that "the actual 
expansion of the management information system in public administration 
proves it" (a statement open to considerable criticism) he gives us no further 
information on these roles. 
Both the internal and external environment of the public organisation manager 
is stable relative to that of a private firm and few unexpected situations 
occur. Therefore, although there are sometimes crises to be dealt with, 
the importance of the Disturbance Handler role diminishes for the public 
manager. In keeping with the lesser importance of the interpersonal roles, 
his Resource Allocation more frequently involves material and financial 
* resources rather than those to do with people because the public organisation 
proceeds with a "natural rhythm." 
The validity of this statement is open to question: Amongst the predominant 
characteristics of public (bureaucratic) organisations are assigning work 
to subordinates, programming it, and continually authorising actions taken. 












In summary, Gingras provides us with some additional insights into 
managerial work in public organisations. In doing so he confirms the 
existence of all ten of Mintzberg 1 s roles - with the possible exception 
of entrepreneur - and here the results are in keeping with those of 
Costin. Both Gingras and Costin see the public manager as being more 
1 formal 1 , more 1 professional 1 , and (because of the organisational 












CRITICISM OF MINTZBERG'S WORK 
Henry Mintzberg's description of the Role Set as well as the other findings 
and postulations contained in the 'The Nature of Managerial Work' have found 
wide international acceptance in the relatively short time since publication. 
The text has formed the basis for management and professional seminars, 
is used in training programmes, and the theory has been published in one 
form or another in a large number of journals. It is probably true to say 
that the closer the leader is to the 'coalface' of management, the more 
enthusiastic has been his reception of the work - no doubt because he 
recognises it as the most accurate theoretical model or set of statements 
reflecting what he actually does: This in contrast to the many 'How To' 
prescriptive texts on management. 
At the same time Mintzberg's work had attracted some criticism. Two of 
these critiques - from widely differing quarters - deserve comment: 
Paine and Naumes' 'Strategy and Policy Formation' is in many ways an 
excellent book. It is certainly refreshing in that it attempts to 
integrate the various prescriptive and descriptive approaches to policy-
making and to develop a hierarchy of the elements. It also expresses 
reservations concerning the validity of Mintzberg's work. 
The authors quote Campbell et al (1970) as saying that what we do not 
have but what we need is 11 a set of fundamental dimensions to describe 
or me as u re . . . job be ha vi ors . 11 ( 19 7 4 : 115) 
Firstly these latter authors belong firmly in the Behavioural Science 
School which we reviewed in Chapter 2. Secondly, although they are 
critical of the Ohio Studies approach and regard the 2-factor description 
of managerial behaviour (Initiating Structure, and Consideration) as 
manifestly adequate, 
11 Certai nly, this must be an oversimpl i fi ca ti on of the characteristics 












they completely ignore the field findings of Leonard Sayles (1964) and 
somewhat arbitrarily go on to evolve a 4-factor schema of individual 
autonomy, position structure, reward orientation, and consideration: A 
description which one might contend is an equal oversimplification even 
when seen in the light of just Sayles' field descriptions. 
More particularly, it is hard to understand why Paine and Naumes avoid even 
naming Mintzberg's roles when extracts of much of his other work are discussed 
at length, and the subject of managerial roles is dealt with in several 
places in the text. Whilst the authors recognise·the need for more empirical 
research, mention of Mintzberg's (1973) work is confined to a footnote. 
Perhaps the reason is that for all their seeming objectivity and eclecticism, 
they remain basically normative in their approach. They speak of 'what 
should be' and further appear to want descriptive theory to fit in with the 
main body of nonnative theory: 
"Advances in field research would probably be aided and abetted by 
advances in nonnative theory. Better normative and descriptive content 
is needed for policy prescriptions." (1974:20) (underlining mine) 
Thus the results of empirical studies such as those of Mintzberg which do 
not dovetail with descriptive dogma (and even contradict some of it), are 
relegated to the background. 
Finally, in discussing the various descriptive approaches (inter alia, March, 
Simon, Mintzberg) Paine and Naumes say that: "they may be criticised as either 
not testable or not yet adequately tested." (1974:19) 
We might simply ask whether~ prescriptive theory has ever been 'testable' 
or 1 tested 1 • 
The second criticism comes from Rosemary Stewart. In the previous section we 
reviewed her latest book, 'Contrasts in Management' (1976) and saw how she 
avoided using any of the role descriptions. This is because her philosophy 
about managerial behaviour differs in two fundamental respects from that of 












Firstly, she does not believe that research should be oriented towards 
producing a general theory about managerial work but should rather concentrate 
on isolating differences. In an earlier work she stated: 
11 The diversity of a manager's job reduces the value of generalisations 
about his functions 11 (1967:67), 
and in summarising her latest work: 
11 The research has shown the extent of the differences between managers 1 
jobs in terms of demands. This should help to·shift the focus of 
interest from the traditional generalisations about managerial work 
to a recognition of the importance of understanding the differences 
in such work. 11 (1976:155) 
Secondly, in direct contradiction of Mintzberg, she does not believe that 
all managers perform all ten roles and she regards the role descriptions 
themselves as being too wide: 
11 We tried during the observation to use, as one method of analysing 
the manager's activities, the roles described by Mintzberg. We found 
it too difficult to identify the roles unambiguously for them to be 
useful in our analyses. 11 (page 153) (She does not say why) And 
11 The relative importance of the roles differs greatly in different jobs: 
They do not apply in all managerial jobs. 11 (page 123) 
Now we have seen in reviewing the work of Charan (1969), Costin (1970) and 
Gingras (1977), that there is every indication that all managers do indeed 
perform all ten roles in the course of their work - although there is a 
differential role emphasis (as originally postulated by Mintzberg). Also, 
none of the research reviewed (including that of Stewart) contradicted 
any other piece of work. 
We come then to a subtle but important point: In her ultimate summary 
Stewart emphasises that : 
"Some of the differences (contact types and work pattern types) identified 
cut-across function and level" (page 155) 
And so, if the differences are found across level and function and job type 













At the same time as we have reviewed work based upon the Ten Role Set in order 
to gain confirmation of the validity of Mintzberg's theory, we have seen 
a comprehensive picture of managerial work in different types of organisations 
at different levels and in different functions begin to emerge. Aided by 
Stewart's (1976) study, we find an increasing and decreasing relative 
importance of certain roles between different types and sizes of organisation. 
Within a~particular organisation there are many similarities across level 
and function, and as we move up and down the hierarchy within the private 
firm two roles (Figurehead and Disturbance Handler) pursue a reciprocal 
importance (Figure 3). 
Most important, there are no contradictory findings either in the characteristics 
or the content of managerial work. What we are looking at are differences 
imposed upon a tableau of similarity. 
It would appear that what Mintzberg says when discussing jobs at different 
levels is generally true: "Although I have found no support for the 
contention that managerial jobs ... differ in kind, there is considerable 
evidence that they differ in orientation" (1973:110). 
My own experimental study takes off from this point in the sense that it is 
based upon an investigation of Mintzberg's Role Set, and we shall refer again 
to the work of Mintzberg, the Diarists, and Sayles in discussion of the results 
which follow. But before presenting this work I should like to discuss. some 
empirical evidence from a number of other areas which directly and indirectly 
bear upon and support Mintzberg's findings. 














Although we have up to now discussed various approaches to different 
aspects of organisational functioning, they have all had one thing in 
common, namely a macroscopic approach. I should now like to briefly 
outline the work of research done on the micro level: the work of 
the cognitivists. Their findings, particularly in the area of information 
processing, will form the basis for a re-examination of managerial 
information-decision-making processes in the following chapters. 
Introduction 
Cognitive psychology as a recognised area within the main body of psychology 
has a relatively short history - something of the order of 20 years. 
It is a somewhat amorphous and ill-organised field consisting of loosely-
connected groups of information whose subject matter includes everything 
from social psychology through to neuropsychology. 
In contrast to the behaviourist who would contend that the physiological 
pattern of the reflex arc explains the stimulus-response relationship, 
the cognitive theorist supports the idea that there is some mediating 
force between stimulus and response which is much more complex than a 
simple arc. The "image" or sum total of past experience is often cited 
as the mediating force. The difference between these two positions is 












"{The Brain) is far more like a map control room than it is like an 
old-fashioned telephone exchange. The stimuli which are allowed in are 
not connected by just simple one-to-one switches to the outgoing responses. 
Rather, the incoming impulses are usually worked over and elaborated in the 
central control room into a tentative cognitive-like map of the environment. 
And it is this tentative map indicating routes and paths and 
environmental relationships which finally detennine·what responses 
if any the animal will finally release." (cited in Kast and Rosenzweig, 
1970:346) 
Thus the cognitivist tries to account for how people behave in terms of 
mental (cognitive) processes which are present at the time that the behaviour 
takes place. He therefore (again in contrast to the behaviourist) views 
motive as a cognitive event rather than a biological one. 
An individual's cognitive or personal value system is affected by his 
physical and social environment, his physiological structure and processes, 
his wants and goals, and his past experiences. The cognitive psychological 
approach attempts to take all these into account. Its approach is thus 
eclectic and as Joynson stresses, it is anti-reductionistic: 
"Cognitive theorists accept cognition on its own level: behaviourists 
try to reduce it down to something else. The behaviourist approach 
to concepts, for example, asks how the subject learns to make a common 
response to superficially dissimilar objects. The cognitive approach 
asks how the subject categorises the world of the senses and brings order 
out of chaos" (1972:9) 
And so cognitive psychology's competitor, behaviourism, tends to characterise 
mental operations as extremely simple one-to-one relationships of stimulus 
and response. The opposing view of the cognitivist is put by Broadbent 
in terms which have applicability in our study of managerial work: 
11 The fashion of recent years has rather been to think of each sensory 
event as affecting a complex of interacting processes many of which were 
already in progress before the stimulus arrived. These processes may 
transform the information about the stimulus into another form, leave it 
temporarily aside and then take it up later, abstract certain features 
from it and neglect others, use it to modify an internal representation 
of the whole outside environment, manipulate this symbolic model of the 
world to represent events distant in space or time, start a movement or 
control it once initiated, and generally operate upon this stimulus rather 












In the same way as other approaches to the study of psychology have been 
criticised, so too has the cognitive one: the behaviourists assert that it 
is too mentalistic, the rationalistic researcher that it is too data-bound, 
and the phenomenologist attacks it for even attempting to formulate laws 
because every individual is unique and thus generalisations inferred between 
them cannot be held to be true. One gathers that cognitive psychology is a 
compromise. Pylshyn (1974) sums it up when he says that "cognitive psychology 
has rather self-consciously steered a middle ground in which the formal 
aspect of the computer furnishes the conceptual structures around which 
empirical observations are organised." And so the cognitivist tends to 
avoid formal models and is generally sceptical of formal experimental method 
which would allow him to investigate the content of mind but not the mental 
process. Because he is so interested in the latter he tends to value 
everyday observation. 
Cognitive Theories 
Leon Festinger broke new ground with his theory of cognitive dissonance 
in 1957. And in 1960 Miller, Galanter, and Pribram published their 
Test-Operate-Test-Exit or TOTE theory which supported the cognitive theorist 
outlook on behaviour. The TOTE unit incorporates the notion of feedback 
control and suggests that the operations which an organism performs are 
constantly guided by the outcomes of the various acts. He continually 
tests the situation for congruity or incongruity. If con~ruity exists 
then no further action is called for. If, however incongruity exists, 
then some operation is invoked. The individual makes tests repeatedly 
in order to indicate whether or not the operation should continue. 
The important thing here is the postulation of a continual testing or monitor: 
an incremental rather than an overall method of functioning. Further, it 
appears from the TOTE model that decisions are made at all levels and that 
















all the accumulated organised knowledge that a person has 
about himself and his environment 
a rough sketch of some course of action (strategy) as well 
as more detailed operating procedures (tactics) 
carrying out a plan step-by-step, completing one part and 
then moving to the next. This may involve overt action or 
only the collecting and/or transformation of information 
( 196 0 : 16-1 8) 
Thus for the first time we have a hint of the pervasiveness of decision-
making and how a basic feedback or decision unit can be used to describe 
all behaviour on continua of programmability or unconsciousness. 
In the previous section we mentioned valence-expectancy theory of motivation 
as it applied to the path-goal of leadership. This, as well as 
goal-setting theory and equity or exchange theory are examples of cognitive 
theories of motivation which can be contrasted with the more "humanistic" 
content theories of Maslow, McGregor and McClelland. 
What of empirical studies, especially those of use to us in decision-making 
in particular and managerial work in general? 
The development of the digital computer in the late 1950's allowed for the 
simulation of individual human thought processes. Van Der Geer (1966) 
outlines the early history of simulation programs: Newell and Simon first 
entered this field in 1960 with the development of their general problem-solver 
program. They were followed by Hovland (1960), Langery (1962), and others 
until Winegrad (1972) formulated a computer program which physically manipulated 
objects .. Thus a valuable stock of analogies or heuristic devices was built 
up with work being done by psychologists, engineers, and mathematicians, amongst 
others. 
~ut almost all of this work focussed on fabricated situations such as the 
playing of chess and solving of mathematical problems. In most of this work 
the researchers elicited formal protocols or verbalisations of conscious 












these protocols were then analysed to build up the computer programs. They 
were apparent simulations of the mental processes which were being used by 
the subjects. The validity of the programs was then tested by having both 
the person and the computer make a similar decision with new data. If both 
produced the same result then it was concluded that a thought process had 
been described accurately. 
But cognitive psychology does not only consist of computer simulations. As 
Neisser puts it: "the occasional and anal~gic use of programming concepts 
does not imply a commitment to computer 'simulation' of psychological 
processes. 11 ( 1966 :9) 
There are a vast number of studies in the cognitive sphere the findings of 
which are valuable in explaining how the manager functions in his job: 
How he perceives his organisational world, the limits to the input storage 
and retrieval of information, and, most importantly, what effect this has on 
the decision-making function. 
In 1961 Vogel and Bogen cut through the corpus callosum of a 48-year old 
epileptic who thus became the first human to have the two hemispheres of 
his brain entirely separated. Subsequent investigation by Sperry (who had 
some years earlier performed the same operation on a cat), Gazzaniga, as 
well as other researchers, confirmed something which had been believed by 
Eastern philosophers and written about by Western authors for centuries: 
that the left and right hemispheres of the brain were responsible for 
entirely different thought processes. They operated in a completely different 
mode and were not merely carbon copies of each other in the same way as 
other duplicated organs of the body. 
The method of operation of the left hemisphere is linear or sequential and 
is thus responsible for logical thought. This contrasts with the right 
hemisphere which operates in a diffuse manner and processes information 
in a wholistic fashion. Levy-Agresti (cited in Bogen, 1969), in discussing 
data collected from one of her patients says that the right hemisphere "is 
specialised for gestalt perception, being primarily a synthesis in dealing 












This means that we have considerable evidence for the existence of two 
completely different ways of thinking. It also means that almost all of 
the knowledge - taken in the general sense of the word - that we have about 
human behaviour is based upon left hemisphere thinking, simply because the 
psychologist, in seeking to be logical and scientific, has used the logical 
left side of his brain with which to interpret the data. Thus, whilst we 
know something about left-sided functioning, we know almost nothing about 
the right. Bogen (1969) feels that 11 we have barely scratched the surface 
of a past unknown" and goes on to say that : 
"The rules or methods by which appositional thought is elaborated on 
1 this 1 side of the brain (the side which speaks, reads and writes) 
have been subjected to analyses of syntax, semantics, and mathematical 
logic, for many years. The rules by which appositional thought is 
elaborated on the •other side 1 of the brain will need study for many 
years to come. 11 (cited in Ornstein, 1973:111) 
Below is a Table of Dichotomies as they have appeared in the writings of 
general literature, philosophy, and as they have been described by 
researchers of split-brain animals and humans. 
The concept of right-sided or innovative thought is discussed further in 
























Humphrey and Zangwill (1951) 
Milner (1958) 
Semmes et al (1960) 
Bogen and Gazzaniga (1965) 


































Perceptua 1 , 
non-verb a 1 




Source: Compiled from Bogen (1969) and Ornstein (1972:83). 
Bogen does not define 'appositional', but says that 11 it implies a capacity 
for apposing or comparing of perceptions, schemes, engrams, etc., and very 













It is said that written data remains just that - raw and m~aningless -
until it has been 'worked' in some way so as to become relevant to the 
problem at hand. Only then does it become information. So it is with 
both visual and auditory stimuli which are the 'raw data' of our information 
processing system. 
Tachistoscopic research has shown that visual stimuli 'assist' and make 
them available for processing after the stimulus has terminated. This 
stage of cognition is called iconic memory (Neisser, 1966:15). But this 
visual impression is subject to very rapid decay and must be coded into 
meaningful elements whilst the stimulus is still active. Because of this 
decay factor and because the coding is meaningful only in terms of the 
subject's past experience, much is lost in this stage. 
Once processed, the elements are stored in short-term memory which is 
again subject to fading-decay if not reinforced. Short-term memory 
also has a limited storage capacity. (Miller, 1956). 
Auditory input is subject to a corresponding echoic memory , and as long 
as it lasts "the listener can select portions of its contents for 
special attention." (Neisser, 1966:199). Hence a filter is at work, the 
selection being a function of the listener's experience as well as his needs 
or wants at that time. Some authors also here refer to 'psychological 
noise' by the receiver. For example, Broadbent (1962) assumes that the 
hypothetical filter can be "tuned" by the receiver to any "channel." 
(cited in Neisser, 1966:208) 
Again the selected, filtered, encoded material is passed to short-term memory 
- what Neisser calls the "active verbal memory" - which is "also the 













A CRITICISM OF COGNITIVISM 
"Even today many psychologists (in attempting to apply 
information theory to psychology) continue to theorise 
and to report data in terms of 1 bits. 1 I do not believe 
however that this approach was or is a fruitful one. 
Attempts to quantify psychological processes in informational 
terms have usually led, after much effort, to the 
conclusion that the 1 bit rate' is not a relevant variable 
at all ... The 1 bit1 was developed to describe the 
performance of unselective systems. A telephone cannot 
decide which portions of the incoming message are important. 
Human beings behave very differently and are by no means 
passive or neutral towards the incoming information. 
Instead they select some part for attention at the expense 
of others, recoding and reformulating them in complex ways. 
(And so) Although information measurement may be of little 
value to the cognitive psychologist ... computer programming 
has much more to offer. A programme is not a device for 
measuring information but a recipe for selecting, storing, 
combining, recovering, outputting and generally manipulating 
it ... This means that programmes have much in common 












What happens then when a person is subjected to too much information in 
a given time? Miller {1960) identifies seven types of dysfunctional 
behaviour: 
(1) Omission: failing to process some of the information 
(2) Error: Processing information incorrectly, (3) Queuing: 
delaying during periods of peak-load in the hope of catching 
up during lulls, (4) fiJtering: neglecting to process certain 
types of information according to some scheme of priorities, 
(5) approximation: cutting categories of discrimination 
(blanket and non-precise way of responding), {6) employing 
multiple channels, using parallel channels as in 
decentralisation and (7) escaping from the task. 
(cited in Katz and Kahn, 1966:231). 
And so information overload can lead to increasingly maladjusted behaviour 
and ultimately to psychological failure. But whilst in a state of 
overload, the manager may not even try to use all the information at his 
disposal. Driver and Streufert {1969) found that subjects in a situation 
of overload use less information in decision-making than do those with 
an optimum amount of information. In other words, more information is not 
necessarily better. They found that there was a 11 curvilinear relationship 
between input complexity and the output of the optical cortex in the brain 
so that beyond the upper limit the brain uses less and less information 
as more and more is provided" (cited in Mintzberg 1975:13). But if as 
Shannon best told us in 1948, "information is choice", how does a person 
use the information at his disposal to choose between alternatives? 
How does he decide? 
Decision-Making 
In Chapter l we briefly considered the work of Herbert Simon and his fellow 
Carnegie researchers March and Cyert. Simon's (1965) trichotomy of 
decision-making behaviour (intelligence activity, design activity and 
choice activity) was discussed as well as the concept of 'bounded rationality.' 
This work more properly belongs in this section, for Simon has been working 
in the cognitive sphere for many years and his findings in this area have 












Mintzberg says that "it is not a coincidence that Simon came to cognitive 
psychology from management: in his former work he saw the need to 
understand human cognition at its root if a sophisticated understanding of 
managerial decision-making was to be developed." (1977a:l2) 
Probably the most definitive work in this field is Newell and Simon's (1972) 
book on Human Problem Solving. They analyse three types of human problems, 
namely cryptarithmetic, symbolic logic, and chess and draw upon this 
empirical data to construct a theory of problem-solving. They argue that 
human problem-solving can be understood by describing (1) the task 
environment in which it takes place (2) the problem space - the space that 
the problem solver uses to represent the environment (3) the task itself 
and (4) the knowledge about it which he gradually builds up. 
One of their essential findings is that complex problems are sub-divided 
by the problem-solver into smaller sub-processes so that the subject can 
then apply general problem-solving programmes and so deal with each sub-
piece. He selects his programmes from a standard repertoire and thus the 
unstructured problem is broken down to the point where his own standard 
programme is employed to solve it. These standard programmes are used 
by the problem-solver on more than one type of problem: they are adaptable. 
In explaining the behaviour of the problem solvers Newell and Simon state: 
"We discover that their flexibility - their programmability is 
the key to understanding them. Their viability depends upon 
their being able to behave adaptably in a wide range of 
environments. A proper understanding of the intimate inter-
dependence between an adaptive organism and its environment 
is essential to a clear view of what a science of an adaptive 
species can be like. 11 (1972:870) 
"We reveal the true simplicity of the adaptive system, for as 
we have seen, we need postulate only a very simple information 
processing system in order to account for human problem solving 
in such tasks as chess, logic, and cryptarithmetic. The 
apparently complex behavior of the information processing 
system in a given environment is produced by the interaction of 
the demands of that environment with a few basic parameters of 













They thus propose an "inner" and an "outer" the.ory of problem-solving: 
The "inner" theory relating to the fine structure - the detail - as well as 
the errors, confusions and wrong explorations. The "outer" theory consisting 
of the main gross results of the problem-solving exercise. 
From what we have said about informatiQn processing with regard to individual 
differences, one would expect that each human approaches a problem-solving 
situation in his own unique way. Newell and Simon disagree. They explain 
differences amongst individuals in terms of learning and development, the 
content of their long-term memories determined by their own culture, education, 
socio-economic class, experience, etc. But they observed a certain "source 
of commonality among human problem-solvers"- namely the characteristics of 
their task-environments: "If we put several humans in the same problem 
situation, if they have the same goals, and if they have sufficient ability 
to solve the problem, then many features of their behavior are given the 
same shape by the task envirbnment. 11 (1972:865) 
They also argued that as all humans have a few universal structural 
characteristics such as nearly identical memory parameters "these 
commonalities produce common characteristics of behavior among all human 
prob 1em-so1vers. 11 ( 1972 :864) 
Summary 
Cognitive psychology is complex in that the field is ill-defined and 
in seeking to answer more applied needs it synthesises many of the previously 
arbitrarily separated areas of more traditional psychology. It does not 
see the need of necessarily having to maintain a position of strict objectivity 
and might advance explanations which are not immediately verifiable by traditional 
means. 
This "anti-empirical trend" {Broadbent, 1970:87), has brought criticism 
from the behaviourist in particular. But as we have already seen, their 












It is precisely because the cognitivist has been prepared to adopt this 
somewhat eclectic stance that his work is so valuable to us in explaining 
aspects of decision-making and of strategy formulation. These subjects 
are discussed in Chapter 8. 
In particular, the cognitive findings on information processing form the 
basis of our understanding of the manager's monitor and disseminator role 
activity. The relationship between role behaviour and strategy formulation 
is examined in Chapter 9. 
Finally, the argument in favour of the cognitivist is put quite bluntly 
by Posner et al who state: 
11 The human information processing system is so adaptable that 
its mechanisms cannot be specified by empirical study, at 
least not with the methods available in psychology. 11 
This thought is returned to in discussing the implications of the study 













INFORMATION AND DECISION-MAKING 
We saw in Chapter I how the traditional approach to decision-making viewed 
the manager as acting 'rationally' by choosing the best alternative course 
of action, all of which are known to him. He was seen to be in possession 
of all relevant information. The vast prescriptive literature which has 
grown up around this notion deals with routine decisions - decisions which 
are repetitive and refer more to the operating level of the organisation. 
In contrast to these programmed decisions we know that the type of decision 
which the manager has to face is unprogrammed or unstructured. It is highly 
complex and open-ended and there is no 'correct' or 'best' solution. 
Some unprogralTTiled decisions are entirely novel and must be especially designed 
to fit the particular set of circumstances, others have not been encountered 
in quite the same form before. 
How then does the manager go about making these decisions? And what 
empirical evidence do we have of these processes? 
PROGRAMMING THE UNPROGRAMMABLE 
Evidence from the cognitivists was that faced with a complex situation, the 
individual broke the available evidence down into smaller and smaller 
fragments until they were of a size that we could deal with them: He 
programmes the problem into familiar structured elements which are then 












11 The processes themselves are made up by aggregating very large 
numbers of elements, each element, taken by itself, being 
exceedingly simple. In an age of electronic computers this fact 
- if it is a fact - should not surprise us, for this is exactly 
the way in which a computer operates: It performs intricate and 
elaborate mathematical computations, but it performs them by 
executing sequences of enormous length of elementary steps, 
where each such step is no more complicated than adding one and 
one to get two. We are not arguing that human brains are 
necessarily like computers, but simply that complex processes can 
be aggregated from simple elements. 11 (1958:178) 
In this way the individual problem-solver overcomes his own cognitive 
limitations, and he then proceeds to take short-cuts by choosing solutions 
which are not optimal but satisfactory. Thus we can infer from the work of 
Newell and Simon (1972) and others that unprogrammed decisions are 
programmable and that there is an underlying logic or structure to the whole 
decision process. 
Carrying on the analogy between managerial work and computer programmes, 
Klahr and Leavitt (1967) described an 'Executive Programme' in which they 
saw the executive looking outside the programme (or organisation) and 
receiving information as well as looking inside the organisation in order 
to maintain control over its sub-programmes: The manager (1) detects 
by checking what is to be done and what still needs doing (2) interrupts 
by stopping one sub-programme and starting another (3) monitors by making 
sure that no errors have occurred or are threatening (4) allocates resources 
to the appropriate routines (departments) and (5) coordinates by making 
sure that when sub-parts of the activities are completed the results are 
fed to the next stage of the process. Finally, he (5) does 'housekeeping' 
by inspecting and cleaning up unused areas to make them available for new 
information. These housekeeping routines initiate and finalise the loose 
ends that the sub-programmes may have neglected. 
As Mintzberg notes: 11 what is interesting about this approach is that it ties 
the description of the manager's work to a set of programmes that have already 
been specified" (1973:137). More particularly, we are introduced to the sub-
routine of 'interrupt' where the manager is seen as starting and stopping 
and switching backwards and forwards between programmes. This would tend 
to suggest problems are solved (decisions are made) not in an wholistic 
manner, but that when one part of the problem has been solved the manager may 












to the original one. 
Amongst the empirical work done on programming managerial decisions is the 
study by John Radomsky (1967). He studied the decision-making behaviour 
of three middle managers by asking them to verbalise their thoughts as 
they sat working at their desks. He recorded their actions on videotape. 
The following day these tapes were reviewed with the manager and it was 
found that he was able to pick up details missed by himself and previously 
unnoticed by the subject. From these protocols, Radomsky worked out the 
manager's scheduling programme (Figure 8). 
He defines scanning as the process of identifying information in the 
environment - the skinning of information which the manager sees or feels 
is easily within rrls reach. Some of this information has purposes other 
than identification of problems. The manager is essentially focussing 
his attention on that portion of the task which he will consider for 
processing. This has the 'flavour' of a programmed process in that he is 
seeking to recognise problems that have occurred before or are predetermined 
by policy procedure or practice. 
Radomsky differentiates between scanning and search. He defines the latter 
as a task consisting of extended active information. It is the infonnation-
gathering process associated with new ill-defined problems. For example 
search consists of thoroughly studying supplemental data to pinpoint the 
source of vaguely defined problems. 
He notes that the manager always begins his working day by doing short jobs 
and cleaning up loose ends before proceeding with scheduled items. As he 
scans and new information comes to his attention the manager modifies his 
agenda accordingly: 11 thus we are dealing with a dynamic process, making 
decisions based on conditions of the moment. 11 (1967:29) 
What is even more. interesting is Radomsky's conclusion that the manager has 
created a mental picture of the world as he would like to see it and that his 
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11 Wrien the manager receives information describing the world as it 
really is, he will compare it to this model and identify undesirable 
differences as problems. The key to this is his information system. 
What he gets, determines what he does. 11 (1967:63) 
STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
* Field investigations of the strategic decision process compared to the vast 
volume of normative literature on the subject is of course sparse, but 
there are to date a number of studies of these unprogrammed strategic 
decisions which have attempted to describe the decision-making process in 
conceptual terms. Whilst none of the researchers 11 were able to develop 
enough understanding of the process to formulate a computer simulation of it 11 
** (Mintzberg, 1978 ), their findings stand in contradiction to a great deal 
of the prescriptive dogma. 
The first of these was Cyert, Simon, and Trow's (1956) investigation into 
the decisions surrounding the feasibility of using electronic data processing 
equipment in a medium-sized firm. By observation, study of company records, 
and interviewing, they were able to infer a sort of 'programme' which was 
used in this unprogrammed decision process, and further, to identify the 
programme component of communication, search for alternatives, and information 
gathering routines. They found little evidence of maximising behaviour: 
The firm was seen to seek alternatives which were satisfactory rather than 
optimal and in many cases the choice made was between 'doing something and 
doing nothing. 11 
*We define a Strategic decision as a single important non-repetitive decision: 
one which in retrospect had a telling effect upon the organisation or a part of it. 
This compares with Strategy Formulation (Policy Making) discussed in the next section. 











TABLE 5 I SOME FIELD STUDIES OF STRATEGIC DECISION PROCESSES. 
RESEARCHER ACTUAL DECISION(S) STUDIED TYPE OF DECISION 
Cyert, Simon Feasibility of using EDP Improvement 
Trow ( 1956) equipment in a corporation decision - new 
equipment 
Snyder and "U.S. decision to resist Foreign policy 
Paige (1959) aggression in Korea" crisis decision 
Pfiffner (1960) Various decisions in the "Poli cy 11 d cisions 
(Nicolaidis, 1960) pub 1 i c sector 
Dufty and Taylor Decision to transfer employees Implementational 
(1962) after merger of two 
transportation companies 
Cyert and March Accelerated renovation of old Various types of 
(1963) equipment, search new working 
quarters for a department, 
selection of a consulting firm, 
choice of a data processing system 
(last two subdecisions from 
Cyert, Simon, Trow,1956) 
Sae lberg ( 1967) Search for a ful 1-time job by Personal strategic 
MBA students decision 
Mintzberg Various decisions in all kinds Many types of 
Raisinghani of small to medium sized strategic decisions 
Theoret ( 1973) organizations 
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In 1960 Pfiffner analysed Nicolaidis 1 (1960) study of 332 administrative 
decisions which were documented in the form of short narratives. They found 
irrefutable evidence of information which extended far beyond the sphere of 
traditional economic rationality and into areas such as emotions, politics, 
power, group dynamics, personality, and mental health. Fragmentation of 
the decisional problems into smaller units was found to be a feature as it 
was by Soelberg (1967) who investigated the judgmental decisions of MBA students 
going about choosing their full-time jobs. Soelberg found that the decision 
process started with the student formulating an ideal solution (the perfect 
job), that he then begins the search for available solutions in parallel, 
and that each alternative (job offer) is put through a series of evaluation 
cycles. Those which passed initial screening are put into an •active roster. 1 
A 1 confirmation 1 process follows during which the student compares his ideal 
candidate with his second choice in order to convince himself that he has 
chosen well. When satisfied he will announce his choice. 
One of the most surprising findings was that although students were trained in 
very sophisticated techniques of management science, they did not engage 
in any form of quantitative analysis before making their choice, but rather 
weighted the different goals only after the choice had been made. In summary 
then we have fragmentation, comparison of alternatives to a preset ideal 
(corroboration of Radomsky 1 s finding), non-quantitative evaluation of 
alternatives, and post-choice justification. 
There are a number of other empirical works which have investigated many 
different types of decision using widely different methodologies. These 
are summarised in Table 5. In this section I should like to concentrate 
on the work of Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976). Firstly it is 
perhaps the most rigorous study in this area and none of its findings are 
contrary to those of other researchers. Also, the conceptual framework 













Fifty teams of students who were engaged in policy courses at Master's 
level were asked to study a single strategic decision made by an 
organisation. They had to describe the decision in narrative form and 
then attempt to programme it - to "describe the steps included in the 
decision in enough detail so that you can represent the decision in flow-
chart form as you would a computer program. 11 Of the fifty studies over 
a period of 5 years, 25 of them were selected for further analysis. The 
selective group covered a wide variety of decisions made in vastly 









to construct a new container tenninal 
to survive after losing a major client 
to buy jet aircraft 
to hire key announcer 
to introduce new type of beer 
to introduce controversial new form of treatment 
to institute mandatory retirement age 
The object was to isolate the basic components of the strategic decision 
process, to plot their interrelationships, and so to describe the structure 
of the strategic decision process. 
The Authors• analysis is presented in the fonn of a lengthy discussion which 
incorporates an incredible 50 hypotheses which are derived (1) from their 
own earlier findings (Mintzberg, 1973), (2) from other empiricai literature, 
as well as (3) some which lack formal support but were suggested by anecdotal 
evidence in their study. Quite obviously detailed discussion of these 
hypotheses is not possible here, but I have incorporated some of them 
into the brief description of their conceptual framework. 
Mintzberg et al describe the decision process in terms of 3 phases which are 















involves the Recognition of a decision situation 
and the Diagnosis of it 
consists of Search and Design activities which 
leads to the establishment of one or more solutions 
involves the Screening of alternatives, 
the Evaluation and Choice of a solution 
as well as the Authorisation of it 
In addition they describe 3 groups of parallel processes which support the 
central phases. These are Decision Control processes which oversee the 
planning and execution of the decision-making, the Communication processes 
whereby information is collected and disseminated, as well as Political 
Processes which the decision-maker uses to achieve a successful solution in 
an environment of power complexity. Further, they find evidence that the whole 
strategy decision-making process is characterised by 6 Dynamic Factors, 
'time-related events that reflect the open-ended nature of the process-' 
These are interrupts and impasses, scheduling delays, feedback delays, 
timing speedups and delays, comprehension cycles and failure cycles. 
These components of the strategic process are illustrated diagrammatically 
in Figure 9. 
The Authors take pains to point out that although all decision processes 
J 
begin with the identification of a stimulus and end with selection of a course 
of action, it cannot be assumed that the processes flow through the 3 phases 
in a simple sequence. The flows are complex and involve a complicated 
intermingling of the 3 phases. We are dealing then with a process which is 
not sequential but iterative, switching backwards and forwards between phases 
and constantly being mediated and influenced by the dynamic factors: 
11 The organisation typically begins with little understanding of the 
decision situation it faces or the root to its solution, and only a 
vague idea of what that solution might be and how it will be evaluated 
when it is developed. Only by groping through a recursive, 
discontinuous process involving many difficult steps, a host of 
dynamic factors, and a considerable period of time, will a final 
choice be made. We are dealing here, not with the decision-making 
under uncertainty of the text book, but with decision-making under 
ambiguity where almost nothing is given or easily determined. 11 






























THE STRATEGIC DECISION PROCESS 
INFOHMJ\TION 



















Recognition: The manager monitors his environment continuously in search 
of decision situations. He 'finds problems and opportunities in the streams 
of ambiguous, largely verbal data that continually bombards him' {Hl). 
Some of this data comes to him from the formal MIS, but because the problems 
and opportunities are found in the largely informal data, most of the 
information which influences strategic decisions comes to the manager 
through his own information system. 
Incoming data, as we would expect from the findings of the cognitivist, is 
filtered and the manager only makes use of the small portion of it in order 
to recognise strategic decision situations. He is therefore able to protect 
himself to a certain extent from information overload and he can also devote 
his attention to those issues which he believes to be important. However, 
this selective perception or filtering-out of certa in types of information 
may cause him to overlook problems and opportunity situations in certain 
areas of the organisation and his attention is directed elsewhere. 
Even these very limited observations bring into question the whole concept 
of the formal managerial information system which lays down that all the 
information needed by the manager for making strategic decisions can be 
provided by means of the MIS. (This question has been documented by 
* Mintzberg in two thought-provoking papers) 
Diagnosis: Once an accumulation of informational imput has reached a 
certain threshold level, the decision process is initiated and the manager 
begins to commit resources to make it. His 'first action following recognition 
See Mintzberg (1972) 'The Myth of the MIS', and (1975) 'Impediments to the 












is. to open information channels to learn about the situation he faces' (H6). 
If we conceive of all strategic decisions as being constructed along an 
Opportunity-Problem-Crisis continuum, then 'formal diagnosis is most common 
where the decision to be taken concerns a problem which is nearer the 
opportunity end of this continuum. Opportunities do not require a great 
deal of investigation, whilst intense problems and crises mean that pressures 
of time would discourage a formal diagnostic procedure. 
Development Phase 
Search Programme: Various types of search can be described: Memory, Active, 
Passive, and Trap (the activation of 'search generators' such as suppliers). 
Specifically, 'search begins in local familiar areas' (H9) and 'initial 
failure leads to the use of more active search procedures and to search in 
more remote and less familiar places' (HlO). Finally, 'organisations resort 
to design activity (if possible) when search for an acceptable ready-made 
solution ultimately fails' (Hll) (1976:19). 
Design Programme: 
manager they must 
of the situation. 
Because ready-made solutions are often unavailable to the 
be especially invented to fit the particular requirements 
Mintzberg et al found that more than half the decisions 
required especially designed solutions. Thus design involved a creative act. 
Further, they hypothesise that 'the decision-maker begins with a vague image 
of an ideal solution and that the decision is factored and through a sequence 
of nested cycles of design and/or search activities, a solution gradually 
crystallises' (Hl2). This cycle is repeated until an acceptable solution 
is found. They also find strong evidence that only one full solution is 
produced by the end of the development stage before final selection takes place. 
Selection Phase 
Screening Programme: Typically only one fully developed alternative has 
been generated. Screening takes place to reduce the number of partially 












simply does not have the time to intensively evaluate every alternative 
that he has discovered during his search programme. 11 This suggests that 
screening by its very nature focusses on feasibility - it is more concerned 
with strictly eliminating unfeasible or unworkable alternatives than with 
determining which one is best 11 (1978:30). Thus the acceptance or rejection 
of each of the alternatives is done in terms of other constraints which are 
often of a policy nature and have nothing directly to do with the problem at 
hand. 
Evaluation and Choice Programme: In the same way as screening reduces many 
alternatives to a few, so the evaluation and choice prograrrme reduces the few 
to one. It requires the consideration of a great number of factors and 
therefore 'the evaluation/choice program is surprisingly crude in practice.' 
(Hl7) and further evaluation and choice are usually inextricably intertwined 
{Hl8). The manager must consider a variety of value issues as well as hard 
factual data. Pfiffner in addition points out that there is a vast array of 
behavioural data: 
11 These are facts relative to emotions, politics, power, group dynamics, 
personality and mental health. In other words, the data of social 
science are facts just as much as the carbon content of steel or 
the dollars and cents in the salary fund. The administrator is forced 
by environment to take social science data into account in making 
his decision. 11 (cited in Mintzberg, 1978:31) 
Authorisation: Authorisation is usually necessary following evaluation/choice 
because the decision-maker does not by himself have the power to commit the 
resources involved in implementing the decision. Thus the manager must defer 
to the 'sponsor' for his approval. The sponsor's authorisation is in turn going 
to be contingent upon the availability of resources and the type and nature 
of other decisions which he has authorised - all of which are unknown to the 
decision-maker. 
"What we have in authorisation, therefore, is a coupling of the manager's 
comparative ignorance with the sponsor's inherent bias. The manager 
while perhaps unbiased, cannot really verify the sponsor 1 s figures, 
while the sponsor knows the issues best, is most corrmitted to the 












Selection in Three Modes 
All the programmes or sub-routines within the selection phase (screening, 
evaluation/choice, or authorisation) can take place in one of three basic 
modes of behaviour. These are Judgement, Analysis, and Bargaining. The 
mode which is chosen is a function of the agreement on the facts and the values 
involved in making the decision. Where both fact and value is agreed and 
the data is available, then analysis (computation) is used. Where there is 
disagreement about values, bargaining is used, and when calculation is not 
possible but there is agreement about values, then the mode of choice is 
judgement. 
We have some evidence from Mintzberg 1 s earlier study (1973) that judgement is 
the mode which is most frequently used. This is because the manager is the 
person in the organisation who has most information in his possession and 
also has the authority to commit the resources that are required by 
strategic decisions. Hence judgement is most compatible with the hierarchical 
nature (structure) of the traditional organisation where both information 
and authority are located at the top of the pyramidal form. Mintzberg adds 
that 11 judgement is also the most convenient mode - choices are made within 
one head, for better or worse. 11 (1978:34) 
We should also expect analysis to be the least used mode because as we have 
seen the issues involved in the strategic decision process do not often 
lend themselves to computation. 
In summary then we find that the empirical evidence on strategic decision-
making is at variance with the normative model. The findings suggest a complex 
interwoven pattern of cycles which is even more complicated than Simon's 
(1965) trichotomy of Intelligence, Design and Choice. The whole process 
involves issues which are value-laden and in many respects depend upon 
cognitive, behavioural, and other factors which make it far more imprecise 













A venture into the literature on Strategy can be a confusing experience. For, 
in seeking to find out what strategy is and what to do in order to formulate 
it~ one is treated to conflicting answers and advice. In Chapter I we 
reviewed the prescriptive literature of Management and this is naturally 
the largest source of information on Strategy Formation as well. There is 
little disagreement between writers in this School: 
By far the most authoritative book on the subject is 'Top Management Planning' 
by George Steiner (1969). He tells is quite definitely that: 
"Strategic planning is the process of determining the major objectives 
of an organisation and the policies and strategies that will govern 
the acquisition, use, and disposition of resources to achieve those 
objectives." ( 1969: 34) 
Strategy is defined in almost the same terms by Chandler as "the determination 
of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption 
of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out these goals." (1962:13) Newman et al tell us a little less formally 
that the strategic planner must first of all ask himself what the mission of 
his enterprise is going to be and then must pick steps to achieve that goal: 
"Picking the right target obviously is crucial " (1976:8). And so by this 
time one has gained the definite impression that the end objective must be 
followed by formulation of the means to achieve it, and this preliminary 
thought is confirmed by Paine and Naumes who state quite categorically that 
"strategies may be viewed as specific major actions or patterns of action 
for attainment of objectives" {1974:7). 
This method or mode of strategy formulation is then the Grand Plan: It demands 
rationality (almost in the economist's sense of the term), formality, and 
strict quantitative analysis. Sophisticated scientific techniques are 
employed to systematically reduce all the means to formally stated goals and 
into structured components. It is in essence an extension of early operational 
* planning to the strategic level. 













However, reading authors such as Ansoff {1968), Cyert and March {1963) and 
Lindblom (1959) one finds a certain disagreement with this approach. This 
is best illustrated by considering Lindblom's concept of 'disjointed 
incrementalism' or 'muddling through' . 
In contrast to the rational-comprehensive approach of the traditional planners, 
Lindblom sees the whole strategic process as proceeding through cycles of 
successive limited comparisons. He argues that the means cannot follow the 
end because the two are not distinct from one another but are closely 
intertwined: the means and ends are not distinct and means-end analysis is 
often inappropriate, mainly because the goals or objects of the organisation 
comprise value goals which cannot be quantified. Thus the amount of analysis 
which is possible is drastically limited: 
11 I know of no way to describe - or even to understand - what my 
relative evaluations are for, say, freedom and security, speed and 
accuracy in government decisions, or low taxes and better schools, than 
to describe my preferences among specific policy choices that might 
be made between the alternatives in each of the pairs. 11 (1959:81) 
He draws a distinction between the 'Root' method of the planner and the 'Branch' 
approach which he advocates because values are seldom agreed upon and stable. 
Policy-making is for him 11 not made once and for all; it is made and 
remade endlessly .... as a process of successive approximation to some 
desired objective in which what is desired itself continues to ~hange under 
reconsideration. 11 (1959:86) 
Thus this view of strategy formulation sees the organisation behaving in an 
'adaptive' mode {Mintzberg 1973a). It reaches decisions by incremental 
serial steps and reacts to its ever-changing environment by seeking only to 
reduce uncertainty. The whole strategic process is disjointed and fragmented 













Ranged, against these two theoretical interpretations of strategy formulation 
is a third mode - the entrepreneurial. The many writings of Peter Drucker 
{based upon his own experiences), as well as those of Collins and Moore 
{1970) and Michael Maccoby (1977) give us empirical evidence of men at the 
head of organisations actively searching for opportunities and taking risky 
decisions under conditions of extreme uncertainty. The strategy-making 
of these organisations is thus proactive and "is characterised by dramatic 
leaps forward in the face of uncertainty" (Mintzberg, 1973a:45). The 
environment is not looked upon as a sum of constraints to be 'satisficed' but 
as a global force to be fought, changed, and thus conquered. 
Where then, does the 'truth' of strategy making lie? Which mode is correct? 
Do different companies use different modes dependent for example upon their 
structure? Or does a single company use different modes at different levels? 
Or at different times in its organisational life? 
Questions such as these went largely unanswered until Mintzberg conducted an 
investigation into the 
a long period of time. 
in Strategy Formation' 
studies: 
strategies of a number of different organisations over 
The study was largely inductive and his paper 'Patterns 
(1976b) is a report based upon the results of three 
Volkswagenwerk 1920-1969 
U.S. policy in Vietnam 1950-1968 
The magazine, 'Saturday Night' 1928-1971 
He begins by drawing a sharp distinction between intended strategy (general a 
priori guidelines of the sort that we have considered above) and realised 
strategy {the evolved, a posteriori results of decisional behav.iour) which 
is the set of strategic conditions resulting from the intention. He therefore 
defines strategy in general as 'a pattern in a stream of decisions' (page 2). 
Basic data was co 11 ected from a variety of written records and reports and was 
backed up wherever possible by interview with current and ex-employees. The 












of important decisional changes and actions by the ~rganisation. Simultaneously 
a chronicle of environmental changes and trends was made covering the same 
time period. From these two chronological listings various patterns in 
the stream of decisions began to emerge and the following types of periods 
were identified: 
Continuity: where existing strategies remained unchanged 
Limbo: periods where the organisation hesitated to make decisions 
Flux: where no consistencies in the decisional streams were evident 
Incremental change: during which new strategies form gradually 
Piecemeal change: where one strategy changed quickly whilst others 
remained stable, and 
Global change: where many strategies changed quickly and in unison. 
Mintzberg found strong evidence of two superimposed patterns running across 
the three studies. The first he describes as 'the life cycle of an overall 
strategy - its conception, development, decay and death. 1 The second pattern 
is cyclical and exists within the life cycle. It shows periodic waves of. 
·change and continuity and suggests that strategy does not follow the 
continuous neat sequence of the advocates of the planning mode, but is rather 
'bumpy and ad hoc' (in response to the turbulent environment in which the 
organisation exists) with a complex intermingling of periods of continuity, 
change, flux and limbo. Mintzberg therefore speaks of the usual prescriptions 
and employment of the normative techniques of analysis and planning as being 
'insignificant' and concludes that: 
"To tell management to state its goals precisely, to assess its 
strength and weaknesses, to plan systematically and 'rationally', 
on schedule, and with reams of quantitative information, to make 
strategies explicit, are at best insignificant guidelines, at 
worst the demonstrably misleading precepts to some organisations 
facing a confusing reality." (1976b:22) 
But within the cycle we can find evidence of all three types of strategy modes: 
the incremental change of the adaptive mode, the continuity of the planning mode, 













The precise pattern to be found in any single organisation is then going to 
depend inter alia, upon the chief executive - the degree to which he retains 
power or delegates, the stage of development of the organisation and the 
state of the environment in general, though - and most importantly for our 
purposes - strategy formation "can fruitfully be viewed as the interplay 
between a dynamic environment and bureaucratic momentum (of the organisation) 
with leadership mediating between the two forces" (page i) (underlining mine). 
The choice of mode (or combination of them) and the degree to which the 
leader is successful in implementing it will strongly determine the 
survival and growth of the whole organisation. The choice and the extent of 
his influence is therefore a t;.eflection of the leader's own effectiveness. 
We have thus seen a confirmation by the empiricist of cognitive findings 
on the manager's information handling and a cyclical pattern in his strategic 
decision and policy-making activity has been demonstrated. 
In the following chapter we explore the relationship between these concepts 
and the way in which strategic implementation is mediated by the manager's 













SOME TENTATIVE POSTULATES 
In the last three Chapters we have reviewed empirical evidence of a widely 
different sort. Along the way links have been found such as that between 
cognition and decision-making - but elsewhere the interrelatedness of the 
bodies of knowledge is not so obvious. In particular, the discussion of 
material in the last Chapter was in no way meant to be comprehensive: 
presentation was designed to introduce the reader to the type of work being 
-done in this area. I should now like to substantiate the contention made 
earlier that the work of the cognitivist and the strategist have bearing · 
upon the validity of the Role Set by attempting to consolidate these 
findin~s. It can be shown that they are not isolated islands of information 
in the sea of management but on the contrary, form a cohesive body of empirical 
evidence - a gestalt. 
There are several ways in which we could proceed to demonstrate this 
interrelatedness. One way is to start off with cognitive knowledge and 
to point to findings such as information overload with the attendant difficulty 
of evaluating 'soft' data, and then to cite researchers such as Witte (1972) 
who concludes from his empirical studies that: 
"Human beings cannot gather information without in some way 
simultaneously developing alternatives. They cannot avoid evaluating 
these alternatives immediately, and in doing this they are forced to 
a decision. This is a package of operations, and the succession of 
these packages over time constitute the total decision-making process. 1 












And in this way successive overlapping links could be shown. However I 
should prefer to look at the whole question a little more broadly: 
It is generally recognised that the furtherance of psychological knowledge 
proceeds at 3 levels of inquiry and there is continuous debate as to which 
level should be chosen for investigation and generation of data. The most 
microscopic or experiential level relates to consciousness or mind. The 
cognitivist's work with its focus on thought process is mainly of this type 
although his work overlaps onto the second, physiological level. The 'highest' 
level is that of overt behaviour. 
Similarly, within the field of management there is recognition of a number 
of levels which can be arranged in a hierarchy of complexity. In ascending 
order we have roles, programmes, decision-making, and strategy formulation, 
which culminates in policy or management of the total organisation - the 
attainment of overall objectives. We have reviewed empirical work on each 
of these levels. 
Now it is patently obvious that a manager's overt behaviour is reflected in 
his role performance. - We thus have not two bodies of knowledge emanating from 
two distinct disciplines, but a cohesive single entity of different type and 
magnitude of enquiry no one part of which can be adequately explained 
without reference to its antecedent precursors. 
In talking about Role though we must be careful to draw a distinction between Role 
prescription (the pattern of behaviour which is expected of the manager - his 
responsibilities and duties) and role performance (the actual pattern of 
behaviour indulged in by him: the actual functions and duties which he 
performs). One can here draw an analogy between intended and realised strategy 
which we mentioned in the last Chapter where the primary interest was in the latter. 
We saw from the empirical evidence that total role performance involves the 
manager coupling sets of programmes of a widely different nature which are then 
linked to form (make) strategic decisions and hence strategy. 
Implementation of these strategic decisions (which involves committing resources 












environment. It can therefore be argued that the results of implementation 
act as a stream of decisions which cause an on-going reformulation of 
strategy. This entire process must be monitored by the manager. 
At the same time the manager must also couple his set of role performances 
with those of the other members of the organisation (they must be 1 in step') 
in order to create the structure nece.ssary for the flow of authority and 
information: The authority for influence, the information for monitoring 
- although .the two are interlinked .. This process too is under the control 
of the manager in the sense that it depends upon his adopting the correct 
behaviour (role performance) to bring it about. 
vJe can therefore conclude that role performance influences strategy formulation 
and implementation, and conversely, strategic implementation {if monitored 
correctly) influences role performance. 
(It is interesting to here note that we draw these conclusions solely on the 
basis of the empirical evidence reviewed in this Section. However, the 
Social System theories of Katz and Kahn (1966) and Hunt (1972) discussed 
in Chapter 5 both saw roles and corrmunication as •crucial to the organisational , 
process•, and further, the objectives of the system were said to be determined 
by this interaction. At that time we drew the conclusion that: 11 strategy 
must continually be altered in the light of information received"). 
Let us for a moment look at this process the other way about, not from the 
point of view of role performance but of overall organisational success: 
One cannot define the success of any organisation excepting in terms of a 
set of stated criteria, and a company will state these criteria in its report 
* to shareholders. These criteria.of success (or failure) are most often measured 
by for example an increase in market share or by some financial indicator such 
as percentage return on invested monies. Companies build up track records of 
previously stated objectives (intended strategy) with the results of implementation 
This statement holds true for the public sector as well, although here the criterion 
is often 1 service 1 of one sort or another: An increase in service within the same 













The level of strategic implementation then, can be looked upon as the level 
of success or failure of an organisation .. 
On' the other hand, if implementation causes a continuous refonnulation of 
strategy by the manager in the light of (monitored) infonnation received, 
then the level of role performance (of behaviour) is the level of measurement: 
The level at which the manager by 1001 acts or omissions of behaviour 
determines the success or failure of his organisation. 
Stated infonnally one can look at the manager as being in a human Skinner Box 
and measurement and analysis of the quality and quantity of his role 
performance must provide an indicator of success. 
Analy~is of the time spent in performance of each role in the set will 
provide us with an operational statement of managerial success (Pl). 
Successful managers will exhibit a consistency in their time allocation between 
roles compared to unsuccessful managers, and quite obviously, (P2) The amount 
of time spent in performance of each of the roles by a given· manager will 
not be equal. 
If the manager m·ust monitor both internally and externally to initially fonnulate 
strategy and then continue to monitor the results of implementation to ensure 
effective reformulation (strategic shift), then effective perfonnance in the 
monitor role must be crucial for managerial success (P3)~ Successful managers 
will exhibit significant differences in the type and quality of their monitor 
roie behaviour compared to their unsuccessful counterparts .. 
Monitoring is not just simply a question of informational input: The manager 
must select (filter) that which is useful to him from the vast volume of 
information with which he is bombarded. And at the same time he must be open 
to and aware of input from certain quarters which are important to h.im. There 
* must neither be an overconcentration on 'favourite' areas nor a neglect of 
'disliked' ones. 
·The literature abounds with examples of executives who came to general management 
through, for example, marketing and continue to favour that function at the 












The extent to which he does this is going to depend upon his ability to learn 
what is important to him, and this in turn will to a large extent be dependent 
upon his own personal cognitive limitations. Whilst we are not primarily 
concerned with qu~stions such as 'what makes a good monitor?' or 'what stops 
a man from monitoring effectively?' (the study does not go into the personality 
characteristics which predispose towards a particular action, but is concerned 
mainly with what the manager does or does not do and its effect), we can say 
that (P4) The extent tp which a given manager can select that information 
which is important to him will strongly influence his success. 
Above we said that the manager's total role performance must be congruent 
with that of his subordinates in order to create the necessary structure for 
strategy implementation. The extent to which the manager can effect this 
congruence will be a product of the influence he exerts upon his employees, the 
employees' behaviour, and the degree to which he changes his own role behaviour 
to suit them. The one reflects the manager's motivational (leadership) ability, 
the other depends (largely) upon the manager's monitoring skill. Overall 
effectiveness in this area will increase subordinates' satisfaction, aid 
structure, promote productivity, and generally provide a positive organisational 
climate. This will be reflected in the amount of unsolicited (volunteered) 
information which the manager receives. We can thus conclude that (P5) Successful 
managers spend more time in motivational (leadership) role performance and 
(P6) Successful managers receive more unsolicited information from their 
subordinates than do unsuccessful managers. 
The manager has several roles which he performs outside of the organisation 
(Figurehead, Spokesman, Liaison). The network of contacts built up via 
the Liaison role is especially important in providing him with vital 
environmental information. This information is in turn an important input 
to his decision-making and hence strategy. Therefore, (P7) Successful managers 
receive more information from outside the organisation than Unsuccessful 
managers do. 
In the above paragraphs a number of interactions within the Role Set have been 
proposed. The Rol~s indeed form a 'gestalt' (Mintzberg). There is an inter-
dependence of managerial performance in each of them which reciprocally influences 
both manager and subordinaes. It should therefore be possible to plot a map of 
role interaction showing that {PB) Performance in the monitor and leader roles 

























THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The broad overall aim of this study - the purpose hovering in the background 
- was of course to effect an integration between the two main traditional 
bodies of knowledge which were reviewed in Part One. The fact that much of 
the empirical evidence in Part Three refutes a good deal of the traditional 
dogma and itself forms a gestalt does not mean that no truth resides in the 
Management or Behavioural Science Schools. On the contrary, we saw how each 
sub-school tends to concentrate on just one aspect of management. 
However it was patently obvious that further investigation along traditional 
lines was going to be fruitless and that the only concept which showed 
promise of being able to generate meaningful data and so serve as a vehicle 
to effect this integration was the Ten Role Set. 
I reasoned that the data generated by practising management analysed in terms 
of the role system could provide valuable insight into the question of 
what successful managers do: It had to be operationalised. Mintzberg himself 
provides direction for this thought when he says that the role set 11 is not 
fully operational in the form presented, but that to make it so should be ..• 
an obvious next step for comparative research. 11 (1973:267-268) 
The formulation of an experimental condition in which to do this so as to 
adequately test the propositions presented at the end of the last Chapter 












·1. Mintzberg 1s original study (1968) as well as subsequent validation by 
for example, Charan (1969) and Costin (1970) were of course all done 
~ith successful subjects (managers). What about unsuccessful ones? 
The point is here that a consistent demonstration of work characteristics 
and managerial work content analysis across successful executives does . 
not necessarily mean that these f.i ndings hold true for them a lone: 
Unsuccessful executives (or bad managers)' may exhibit some of the self-
same characteristics. 
This meant that the study had to be a comparative one between successful and 
unsuccessful managers in order to validate the findings relating to the 
former. The problem lay in the definition of an 'unsuccessful chief 
executive. 1 This is a contradict ion in terms because any man who 
consistently shows himself to be a bad manager or is completely ineffective 
in his job will have been removed from it. One can therefore only talk 
about successful and relatively unsuccessful executives and this seemed 
to be an inadequate measure for the study. 
2. It appeared that the only way in which this problem could be overcome 
would be to find a yardstick independent of the manager's own behaviour 
against which to measure his success. This implied some market share or 
financial measure. The problem was which yardstick to choose. 
3. Whilst Wf~ can say that successful managers effectively formulate and 
implement strategy and also perform 11'/ell in all their roles on a continuously 
changing basis relative to the monitoring feedback which they receive, 
the converse of this statement is no1t necessarily true: The 1 unsuccessful 
manager' may be indulging in inadequate role performance of one sort or 
another or may not be performing adE~quate ly at a 11. We have no way of 
knowing which. 
4. Perhaps the greatest problem is the fact that the Role Set was the end-
product of Mintzberg's work and, whilst the conceptualisation is empirically 
based~ the ~oles are a resultant de:scription of the activities which he 












of activities onto roles 11 {1973:267). A number of the activities in which 
the manager indulges can be described in terms of more than one role. Very 
little of the manager's time is spent in the performance of what we might 
call a 'pure' role: It is extremely uncommon for any given activity to be 
given over to the performance of a single role. More commonly the time 
period of a given activity has elements of more than one. The primary 
purpose or motivation for example in calling a meeting might well be 
satisfied but during its course new information comes to hand, conversations 
take twists, the manager wishes to praise an employee for a particular 
* 
piece of work which he becomes aware of, and so a particular meeting which 
primarily might have been called for the purpose of decision-making {resource 
allocation) turns out to have informational (monitor/disseminator) and 
interpersonal (leader) role elements. 
This meant that if I was to operationalise the roles by allocating time 
expenditure for particular role activities and compare the results between 
a successful and unsuccessful sample group, then I should- have to make 
certain assumptions about some of the role activities and so formulate a 
tighter definition of each role type. 
In doing this I was much encouraged by Mintzberg himself who said: 11 do not 
be afraid of making assumptions in social research. Providing you state 
clearly that you have done so and you are consistent, then that is 
all right." 
Although some of these categorisations were developed during the course of 
the first part of the analysis (pilot study), I should here like to summarise 
the criteria against which the data was analysed into role activities. 
A more comprehensive explanation of the rationale surrounding these 
categorisations is given in Appendix 2, and examples of each of the roles 
are quoted in discussion of the results. (Chapters 11 and 13). 
No difficulty was experienced in apportioning activity to the roles of 
Figurehead, Disseminator, Liaison, Spokesman, and Negotiator. 












The remaining three Decisional Roles of Disturbance Handler, Entrepreneur, 
and Resource Allocator were dealt with as follows: 
Disturbance Handler: This was taken to be attention to immediate crises or 
'fire fighting' - attention to problems which had only just manifested themselves. 
Resource Allocator: Programming, assigning, or otherwise allocating resources 
is fairly straight-forward except for cases where action by an employee has 
to be authorised for responsibility previously delegated. This type of 
activity was ascribed to the Resource Allocator (rather than Entrepreneurial} 
role. 
Entrepreneur: All activity involving improvement projects - the initiating. 
of controlled change - whether of a minor or major nature was ascribed to 
the entrepreneurial role. 
The largest assumptions were made with regard to the monitor and leader roles. 
Here the set of activities seen as falling into both was severely circumscribed: 
Monitor: Only that activity which was specifically for the purpose of the 
reception of information was ascribed to the monitor role. At ·the same time 
this infonnational input to the manager was split between solicited and 
unsolicited (volunteered) infonnation and a· distinction was made between 
information coming to him from outside the organisation and from within via 
his subordinates. 
Leader: Here too, the leader role was very narrowly defined to include only 
those activities which were used expressly for interpersonal purposes - where 
the primarY purpose of the activity was encouragement, criticism, or praise 
of subordinate. At the same time, within this definition, the leader role 
activity was split between motivational activity and leader activities revolving 












The reader will therefore quickly perceive that this policy of ascribing 
time to the leader and monitor roles will result in a very conservative 
estimate of the amount of time which the manager spends fulfilling these 
two role performances. This policy was deliberate as these two roles are 
central to the discussion which will be presented below, and it will be my 
intention to show that the arguments hold true even under this 'reduction' 
policy. 
Because of these assumptions regarding the role activity the results of 
both the pilot and the main study reflect not an absolute but relative 
amount of time spent performing each role. However, as the ultimate aim 
of the study is to isolate differences between the successful and unsuccessful 
managers, this is not material. 
5. Even before embarking on any of the empirical work I had seen the study 
possibly ending in the development of an instrument which could be used 
to test the role performance effectiveness of a given manager easily. 
Attainment of this goal was going to require two things in addition 
to the validating data which is the main purpose of the study: 
A reformulation of the role activity and the development of an accurate 
method of data collection which could be used on many subjects. 
Redefinition of Role Activity: The description of the roles presented 
in Chapter 6 is in essence a summary of Chapter 4 of Mintzberg's (1973) work. 
These descriptions had to be reduced. They had to be made tighter in the 
sense that the list of activities constituting a particular role had to be 
more compact, and they had to be looser in terms of the descriptions being 
in more general terms without becoming so loose that a particular 
description was ambiguous. 
Put informally, the intention was here to formulate a summary score sheet 












Data Collection: In considering which method of data collection to use 
I regarded it as imperative that the subjects should not know that their role 
performance was being studied (they should not be informed of any sort of 
'label' or category beforehand) and that they should not be required to do 
any sort of self-estimating. ·This seemed to eliminate questionnaires - the 
usual method of choice for large samples - because I could see no way of 
constructing nor validating such an instrument without transgressing one or 
both of these criteria. This left the methods of direct observation and 
some sort of diary method. Of these two it was patently obvious that 
observation could not be used in the future for mass collection. from many 
subjects because it is so time-expensive. This left diaries as the only 
method which could be self-administered by the subject without him having 
any idea of exactly what the purpose of the data collection was. 
On the other hand I was very aware that for the purposes of this study it 
was preferable - perhaps essential - to gain as much detail as possible 
both in terms of time-expenditure and anecdotal material to substantiate 
and back up this data in demonstrating the validity of the postulates. 
Direct observation was the only method that was going to provide this. 
In addition, consideration of the above five areas of difficulty led me 
to believe that these problems were not going to be overcome all at once, 
but would have to be worked through. I therefore decided to do a Pilot 
Study of Observation before embarking on the main research using a Diary 














The Pilot Study was undertaken principally in order to gather data in 
sufficient detail so as to be able to 'map' the roles and so plot the 
dynamic interaction between them. Following from this, I felt sure that 
one or a small number of the roles would be central or crucial to total 
successful managerial performance and therefore wanted to isolate these 
roles and so refine hypotheses about them. These hypotheses would then 
be tested in the main study. 
SELECTION CRITERIA 
The choice of subjects posed some difficulty: A pair - one Successful, the 
other Unsuccessful - was needed, but the criteria against which the selection 
was to be made required some consideration. 
I reasoned that if the data collected from the Successful manager was to 
be used to refine a set of hypotheses then this man would have to be what 
could be described as generally Successful in every sphere. He must have 
headed a company which had at least maintained {but preferably improved) 
its position over the last five years: he must possess a good 'track record' 
in order to satisfy the management school. In addition I wanted him to 
possess the "innovative spirit to satisfy my penchant for the entrepreneurial 












His leadership style had to be neither wholly autocratic nor wholly 
democratic. It had to show elements of both and he preferably had to 
exhibit a strong style of flexibility. He had to be the type of man who 
was aware of the importance of human relations within the firm and one who 
had shown that he had employed these basic principles, albeit in an intuitive 
way. 
In order to find the target subject I studied the list of Top 100 companies 
(Financial Mail Special Survey, April 23, 1976) and the Chief Executive 
heading each of them. Further data on each of the companies was collected 
from other sources and from the Stock Exchange Handbook. After this 
fairly legnthy search I drew up a short list of three possible men and 
then gathered further personal data on each of them - mainly from magazine 
* profiles and interviews. Final choice was a Mr. Gordon whom I believe is 
ideal insofar as both he and the company which he heads in many ways surpass 
the set of criteria which I have outlined above. Perhaps a short profile 
of the man and his company will illustrate this contention. 
The Successful Subject : The Man and His Company 
The company which Gordon heads, Spatial, is a chain of retail stores which 
operates nationally. It was started by him approximately 10 years ago and 
the increase in profit and turnover during the last five years have both 
been greater than 350 percent. The Company continues a vigorous physical 
expansion, follows a policy of decentralisation into regions, and has 
successfully diversified into several allied activities. 
Spatial can thus be classified as being in a Second Stage (Lievegoed) and 
the man himself has satisfactorily performed the dual function of Strategist 
and Organisation Builder (Uyterhoeven). Other criteria against which the 












management school would judge success are most certainly met. 
Over the last five years especially, Gordon has had to delegate considerably both 
to allow for the organisational growth and in order to reduce his own personal 
workload. But he has not allowed this delegation to remove him or put him at 
a distance from his employees. He still maintains an open-door policy to any 
of his subordinates at any time: 11 In a company relying as much as we do on 
dedication, loyalty, and enthusiasm, management can't afford to be aloof. 11 
He believes in teams and teamwork. He is looked upon by his employees as 
being "tough but fair. 11 
He therefore shows considerable evidence of realising the importance of human 
relations principles and he is perceived by his employees as having a flexibility 
of style which should satisfy the Leadership Theory School. Further evidence 
of this flexibility emerged during this study and examples are quoted later 
in this Chapter and in Chapter 13.) 
The Unsuccessful: The Man and His Companies 
As Gordon's counterpart or foil I needed a man who, regardless of his style or 
method of management, could be described as Unsuccessful in management school 
(financial) terms. Again I scanned company reports and periodicals and finally 
isolated a Mr Lewis. This man heads James Stanton & Co., a mini-empire of 
industrial holdings engaged in such diverse spheres as textiles, property, 
commodity trading, and a service industry. The Holding Company and two if its 
subsidiaries have listings. 
The label 'Unsuccessful' is merited on several counts. The companies have lost 
millions of Rands over the past few years, bankruptcy has threatened on at least 
three occasions, and the turnover in his senior managerial staff is known to be 
phenomenal. Both growth and organisation building are therefore negative. 
Even though Gordon and Lewis are in many ways very different, they share a number 
of similarities: Both are entrepreneurs, having founded their own businesses with 
very limited capital just over a decade ago. They come from the same sort of 
background, are the sons of non-professional men, and have the same (University) 
education. They are both in their 40's. 
We shall now consider each man in turn. The method and analysis of each is 
presented separately and then in the final part of this Chapter the differences 











THE SUCCESSFUL MANAGER 
Method of Data Collection 
156 
At the initial interview with Gordon I described the research that I intended 
doing and asked him to participate. He listened carefully and then said 
that whereas he was sympathetic, he could not allow me to observe him directly 
because his staff would not understand who I was or what I was doing there 
and would therefore "clam up. 11 This would disrupt relations with his 
subordinates which were 11 precious 11 to him. He said that he was prepared to 
devote further time to me, to give me further interviews, but there was to 
be no observation. He appeared completely sincere in this and not even my 
frank admission to him that he was to be my 'guinea pig' appeared to worry 
him. However there did not seem to be any way in which I could profitably 
make use of his offer. 
Just as I was regretfully thinking that I would have to approach someone else, 
Gordon mentioned to me that it had for many years been his habit to keep 
a diary of all his daily activities. This document was in addition to his 
normal appointment diary kept by his Secretary and was dictated by him from 
memory into a dictaphone usually at the end of each day's work. It was then 
typed by his Secretary the following day. The diary documented not only 
reports of meetings both scheduled and unscheduled but also his thoughts, 
impressions, future plans, records of telephone conversations, opinions of 
people, company data, and reminders to himself for follow-up action. It was a 
chronicle of everything that he had done and everyone that he had interacted 
with throughout a given day. 
It really was a most unusual and comprehensive document and perusal of just 
a few pages gave tremendous insight into not only the activities of this man 
but the way in which his mind worked. It occurred to me that with very little 
adaptation this diary could be used to collect the data needed for the study. 
I also regarded it as significant and important that the preparation of this 
diary was not a new exercise for him - he had been used to doing it for many 












After some discussion he agreed to expand this diary simply by being sure 
that each activity (however insignificant) was well-documented and that 
the time taken for each was recorded. The only other change which was 
necessary was that, to compensate for any possible memory loss, he promised 
as far as his schedule allowed him to make notes and to record the data for 
the diary in frequent mini-sessions throughout the day rather than in a block 
at the end of it. 
Using this expanded diary method, data was collected over a period of 14 
days. This included three Saturday mornings and so the period covered was 
equivalent to 12,5 full working days. 
Analysis 
In the first stage of the analysis I made no attempt to categorise any of 
the activities into roles but merely went through the diary material 
splitting a particular day's work into time slots according to the 
information provided and making a note in the margin as to the length of 
time that each meeting or telephone call had taken. 
At the same time I ensured that every minute of the working day had been 
accounted for. Occasionally there were gaps in the time sequence and this 
was marked as 'Lost Time'. Subsequent analysis showed that this lost time 
was almost wholly due to travelling by car to and from lunch appointments 
or other meetings, or time spent in aeroplanes. 
The difference between the stated Starting and Stopping Time produced a 
Gross Work Time for that day. From this was subtracted any lost time 
(travelling) to produce a Net Working Time for the day. ('Recordable' Time). 
Addition of all the Recorded Times on a particular day {the sum of the activity 
times) gave the Actual Recorded Time for the day. The difference between 
the Recorded and Net Times was shown as Unaccounted Time. This Unaccounted 
Time was on most days very little and is an obvious reflection of time 
expended on private activities by any person. It was also found that on those 
few occasions where the Unaccounted Time was greater than 15 minutes it was as a 
product of travelling time: time lost due to the upheaval of physical 











TABLE 6 SUBJECT GORDON : 
Start Stop 
Time Time 
Fri day 11 08. 15 18.35 
Saturday 12 08.30 12.35 
Monday 14 08.00 19.30 
Tuesday 15 08.00 19.00 
Wednesday 16 08.15 18. 15 
Thursday 17 08. 15 19. 15 
Friday 18 08.10 19.40 
Saturday 19 08.00 13.00 
Monday 21 08. 15 19.00 
Tuesday 22 08. 10 19.00 
Wednesday 23 07.55 21.45 
Thursday 24 08.30 19.30 
Friday 25 08.00 17.20 
Saturday 26 08.00 12. 15 
Total Time = 
x = 
T = Travelling time 
HOURS WORKED AND RECORDED TIME 
Gross Hours Lost Net Hours 
For Day Time For Day 
10.20 - 10.20 
04.05 - 04.05 
11. 30 01.00T 10.30 
11; 00 02.20T 08.40 
10.00 .40 09.20 
11. 00 . 30 10.30 
11. 30 l .OOT 10.30 
5.00 - 5.00 
10.45 - 10.45 
10. 50 - 10.50 
13.50 1.45 T 12.05 
11.00 l.15 T 09.45 
9.20 - 09.20 
4. 15 - 4.15 
134.25 Total Recorded Time = 

















































Table 6 lists the Gross, Net, and Recorded times for the total period of the 
study. From this it can be seen that the mean Gross Time worked was 10,45 
hours per day, and the Net was 10,0 hours, Total Recorded Time in the 
study was approximately 123 hours. 
During this first part of the analysis I made notes on queries on the 
identities of certain people and the nature of certain activities I did 
not understand, and these were cleared with the Subject himself during a 
subsequent interview. Any further minor points were cleared with his 
Secretary during the course of the analysis. 
I then went through the material again splitting the periods into time 
activities, questioning in each case which role was being performed without 
actually doing any scoring. It was during this part of the analysis that 
* many of the role categorisations discussed in th  last Chapter were developed. 
Finally with these assumptions made, each activity was apportioned to a 
particular role. During this stage I kept asking "what is the main purpose 
of this activity? In many cases any given time activity was spent in 
performance of a single role. In some cases there were two and in the case 
of 3 meetings the role performance was of course multiple. In the absence of 
more detailed time information an assumption had to be made as to the time 
split between roles. These cases are discussed below. 
Before presenting the results of this analysis I shall cite examples of each 
role performance. Although these have been divided into the 3 groups for 
purposes of presentation, the reader will notice the interlinking between 
the Interpersonal, Informational, and Decisional roles: They cannot be 
completely dissected. 
*See also Appendix 2. 
**This original analysis of Gordon's diary was done in June 1977. I reanalysed it 
in May 1978 immediately prior to analysis of the data in the main study. Changes 













As figurehead outside his organisation Gordon takes part in the usual 
ceremonial events and there is nothing especially noteworthy in his performance 
here. Within the organisation he (predictably} records that: "I also then 
spent 10 minutes signing a 11 the di rector 1 s cheques for their fees. 11 
However at the same time he takes the opportunity of introducing a motivational 
aspect by "writing a personal note to each director thanking them for the 
year 1 s work. 11 (Leader :Motivator). 
Leader role activity was scored under 2 headings: What Mintzberg calls the 
'special category• of staffing: firing, hiring, training, and promoting -
generally providing for interpersonal growth of the organisation - was labelled 
Leader:Builder and all other Leader activity was strictly for Interpersonal 
purposes was labelled Leader:Motivator and thus included all other 
relationships with subordinates. 
In the Motivator category Gordon gives guidance sometimes by criticising, 
sometimes by praising. There is a strong flexibility of style. He also does 
not have to seek out subordinates needing guidance; they come to him 
asking for it. 
"Tony (General Manager) phoned me about the TV interview which he is holding 
on the new Price Marking Act and I gave him a few pointers on how to handle this. 11 
He remembers things and gives encouragement where it is not really called for: 
11 It is 11 o'clock. I phoned Lew (General Manager) to wish him and the 
store a very happy birthday. It is exactly 2 years old and all the 
dramas of the opening day came freshly to mind. 11 
For this particular bit of human relations building Gordon is himself rewarded 
and the bond between superior and subordinate further cemented into a 
working team - when this manager later phones back to report that 11 they had 
































































But when subordinates do not perfonn as Gordon thinks they should then the 
criticism is not slow in coming: 
11 I phoned Tony and gave him hell for not having got out the Polanski 
Minutes after our meeting with him 2 weeks ago. I told him that it 
was inexcusable not to do a Minute after a meeting for communication 
purposes. 11 
And confirmation that this anger is controlled, purposeful, and certainly 
not just a reaction is given when, after discovery of a crisis situation 
which he believes has arisen because subordinates have 11 handled the situation 
extremely badly with regard to relationships 11 and in some cases 11 exceeding 
their limits of authority 11 , he records: 
11 I hammered this hard because it was a matter of principle to teach young 
buyers that we will not tolerate any breaches of policy of strong, 
open, fair dealing. And if we have not been courteous or if we have 
broken any contracts, I will certainly not tolerate it. I think it was 
a very useful blood-letting." 
As Builder he is constantly scanning his own organisation looking for talent 
amongst his own ranks which can be rewarded with promotion. On one occasion 
he meets with one of his senior subordinates and they spend an hour 
discussing whether a particular senior post should be filled from overseas 
or not. They decide that "our own talent is sufficient without our filling 
important slots with outside people." 
But this confidence in and support of his own subordinates is not unrealistic. 
Again we see a flexibility of thought when on another occasion he records: 
"We researched 3 of our own men but we fe 1 t that they were either not 
suitable or would not quite get on in the circumstances and so we agreed 
to bring in an outside man into this post." 
His personnel policy and practice is GUrious in this respect for its 
flexibility: A man previously employed at Spatial and dismissed, reapplies. 












11 He just isn't suitable enough. Although we have tried for 3 years to make 
him into something. It's a pity but he just isn't up to it. 11 But when 
another manager cannot control stock shrinkage "and other matters", he 
is dismissed. Instantly. 
There are 2 buyers at a particular branch. The one has a problem with the 
other 11 relationship-wise 11 and wants to resign. Gordon goes "through the 
problem and the cause of it 11 and comes to the conclusion that 11 the whole thing 
is one of incompatibility and possibly just bad handling. 11 And so he puts 
11 a 2-week moratorium on the situation to sort out the problem. 11 
Two days later he calls in 3 of his senior subordinates and discusses the 
problem with them for an hour. They reluctantly decide to accept the 
resignation. But still Gordon is not satisfied and talks to the problem-buyer 
the following day.· Only after this meeting as well as after further discussion 
with other subordinates does Gordon finally decide to accept the resignation 
and record: "It's sad but I felt that it was correct after discussion at 
length. 11 
This conviction of the need to conserve man-power is of course not only 
for the present but also for the future. He has many meetings specifically 
for the purpose of discussing personnel policies, procedures, and 
training "to ensure that we use their talents for the future. 11 
Although performance of the Liaison role is primarily in order to build 
up a network of contacts which will be useful in the future, there were 
very few occasions where this fraternising with peers did not produce some 
immediate reward: 
11 ! then went to town and had an interesting lunch with (5 Gentlemen whose 
names read like the Who's Who of business and banking). We discussed 
politics, business, and the state of the country in general. I got the 
distinct inference that ... This is purely a gut feel but I think it 
is going to come about. 11 
On another occasion Gordon gives a lunchtime speech to a small group of 
influential brokers and financial investors and records that: 11 I felt it 












Afterwards he picks up a piece of 1 hot 1 information concerning the price of 
Spatial' s shares and a 1 so hears a rumour that another 1 arge Group is in 
financial difficulties. 
(Here I apportioned to the Monitor role 5 minutes for each of these small 
activities and the remainder of the time to the Liaison role). 
Informational Roles 
Analysis of the Monitor role activity was very interesting. As already 
explained this role was split two ways: Into Information coming from 
outside the organisation and that which came from internal sources, and 
at the same time a distinction was made between solicited (requested) and 
unsolicited input. This of course meant that any time period costed to 
the Monitor role had to be recorded twice. 
The most obvious source of outside information for the manager is the 
printed word and Gordon does his fair share of reading periodicals and 
trade magazines. On an aircraft he spends half an hour reading "the latest 
retailing magazine which had a long article on expansionism. This is very 
interesting if we are to think of ... (some expansion project)." And so 
we here have a link with the Entrepreneurial role. 
Within the organisation he solicits information from subordinates about topics 
which he believes to be relevant from time to time: A general manager is 
"cross-questioned deeply" about the management methods which he is employing 
and how it is that he is able to keep his control tighter than in any 
other division. As a result "a note of about 15 points which I am going to 
record and want to circulate and discuss at the meeting" are made. 
This linking between the Monitor and the Disseminator role occurred throughout 
the analysis. It seldom happens that information is solicited without Gordon 
taking the opportunity to disseminate to his informant or the informant 
taking the opportunity to add some unsolicited information to that which he 












all probability come to him in an unsolicited form at some later time. But, 
as contended by Mintzberg, there is a pressure for the immediate and the 
verbal. The following report illustrates both these points. Gordon: 
11 I phoned Max about the possible court case with the Sherwood situation 
and he to 1 d me that he had settled out of court for R52 ,000 which has 
been written off against last year. 11 He told me that he had managed 
to settle the rates for the Durban Store and this has come down 
dramatically from what it was through his fighting for it. 
I also told him about the outcome of the John Carter situation and how 
he had decided to handle the matter. 11 
(In cases such as this the total time for the telephone call was apportioned 
between the various enacted roles). 
He is constantly scanning, probing around at odd places in order to glean 
information, and this constant searching for facts often brings to light 
problems or situations which need attention. These crises would only have 
been brought to his notice much later had he not initiated the inquiry himself: 
11 I decided to check into the ... merchandise problem and the question of 
the Rl25 000 to see whether it had been charged to last year (accounting 
period), and I was shocked to find that despite Sam, Lew, and Brian all 
having told me it was charged t  last year, it had not been done. I 
was terribly annoyed that they hadn 1 t told me the truth. It was primarily 
bad communication by them together but they still hid the facts from me 
and I made my point in no uncertain terms to all three of them. It is 
now settled and charged against last year as originally planned. 11 
11 It just shows that one simply cannot stop checking and it also shows that 
it is about time that our top executives started to behave as such. 11 
This last sequence shows the linking between solicited monitoring, disturbance 
handler and leader monitor roles. The total time for this activity was 90 
minutes and was divided equally into the 3 roles. 
Unsolicited information from outside the organisation can come to him from any 
quarter at any time. I was with Gordon when he heard quite incidentally 
that a certain commodity was not being stocked in one of his Stores. He 
immediately called in the Buyer to check on the facts and then 1 jumped rank 1 
by picking up the phone and speaking directly to the Store Manager. 
But I did not know what he was thinking at the time. Later I read in the diary 
that he had recorded: 11 It looks as if there could well be a problem where 
(the manager) has either cut the range too much or is running his Store badly. 












Thus information, however unsubstantiated, is acted upon on the assumption 
that a disturbance exists and he is wanting confirmation either that the 
information is false or that the crisis has been cleared up. Once again 
we see a link between Monitor, Disseminator, and Disturbance Handler. 
Any manager must rely heavily upon unsolicited information coming to him 
from within his organisation from subordinates. Because of his preference for 
live 'hot' informational input he cannot wait for this to come to 
him through channels from any level in the hierarchy. Mintzberg goes so 
far as to suggest that the executive actually encourages subordinates to 
jump rank and come directly to him. This wish is subtly conveyed to the 
subordinate so that he feels sure of being well received - provided that the 
informational tit-bit which he has to offer is of sufficient importance. 
Gordon provides us with strong confirmation of this: 
"Chris came in to mention to me that he had heard a rumour that the 
Ressel Group is possibly going insolvent. This could cause an enormous 
problem with the Bank and could cause trouble with our Witbank 
Financing arrangements." 
Gordon does not regard performance of the Spokesman role as a nuisance but 
at the same time he does not glory-seek. He merely regards it as an essential 
part of his overall management of the organisation. In the middle of an 
important scheduled meeting he records: 
"I was interrupted by the Sunday Times regarding a big supplement that 
they are putting out. They wanted to know how I felt about the impending 
rise in price of (a certain commodity). This call took a good 10 minutes." 
Decisional Roles 
The role of Resource Allocator is best illustrated by considering the proceedings 
of one of the two Directors Meetings contained in the study. One of these 












The proceedings of this meeting illustrate just how true it is that the 
manager performs a Leader role in real terms whenever he interacts with his 
subordinates .. In the space of the two hours a total of 20 items were 
discussed and all these were itemised separately for me in the Minutes. 
During this time Gordon listened to information from his co-director 
subordinates (Monitor), expounded information which was relevant to the 
topic under discussion (Disseminator), and charged one or several of his 
subordinates with the task of following up each item under discussion (if 
there was incomplete information) or with the implementation if a decision 
was made (both Resource Al locator). And yet there can· be no disputing the 
fact that not only was he performing his function of Leader but also that 
of Figurehead. Some examples extracted from the Minutes in surranary form 
show how these were allocated to the various roles: 
Gordon raised the point that rates as well as other overhead charges had 
risen steeply recently. Max Allen to check on these charges and to report 
back (Disseminator/Resource Allocator) 
Cash Position: The Company has Rx on call at the week ending (Monitor) 
Gordon indicated that the Company results for the Fiscal Year were looking 
good but put emphasis on the preparation for the possible difficult year 
ahead. SP is to have the results ready for the preliminary Board meeting 
on Saturday 26. (Disseminator/Resource Allocator) 
Gordon mentioned that Jeff Smith (Middle management) had resigned and that 
his replacement would be handled over the next few days (Disseminator). 
In this case I was forced to divide the time by the number of items and further 
to sub-divide each item according to whether it was a single or dual role 
activity. I do not believe that handling the 2 Directors' Meetings which 
were included in the study this way makes any material difference to the 
results simply because (as already stated) all the items under discussion 












Another important aspect of resource allocation is the scheduling of the 
executive's own time and the way in which Gordon does this is examined in 
the following Section. 
By far the most interesting Decisional role is that of Entrepreneur. At the 
time that the study was made Gordon had already initiated or set in motion 
an extremely important improvement project, namely a reorganisation of Spatial 's 
capitalisation. Preliminary discussions and meetings have already taken place. 
We pick up the sequence of activities on Wednesday 23: 
11 ! then had a 3-hour meeting with John, Solly, Wesley (outsiders) and 
4 of our own people on the whole question of a capital base and we 
agreed to go for the share issue." 
There could be a very convincing argument for including a degree of Monitor 
role in this activity as Gordon is hearing expert advice from his subordinates 
as well as other advisors on the matter of the capital base. However, this 
meeting has taken place some 11 days after an earlier one (Saturday 12) which 
lasted 135 minutes and which was split between Entrepreneur, Monitor, and 
Resource Allocator. At this meeting Gordon ended by asking 2 of his subordinates 
to "go into depth and come back to a meeting on the 23rd with the final 
alternatives and with figures attached." However, even at that time he 
records that "we had definitely decided to go for the RXm capital raising 
exercise and we are now (only) working out the route and the timing." 
The point is here that he had already taken the decision on the 23rd and 
has elected to keep the decision very much under his own supervision. He was 
really only asking for figures to endorse a decision already privately taken: 
He has decided on a certain course of action and will not change his decision 
unless the information brought to him shows this decision to be wrong. 
But the figures endorse his own point of view and after the "informal vote" 
is taken on the 23rd he records: ''I am pleased to have talked around it and 
have come to this decision." There is a strong suggestion that he himself 












He is clearly looking for support for a decision that he has taken. There 
is not a right or a wrong answer, all of the variables cannot be quantified, 
there are probably more unknowns than knowns, and the degree of consensus 
that he gets reduces the sense of loneliness 'up there. 1 
There were a number of these cases where the more important decisions -
particularly those of the improvement project type where he was perfonning 
an entrepreneurial role - tended to be discussed privately between Gordon 
and one or two of his senior subordinates ,first rather than brought up in open 
directors' meeting. Plans and changes for the future were often discussed 
seriatim with a number of subordinates, then with a larger group where 
each one would be informed of Gordon's intended action, and by the time they 
were discussed in formal meeting it was merely a question of 'rubber stamping.' 
Performance of the Negotiator role was confined to a few occasions where 
he made 11 deals 11 with senior executives of supplying factories. Each of 
these meetings lasted approximately an hour. The results of this role 
analysis are presented together with those of Lewis in Table 12 later 
in this Chapter when we discuss the differences in role performance between 












GORDON'S WORK CHARACTERISTICS 
We turn now to a consideration of.the people with whom Gordon interacts, 
for how long, and how often per day: An examination of his work 
characteristics. 
We are here fortunate in being able to make a direct comparison on selected 
characteristics between the Charan and Mi ntzberg studies as reported in the 
latter's work (1973:105). 
Logically one should expect that the activity profile of the chief 
executive of a large South African Company would fall somewhere between 
those of a large and a small American one. Do Gordon's? The answer is 
yes, and no. Table 7 shows Gordon's work characteristics listed between 
those of the Mintzberg and Charan study. 
In the total number of activities per day, the number of telephone calls 
and the proportion of total time taken,Gordon is very similar to or the 
same as the executives in Mintzberg's study, although his calls take somewhat 
longer. Similarly there is little difference in the characteristics 
of his scheduled meetings. The main differences come in desk work, 
unscheduled meetings, and the amount of time spent in verbal contact with 
subordinates. 
We should remind ourselves that the Mintzberg and Charan figures are the 
results of averages between people so that any one of Gordon's personal 
work habits is going to be highlighted when seen against these means. 
He is primarily motivated by a strong belief in people. He has an open-
door policy and is genuinely willing to spend large amounts of his time 
talking to subordinates. He ends up by spending 66% of his time in verbal 
contact with them - a figure far higher than either of the other two groups. 
(In personal interview he told me: 11 ! spend 50% of my time on people matters. 11 ) 
This has several results: It means that although the number of unscheduled 
meetings which he has per day is not significantly higher than those of 











TABLE 7 SELECTED COMPARISONS OF THE WORK OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF SMALL AND LARGE ORGANISATIONS 
Large Organisations Gordon based Sma 11 Companies 
5 chief executives on 12 days 3 presidents 
25 days of of observation 6 days of 
observation observation 
Mi ntzberg Study Charan Study 
Number of activities per day 22 19 77 
Desk Work Sessions 
Number per day 7 2 22 
Proportion of time 22% 15% 35% 
Average duration 15 min 46 min 6 min 
Telephone Ca 11 s 
Number per day 5 5 29 
Proportion of time 6% 7% 17% 
Average duration 6 min 10 min 2 min ....., 
Scheduled Meetings 
Number per day 4 6 3 
Proportion of time 59% 48% 21% 
Average duration 68 min 47 min 27 min 
Unscheduled Meetings 
Number per day 4 6 19 
Proportion of time 10% 24% 15% 
Average duration 12 min 23 min 3 min 
Proportion of Activities Lasting 
Less Than 9 Min 49% 20% 90% 
Proportion Lasting More Than 
60 Min 10% 11% 0.02% 
Proportion of Time in Verbal Contact With: 
Subordinates 48~b 66% 56% 
Suppliers and associates 17% 5% 31% 
Peers and trade organizations 11 % 11% 0.2% 
Others 23% 4% 14% 
Proportion of Scheduled Meetings with more 












meeting are nearly twice as long. Gordon does not believe in hurrying 
people either in personal contact or on the telephone. Also, notwithstanding 
that he works long hours he is left with very little time for himself for 
desk work sessions. These he has to 'make' by periodically closetting 
himself in order to deal with that which has to be dealt with. 
TABLE 8 
DAY 





















IN ADDITION TO NORMAL MAIL 
Includes dictating diary 
Includes messages 
Includes going th rough own notes 
Includes diary 
Includes diary and 
11 a few personal matters. 11 
Mail of the previous day 
Includes messages 
Includes checking outstanding 
matters with Secretary 
= 4,04% of total time {7555 mins) 
i 
On one occasion he records that: "I had very few phone calls today because 
I just cut off and spent the morning . . . and the afternoon . . . 11 
Occasionally he feels the need to mainly rearrange his thoughts and often 
speaks about "clearing himself" By this he does not mean clearing work 













This brings us to his mail record which is analysed in Table 8. From this 
it can be seen that, far from attending to mail as it comes in, many days 
can pass between mail activities. Mail is dealt with during those few 
times (2 per day) when he has time at his desk. On one occasion he records 
11 ! had time to myself for the first time in 2 weeks. 11 
His activites are therefore not only dictated by the requirements of the 
organisation as they are with any chief executive: 
11 ! am absolutely exhausted but I feel a lot has been achieved in the 
last 24 hours , 11 
But also by his seemingly endless willingness to interact with his 
subordinates: 
"The magic word is 'communication' which is really the name of our 
business. 11 
In concluding this Section I should like - merely for illustration purposes -
to show how a given activity which appears to belong to one role function in 
fact belongs to a completely different one, often of another group. I shall 
cite 2 examples. In the first Gordon meets with one of his inside directors 
to discuss a forthcoming overseas visit. At first glance this meeting is 
interpersonal in nature, until one realises that the primary purpose is in 
fact one of Resource Allocation: 
11 ! had an hour-long meeting with Max concerning his and my overseas trip. 
The main purpose was to coordinate our meeting with Mr Spiegel of 
(Company name) concerning our overseas buying relationship and the 
week that I am going to spend with the people in Frankfurt." 
There is also a secondary purpose of this meeting which is to take the first 
steps towards the initiation of a change within the company. But the fulfilment 
of this entrepreneurial role activity will only take place at the time that 
the trip is made: Assignment or scheduling of his own time precedes the 












The second example is somewhat more dramatic. I am sure that if I had 
asked Gordon what the purpose of the meeting was before it took place he 
would have told me that it was purely liaison in nature. In fact he says 
so: 
11 At four o'clock going right through until six I met Mannie Cohen 
for what I thought was going to be a five minute courtesy meeting 
but it took 2 hours because I found a severe relationship problem 
and a possible break in limits of authority as well as a possible 
commitment of 10 000 units of merchandise from another Company which 
looked crazy to me." 
Gordon reacts to this crisis by calling in two of the subordinates, then a 
third, then a fourth, and finally phoning a fifth "to get all the facts," and 
at the conclusion of the meeting he records: "We came to the conclusion 
that there is not a commitment but that they {the buyers) had certainly 
not handled the matter satisfactorily as far as relationships and limits 
of authority were concerned. 11 
Once again we see the link between Monitor, Disturbance Handler, and Resource 
Allocator: A crisis is perceived and dealt with until the executive is 












A ROLE SET MODEL 
When the sequencing and linking of Gordon's role activity is combined with 
the notions outlined in Chapter 9, an interactional pattern between the 
roles is suggested. This is illustrated in Fi~ure 11. 
It is easy to see that non-performance of the manager's Liaison role 
will result in the manager being cut off from a very useful source of 
(Monitoring) information and conversely, the less the manager monitors 
both inside and outside his organisation the less easily he will be able 
to liaise efficiently - because of rejection by his peers as he is 
ignorant of outside affairs in general, and the internal working of his 
own company in particular. Also less monitoring will result in poor 
ability as a Spokesman because he cannot impart specific information about 
his company without authority. 
Efficient monitoring aids adequate performance on the Figurehead role and 
vice versa. This latter role is further aided by adequate performance 
of the Leader role. 
* We have seen several instances of monitoring followed by dissemination and 
resource allocation activity. The manager cannot disseminate effectively 
unless he monitors adequately, and monitoring is also essential for all 
decision-making. (Entrepreneur, Disturbance Handler, Resource Allocator, 
Negotiator). Decision-making is in turn essential for adequate task 
performance by the manager, by his subordinates, and therefore by the 
organisation at large. 
There is certainly a feedback from Resource Allocator and Disseminator to the 
Leader role on a psychologically supportive level: The Leader will be 
perceived by his subordinates as being a good task leader and their confidence 
Mintzberg contends that a decision must intersperse between monitor and 
Disseminator (1973:74-75). Logic?lly one must agree. However, it is so quick 
that it cannot be observed, and we must leave it to the cognitive researchers 
















A MODEL OF THE ROLE SET 
POWER AND AUTHORITY 
/ .... I__ L_EA_D_ER_I_NT_E_RP_E_R,....SO_N_A_L _R_oL_E __ ~I 
Promotes good human relations 
in the total organisation 
better able / 
aids subordinates give information 
more easily when asked and 
vo 1 unteer more (= receptive 
to upward communication flow) 
B better equipped 

























ENTREPRENEUR HANDLER ALLOCATOR 
~ / 
Promotes good Task performance 
= PRODUCTIVITY OF TOTAL ORGANISATION 
Role 10: NEGOTIATOR = a combination of Figurehead, Spokesman, and 































































in him as a manager will increase. This would be interpreted by them as 
task support. It could also be argued that a similar feedback exists from 
Disturbance Handler (to Leader role) although this was not observed. 
Adequate performance of the Leader role further aids performance of the 
Figurehead as well as the Monitor role in that the Leader is seen 
as being receptive to an upward communication flow from his subordinates. 
They will therefore give more information to him more e~sily when they 
are asked for it and further, will volunteer more. This will result in 
the manager being exposed to a greater variety and quantity of information. 
From this brief analysis it can be seen that it would appear that Monitor 
is central to Leadership activity: It is the most important role in the set. 
However, of almost equal importance is Leader because this has one of the 
strongest inside influences upon the Monitor role. 
The Leader role plays such a strong part in the promotion and establishment 
of organisational climate and hence the promotion of good human relations 
in the organisation as a whole. 
The emergence of this dynamic is hardly surprising when we recall the 
reciprocal relationship between satisfaction and productivity which was 
demonstrated ('proven') in Part 'I. 
The suggestion of this model is certainly not complete and should only be 
seen as a first approximation. More specifically it does not adequately 
show the importance of some aspects of the Leader role such as training, 
hiring, and promoting (Builder) nor the importance of ongoing and long-term 
improvement projects (Entrepreneur). Both of these role activities have 
important effects upon the future. 
Efficient performance of both is also entirely governed by adequate Monitor 
role activity: If the manager's intelligence system is defective he will not 
know who to train or who is being trained or when. Neither, no matter how 
good his innovative ideas are, will he be able to ensure that he has 












THE UNSUCCESSFUL MANAGER 
Introduction 
The method of choice for the pilot study had been observation, but as Gordon 
had used an expanded diary I asked Lewis to do the same. At my initial 
interview with him, after agreeding to help me, he took notes on what was 
wanted and agreed to start on the following Monday. 
On Monday afternoon I called him to inquire how he was getting on. He 
wasn't. 11 ! can't work and do this thing at the same time," he said. 
The following day I went to see him and found that he had made a valiant 
attempt: The record started at 7.15 a.m., was neatly divided into columns 
of various types of activities, but ended in a blur around 9.45 a.m. 
11 ! work at such a frenetic pace, 11 he told me, "you'll have to come in 
and record yourself. 11 
Observation was therefore imperative - a development about which I was not 
sorry as I wanted to study this man closely. But the significance of the 
fact that he had tabulated his attempted record into columns as well as 
his remark about a 'frenetic' workpace were only brought home to me later. 
At that time it was not possible for me to observe him fulltime. About 
a week later I called him to arrange dates and he told me he was in the 
middle of a major crisis. Nevertheless, I could come at any time: 11 But 













One rarely if ever has the opportunity of observing a man's behaviour 
when he is engaged in a battle for survival. It is more usual for a man 
to share the glory of his successes with others (especially outsiders) than 
the agony of his failures, and so I accepted this invitation eagerly. 
In addition I felt that Lewis' method of handling this type of situation 
could provide a useful contrast to the bland routine when he was not under 
* pressure. 
Therefore the days of observation are not consecutive. After the day of 
crisis I kept in contact with Lewis by telephone, constantly monitoring 
the situation of his Group and waiting until the major issues had been 
resolved. The elapsed time between the first day and the other days of 
observation is approximately 8 weeks. I then observed him on 4 further 
days. These dates were chosen by myself and not by him: He would tell 
me what he was doing on any following day and I chose the days for 
observation when there were fewer 1 engthy routine meetings such as with 
auditors going over historical accounts. 
METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
lntroducti on 
The routine of observation did not vary much. I would arrive at approximately 
8.15 on each day of observation. Invariably he had been in office for a few 
minutes himself. Mostly he would be reading the newspaper. He spent a few 
minutes filling me in on what homework he had done the previous evening and 
that morning and what (if anything) he had done in office so far. Perhaps 
we would spend a few minutes chatting about generalities. If anything of 
major importance was expected to happen that day he would tell me at that 
time. Recording began after this. 
As it turned out neither his work characteristics nor his role activity 
showed any variablity between Day l and the other days of observation. · 












I sat in one of the clients chairs opposite his desk and remained there for 
the rest of the day. He seemed to prefer me sitting near to him even when 
he was dictating. Occasionally when several visitors were in his office, I 
occupied a chair in the corner on which his briefcase normally stood. 
He excluded me from nothing. On those few occasions when I did not accompany 
him to outside meetings it was because - after discussion between us~ we 
felt that my presence might hinder the proceedings. 
* He hid nothing from me. I was able to see all letters, was present at all 
dictation periods, and in addition was given copies of all draft accounts and 
balance sheets which he prepared. If these were discussed in a meeting then 
an extra copy was made and handed to me. I was therefore able to follow the 
detailed content of all proceedings. 
The Record 
Everything was tabulated on one record which therefore became a mixture of 
the starting and stopping time of each activity, other occurrences such as 
the entry and exit of people from the office, anecdotes, and (when there was 
time) my impressions or opinions. 
I found that usually everything was happening at such a frenzied pace that 
it was hard to keep up with the recording of the activities. It often took 
longer to write about a particular event than the actual time taken for it 
to happen. This is due mainly to already-stored information and the fact 
that various physical actions were taking place at the same time that words 
are being spoken. For example, Lewis might finish a call, shout an instruction 
to a subordinate, and reach for a document on his desk all at the same time. 
In observation so much of what is happening is visual. 
The single exception to this was a 5 minute call he made to his personal 












In the evening of each day of observation I made further notes, expanding 
on the (sometimes one word) impressions formulated during the day and then 
dictated these notes and the record onto tape. Subsequent transcription 
of this material resulted in some 70 pages of data for the 5 days of the study. 
Telephone Calls: The procedure for handling telephone calls varied between 
the first and the rest of the days of observation. Because I was not completely 
familiar with the people who might be calling, Lewis would cup his hand over 
the mouthpiece and explain to me who the person was before he began speaking. 
Because of the experience of Day 1 and due to several discussions which I had 
with him in the interim this was not necessary on the remaining 4 days. 
It was then only necessary for him to say, for example, 11 Smith 11 in the 
short period between the time the telephonist told him that the caller 
was on the line and switching him through. 
However, as Mintzberg has pointed out, during observation one could never hear 
the other side of the conversation and therefore after every call it was 
always necessary for him to tell me (in synopsis form) what the caller had 
said - although it was usually possible to pick up the gist of the content 
from Lewis' responses during the call. 
Talking to the Researcher: During a study of this kind, no matter how much one 
would like to pretend to be a 'fly on the wall', this is just not possible. 
As several other Researchers have noted, introductions are necessary to 
subordinates as well as to outsiders at the beginning of each meeting. This 
does take time. (see Box). 
My presence also affected the study in another rather unexpected way: 
During the natural breaks in the sequence of activities I naturally said little, 
but rather waited because I wanted to see how Lewis would handle or use the 
unstructured time. Instead of getting on with the next activity he often 
addressed remarks to me. These were entirely spontaneous, were not elicited 
by me in any way, and unless he asked me a direct question which demanded 












He got on with his work. Sometimes though {as we shall see) there was 
nothing in the natural sequence of events to occupy his time and here I 
was forced into conversation. These periods which I diarised as 'talking 
to researcher' took up a total of 79 minutes over the 5 days and were 
equivalent to 2,85 percent of the total gross time. This was analysed as 
Lost Time. 
Then there was Lewis' own reaction to my presence. Throughout the period 
he remained friendly and cooperative, open and frank {in fact I am sure that 
in many respects, I know more about him than his own family does) and, 
notwithstanding that he appeared sorry when the study came to an end {"you 
are welcome to come back and do it again any time. 11 ), I am sure that he 
found the fact that he did not know exactly what it was that I was doing 
increasingly burdensome. This showed in the manner of his introducing 
me to callers. In the beginning he was completely neutral, but as the days 
passed he demonstrated that he was becoming increasingly intrigued and curious 
until on Day 5 the secrecy became irksome: During the introduction to a 
visitor, he said, 11 ! don't know what he is writing but he's been doing it 
for 4 days now. Anyway. 11 
Analysis of the Data 
The first stage of the analysis into gross hours worked and activity time 
was done in exactly the same way as for Gordon {page 157), and the results 
are given in Table 9. This shows that Lewis works an average of 7 hours 
per day compared to Gordon's 10: A fact which by itself could mean nothing 
but what is interesting is that Lewis loses 2. 15 hours per day (difference 
between mean gross and net times) compared to Gordon's 45 minutes. We can 
therefore draw a tentative inference at this stage: Lewis is probably a 
less efficient utiliser of his time than is Gordon. 
Each activity was then apportioned to a role, the assumptions as before. But 
in order to fully understand why analysis of Lewis' role activity produced 
the results which they did, it is necessary to talk a little bit more about 
the man, his method of working, and his environment. And so I should like to 












OBSERVER PRESENCE EFFECT 
What effect does the presence of an observer have upon the subjects under 
study (manager and his subordinates) and thus upon the data collected? 
Mintzberg (1968) reports that "clearly the manager could get used to my 
presence as the week progressed but to most participants at meetings, 
.... the presence of a researcher was unexpected. In almost every case, 
introductions were necessary. 
Once introductions were completed, various patterns set in. A few 
people were self-conscious, and would steal quick glances in my direction 
as if they did not believe the expressed explanation for my presence 
... In the vast majority of meetings, however, my presence seemed to 
be quickly forgotten. 
In spite of the adjustments that took place during meeting, the main 
topic of research interest - purpose of activity - appeared to be 
unaffected. The presence of an observer will not change the basic 
purpose of a meeting, although it may change the style that the manager 
uses during the meeting. 11 (page 270) 
Charan (1969) reports ·similar introductions to subordinates at the 
beginning of meetings and remarks that this causes a waste of time. 
Further, that some individuals "showed some anxi ty at the beginning 
of a meeting. 11 It was not only the participants who found his presence 
disturbing: He reports that "in one case the manager asked me to 
leave the meeting mid-way through as he felt that my presence was 
upsetting his ability to hash out the argument presented by the 
participant(s). 11 
Stewart (1976) states: "We were not able to assess whether the observer 
affected what happened except by comparing the diary with the observation. 
We thought that he did in one of the studies (page 152). 
Whilst no fault can be found with Mintzberg's contention that the basic 
purpose of an activity will not be altered by an observer (and therefore 
had little effect upon his own data), this is not what we shall be 
studying in the future: in the Role Set we have a valid set of 
statements with which to describe purpose. The thrust of the research 
must now be directed at questions such as time distribution between 
Roles, frequency of performance of activity, quality and quantity of 
interaction between the manager and subordinate and between the manager 
and his peers, to name but a few. In all of these the presence of the 
observer will have a telling effect upon the results obtained. 
Introductions are inevitable - completely unavoidable. They take time. 
The manager is going to sometimes feel inhibited (Charan) in front of a 
relative stranger, and few subordinates are going to react and interact 
normally in front of a complete stranger to whom they have only just 
been introduced. They will feel threatened. Thus both 'flavour'and 
true communication pattern will be lost. 
Considering the reports of the above researchers and in the light of my 
own experi:ence (see text), I would recommend that direct observation 
not be used for future research and that workers consider using videotape 
{Radomsky 1967) in those cases where observation is necessary or other 











SUBJECT LEWIS : 
TABLE 9 Start Stop Gross Hours 
Time Time For Day 
Wednesday 12 08.25 16.55 8.30 
Wednesday 7 08.15 17. 05 8.50 
Thursday 8 08.20 18.05 9.45 
Monday 12 08.50 17.00 8. 10 
Wednesday 14 08.45 17. 12 8.27 
Total Time = 
x = 
HOURS WORKED AND RECORDED TIME 
Add Less Net Actual Unaccounted Time 
After Lost Hours Recorded 
Hours Time For Time 
Day 
.30 1.46 7 .14 7.00 • 14 
• 30 1.53 7 .27 7.06 .21 
.30 3.36 6.39 6.08 . 01 
. 30 2.04 6.36 6.22 . 14 
.30 1.54 7.03 6.58 .05 
46.12 34.59 = Total Recorded Time 
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Quotes in the text are verbatim: This is how Lewis speaks. 
LEWIS' WORK CHARACTERISTICS 
When I arrived at 8. 15 on the·first Day to observe a man facing a crisis 
which threatened to deprive him of a large part of his 'empire', I did 
not expect to find him sitting reading the Births and Deaths column in 
the newspaper: Unconcerned. Later in the morning he is quite cheerful. 
when he tells me: "So they (the bank) have got the panics (about the 
financial state of the Group). So I get a letter. So cheques might 
be dishonoured. But its lovely." 
And still later in the day when he has explained the nature of the crisis 
to numerous callers ranging from private creditors to merchant banks, he 
remarks: "Today's been easy relative to other days. 11 Easy? "Sure, 
I've had to make no decisions today." 
Two things dominate his worklife: The telephone and his Lists. Everyday 
before breakfast he spends half an hour making a list of telephone calls 
which must be placed to people that he wants to talk to as well as a list 
of things to which he must attend and items such as files which must be 
placed in his briefcase to be brought home that evening. These will be 
of many types ranging from those on operating subsidiary companies to 
banks and friends. All these items are neatly tabulated in column form 
and as each one is attended to it is struck off: "I love crossing off lists. 11 
Items are also added to this list during the day and if it becomes too 
11 messy 11 then it is rewritten. A lot of his deskwork session time is taken 
up attending to the lists. 
I was to find though that it was the telephone that dominates his life: 
11 I always do my ca 11 s first because that determines the day. 11 The fo 11 owing 












12.45 - 12.54: Throughout the morning as each placed telephone call comes 
through Lewis has scratched it off his list. He has also made copious notes 
whilst talking to every caller - commonly on the same sheet of paper as 
the list. This sheet is now full of notes, scribblings, and scratchings-out. 
And so he now rewrites the lists: first the telephone calls, and then 
the 11 do 11 list. 11 ! can live on the telephone. When I have nothing to 
do I create telephone calls. 11 
From his own study and backed up by the work of many of the diarists and 
early observationists, Mintzberg contends that the manager performs 11 much 
work at an unrelenting pace. 11 Stewart (1976) characterises him as having 
11 no time to think. 11 In contrast, Lewis the unsuccessful exhibits quite 
different behaviour: 
He finishes a call and continues searching through files. Whilst doing so 
he talks to me: 11 ! want to try and decide on what basis to propose settling 
with Transocean on Friday11 ••• He finds what he is looking for, closes the 
file, sits back in his chair: 11 Now I sit. 11 I say nothing. The time ticks 
by. And his reverie is only broken when 4 minutes later Sheila puts a pile 
of letters on his desk which he signs. 
I had come to observe a man trying to extricate himself from a difficult 
situation - one which threatened the survival of his whole Group - and instead 
of finding a man in a frenzy, I find one who has nothing to do. This 
behaviour did not change very much from between the 1 Crisis Day' and the 
other days which were supposed to be 'nonnal.' The following extract from 
the diary is useful in illustrating this: 
10.24 - 10.28 
10. 29 
10. 30 - "IQ. 37 
10.38 - 10. 39 
10 . 39 - 10 . 44 
Lewis clips items from the newspaper and gives them to 
Sheila to file. 
Nothing tp do. Lewis sits. 
Lewis makes a personal call. 
He sits. Looking at the telephone and waiting for it to ring. 
He ca 11 s the Bookkeeper, Penny: 11 Why am I ca 11 i ng you? 
No, I don't know why. Look, as I am talking to you anyway, 
on the question of bonuses, you take whatever Sheila gets 
. . . We 11 , I'm feeling in a generol!s mood today. 11 Penny 
obviously thanks him because he becomes embarrassed and 
mutters that 11 thanks are not necessary" before putting 
down the phone. 












As a result I had to list a new category of work activity in the log: 'Doing 
nothing' took up 66 minutes or 2 percent of the total time during the 5 days 
of study. This was quite apart from the category of "Talking to Researcher" 
and both these groups of activity were marked down as Lost Time. 
His Work Environment and Relationships with Subordinates 
Lewis has a completely open door policy: Literally. In fact the door is 
seldom even closed when he is in a meeting with outsiders except on those 
occasions when Sheila is typing and the noise might be disturbing. The 
layout. of offices is in the form of a long corridor and by leaning slightly 
forward Lewis can even see Sheila at her work station. Whilst it is not 
possible for him to see his other employees he can shout to them down the 
'passage' and often carries on conversations with. the telephonist, Jean, 
this way. 
Any caller coming into the reception area, be he an important visitor or 
merely a messenger, can see Lewis working at his desk. 
People walk in and out of Lewis' office all the time whether he is talking to 
someone or not. If he is on the telephone then the subordinate will stand 
waiting for him to finish his call. He does not motion with his hand 
either to sit down or to leave, nor does he in any other way acknowledge 
their presence. Another factor which ensures the constant stream of people 
in and out of the office are the files: Lewis not only keeps essential 
information which should be in the possession of his subordinates, but he also 
literally 'sits on' many current files. These are stacked on a table in his 
office and the overflow is on a counter behind his chair. The contents 
of the files relate to individual acquisitions, current company activity, 
financial statements, profitability figures and balance sheets, feasibility 
studies, as well as debtors. 
His subordinates are therefore placed in a position of having first of all to 
look for these files either in their own or in the general office and having 
wasted this time in a fruitless search to come and ask him for the relevant 












THE DIARY OF A NUMBER 2 
The following is a chronicle in summary form of the interactions and 
meetings which Lewis had with his senior subordinate Arthur Weatherstone 
during the 5 days of the Study. The time of each interaction activity 
is given in brackets. 
DAY l 
11.21 (Arthur Weatherstone walks into the office. Lewis is on the 






Lewis calls Arthur in and briefly informs him of the morning's 
events. 
(Arthur walks in, looks around, sees Lewis is on the phone, and 
leaves.) 
He comes in and Lewis tells him about some new product that 
Spintex are going to make. He mutters a reply and leaves. 
Lewis reports the contents of a call just completed to 
Arthur. 






the subsidiary Constructa. Lewis dominates the proceedings. 
Weatherstone comes in to report on progress of the sale of 
Constructa. Lewis is reluctant to engage in detailed 
conversation and instructs him to enter into "real 
negotiation" with the prospective purchaser. 
He comes in with a query. 
(Arthur has been hanging about in Sheila's 
Lewis sees him, says: 11 All hell's breaking 
they want to buy shares and not assets. 11 
Weatherstone: 11 0h, yes. 11 
Arthur comes in asking: "Should I get Mr. 
Lewis doesn 1 t answer him, but asks: "What 
about .... ?11 
office.) 
loose ... now 
P or Mr. R 
have you done 























Weatherstone comes into the office and they have a short 
discussion on the sale of Constructia. Weatherstone 
reports progress. Lewis issues further instructions. 
(Lewis out of office in the afternoon.) 
(7) 
9.32 Lewis calls out good morning to Arthur who is pottering around 






Lewis calls Arthur into his office and 'fills him in 1 on 
the sale of the past few days. 
(Arthur has the file pertaining to these matters in his 
office. Lewis currently has the information) 
Weatherstone says very little. 
They move onto a discussion of Constructa. Weatherstone 
requests pennission to accept offers for part-purchase of 
the plant. Lewis agrees. 
Weatherstone comes in with a query whilst Lewis is in 
a meeting with an outsider. 
The interruption is allowed. 
Weatherstone is called in so Lewis can inform him of a 
meeting which is to take place. 





Arthur talks, Lewis makes rotes. (9) 
Lewis then begins talking and goes into detail as to how 
he sees the position and how it should be handled. {23) 
(Various interruptions) 
Weatherstone attempts to continue the conversation. He 
asks a question. This reminds Lewis of something else 
(it is obvious that he is not listening) and he calls 
the bookkeeper, Jean. 
Weatherstone ignored, leaves. 
(I did not see him again.) 
Total interaction time = 99 minutes 











9.11 - 9.12 
9.13-9.16 
9. 16 - 9. 21 
9.21 
10.35 .. 10.36 
10.42 
10.52 10.59 
10. 59 - 11. 05 
11. 05 - 11. 12 






A MORNING IN THE LIFE OF A SECRETARY 
Sheila walks into his office and Lewis enquires: 
"Have you got work to do?" "Yes, I . . 11 
"Well then, let's get that sorted." 
Sheila gets her pad and sits down opposite him. 
Just then the phone rings. 
Lewis takes the call. 
He sorts files, mail, brochures, arranging and 
re-arranging them into piles. 
Sheil a sits. 
Sheila leaves. 
Lewis calls Sheila in, asks for certain files and 
stationery to be put in his briefcase to be taken home. 
He calls Sheila ih and begins dictation. 
Dictation interrupted at 
Lewis takes a call. Sheila sit. 
The phone rings again. Sheila sits. 
Dictation continues. 
Dictation interrupted by Lewis himself who makes 
an outside call. 
Another call comes in. 
And yet another. 
Dictation is resumed and continues until: 
Sheil a leaves. 
Dictation time {see Mail Record) 
Total elapsed time 10.42-11.37 
= 28 minutes 











TABLE 10 L E W I S1 M A I L 
DAY TIME ROLE 
SPENT 
(mins.) Figurehead Liaison Monitor 
Wednesday 12 9 3 3 3 
7 - - -
12 4 4 -
Wednesday 7 49 8 12 5 
Thursday 8 28 1 15 -
Monday 12 35 10 2 -
Wednesday 14 21 4 5 -
-- -- --
Total · 161 30 41 8 
% of Total Time 7,78% % 18,63% 25 ,46% 4,96% 
mail 
time 




















































His meetings and consultations with subordinates are limited to a few minutes 
each and although his door is always open and employees do frequently vrnlk in, 
f - -
they are se 1 dom given the opportunity of saying more than two sentences 
before Lewis interrupts - either with an instruction or with a long involved 
speech. Seldom if ever are they given an opportunity of saying their piece 
without interruption.· 
The telephone gets preference over people at a 11 times. Never once during the 
days of observation was I able to record that he gave an instruction to the 
switchboard to 'hold calls' even when he was in scheduled meeting with 
important outside callers. 
He opens all the mail himself and after attending to it (Table 10), it is 
added to the detail contained in the files already in his office. 
The results of empirical analysis of Lewis' work characteristics are shown in 
Table 11. The contents of Table 7 have been reproduced here for.convenience. 
Overall it can be seen that Lewis performs far more like Choran 1 s small 
company president than he does like Gordon or Mintzberg's chief executive. 
The outstanding characteristics are in the proportion of time spent on the 
telephone which at 21% is higher even than Choran's man - although the 
~ 
length of time spent on each call is longer - and the proportion of short 
activities during the working day; Lewis."spends a high 71% of time on 
activities lasting less than 9 minutes. 
The most glaring characteristic though is the small amount of time which 
Lewis spends in contact with his 
than any of the other 3 studies. 
the wrong purpose. I shall now 
subordinates. The figure of 40% is 
It is also time which Lewis spends 
have to substantiate this statement. 
l ov1er 
for 












TABLE 11 SELECTED COMPARISONS OF THE WORK OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF SMALL AND LARGE ORGANISATIONS 
Large Organisations Gordon based on Lewis based on Small Companies 
·5 chief executives 12 days of 5 days of 3 presidents 
25 days of observation observation 6 days of 
observation observation 
Mintzberg Study Charan Study . 
Number of activities per day 22 19 37 77 
Desk Work Sessions 
Number per day 7 2 9 22 
Proportion of time 22~b 15~& 22% 35% 
Average duration 15 min 46 min 10 min 6 min 
Telephone Calls 
Number per day 5 5 15 29 
Proportion of time 6% 7/o 21% 17%· 
Average duration 6 min 10 min 5 min 2 min 
Scheduled Meetings 
Number per day 4 6 3 3 
Proportion of time 59% 48% 39% 21% 
Average duration 68 min 47 min 44 min 27 min 
Unscheduled Meetings 
Number per day 4 6 10 19 
Proportion of time 10% 24?~ l 6~b 15% 
Average duration 12 min 23 min 7 min 3 min 
Proportion of Activities Lasting 
Less Than 9 Min 49% 20% 71% 90% 
Proportion Lasting More Than 
60 Min 10% 11% 2% 0.02% 
Proportion of Time in Verbal 
Contact With: 
Subordinates 48% 66% 40?~ 56% 
Suppliers and associates 17% 5% 15% 31% 
Peers and trade organisations 11% 11% 17% 0,2% 
Others 23% 4% 16% 14% 
Proportion of Scheduled Meetings 















THE PERSONALITY OF THE MAN 
This additional material has been brought out of the main text partly 
because we should not get too far away from the main objective of studying 
Lewis' role activity, but also because (although substantiated by anecdotal 
material) it largely consists of my interpretation of his behaviour. 
In that sense it is subjective. 
It is extremely difficult to form an accurate picture of the total man. 
He is a mass of contradicitions: Impulsive, stubborn, honest, clever, 
naive, kind, unrealistic, are just some of the adjectives which appear 
in my notes. 
People 
He demonstrates a compelling urgency to have constant contact with people -
to talk to and to be liked by them. But when he is given advice by others 
he reacts brusquely and fobs them off. If he is praised by them he 
becomes embarrassed. 
And so there is a strong indication that it is the stimulation of the 
events and the recognition which the callers might bring with them 
which is his primary motivation rather than the people themselves. 
This would explain why he tends to put up with people even when they 
are ineffectual. "I suppose my trouble is that anyone can subvert me. 11 
Things 
He demonstrated many times that he needs the constant stimulus of new 
events and happenings to keep him going. He is a completely spontaneous 
person. Consider the following extracts from the diary: 
He walks around the office touching files and sorting papers on his 
desk on the completion of each circuit around the floor. "I love 
shuffling files. 11 After a few minutes he manufactures a reason 
to "see how Burke is getting on." On the way back from Burke's 
office (2 minutes later) he finds a file in Sheila's office which 
interests him. He brings it back to his desk. 
When there was nothing obviously immediate that needed doing he might look 
at the telephone, look at me, drum his hands on the desk, and say "now 
what?" He actually appeared agitated that there was nothing that 
required his immediate attention. And so we have here an interplay 
between happenings (events) and people. The man creates situations and 
then reacts to them. The telephone is the most convenient means of 
achieving this. And he knows it. On one particular day after a flurry 
of telephone activity with several different people he put down the phone, 
smiled, and said, "see what can happen with just one call. 11 
And one morning the PABX was out of order for 2 hours. Disaster. Lewis 
corrrnences reading the mail, stops, gets up, walks around the office ("I'm 












Everything in his workaday life is dealt with seriatim with little attempt 
made to sequence activities into order of importance. As he gets caught up 
in the happenings of the day his prepared list of items lies forgotten - to 
be returned to when things quieten down - only as a source of generating 
more activity. 
In summary then it is really involvement in the events which seems to excite 
him rather than the events themselves: "I like to do deals and conclude 
and go on." 
I am left with the firm conviction that the situations are created or 
precipitated in order to maintain the hectic climate in which he thrives: 
11 I want finality. I hate unresolved issues." He can thus be described 
as an immediate man. One whose frenetically active mind leads him to 
impulsively respond to anything in the environment which he finds stimulating 
at the given time. 
Naivete 
There is certainly no doubting his intelligence. He has an extremely agile 
mind and is quick to grasp the meaning of new infonnation. And yet there 
seemed to be a certain almost childlike naive quality in his dealings with 
and belief in people. 
The main precipitant of his crisis situation is Weavetex' MD who has pledged 
a portion of Stanton's shareholding in this company to a third party. The 
crux of the matter is: Will Weavetex remain in the Group or not, and if it 
does, at what price will the third party acquire the shares? 
Lewis favours fighting to keep Weavetex. I pointed out to him that this 
might not be a good thing if he were f rced to keep the present management 
team who were all loyal to their 'traitor' MD. Lewis could not see any 
basis for concern or potential difficulty in the future in working with 
this man. 
In discussing the possible longterm outcome of the crisis with an outside 
caller Lewis says: 11 I don't want Weavetex at the price that they are 
offering to pay. l will then be ruined and since l cannot afford to be 
ruined they must just pay a better pri.ce. 11 
At lunch I remark on his apparent willingness to tell callers details which 
they do not necessarily have to know and he retorts: 11 1 always just tell 
people exactly what l am going to do and then they are surprised when l do 
it. But they a 1 so sometimes take advantage ... well, I hate lying. 11 
Self Rea 1 i sat ion 
This brings us to the question of to what extent does Lewis realise his own 
deficiencies? And the answer is that he has a great deal of insight into 
these shortcomings: 
11 I pick people badly, I either get people who do me in or if they are 
nice people they are no good. I choose people l like. l know that 
this is a weakness. 11 
11 1 am not a typical executive because of the chaos around me. But 
one day, when the Group is restructured, l shall get in a strong man 












When talking about the reasons for his predicament Lewis is especially 
frank. One cannot say that he is objective but he is certainly that 
within the constraints or confines of his own personality: 
"'rJe have just misread every situation. All our problems are 
due to Weatherstone and myself. I mean he kept telling me 
that things were going well and they weren't. He just gets 
panicky every time a cheque is due and his every statement is 
prefaced with absolute assurance as to its truth. Result -
we lost Rl million. I take just as much of the blame." 
"This is the problem with running a diversified cong'lomerate. 
You must have a man running each division. You become scared 
of getting rid of him if he performs badly because then there 
is no-one." 
The man is an island. Everything is in his head. . He just cannot let go. 
On Business Life 
The final contradiction comes in his attitude towards business life and 
his reaction to the difficulties. Elsewhere we have seen that he appears 
unconcerned, untroubled. He told me that on the day that he first learnt 
of his crisis situation he did what he could 11 and then put my feet up on 
the desk and read a paperback. 11 His general attitude is typified by : 
11 It's decisions all the time. 
ones - what's the difference? 
But I don't mind. You make some wrong 
You must just run faster than the Banks . 11 
But as we ride down in the lift together one evening I say: "you are tired, 
aren't you?" To which Lewis replies: 11 1 am terrified because I don't 













~UCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL ROLE ACTIVITY : A COMPARISON 
The above discussion of Lewis' work characteristics may seem somewhat lengthy 
but the man's work habits so affect his role performance that it was necessary. 
We are now in a position to compare the role scores of Gordon and Lewis and 
to explain why it is that the latter performs so poorly. These scores are 
shown in Table 12, whilst Table 13 further analyses the Leader and Monitor roles. 
The role set is a dynamic, and Figure 11 (page 176) postulates the form of this 
dynamic - the relationship between the roles. This means that we can commence 
explanation from (almost) any point but it also means that a certain amount of 
repetition is inevitable in building up a verbal representation. 
Let us start off with the rather simple statement that Lewis' delegation is 
poor and incomplete: That his subordinates are given little or no authority 
to carry out the responsibilities with which they have (nominally) been charged. 
This not only means that Lewis must occupy his time attending to small matters 
(a work characteristic) but also that the subordinate must constantly refer 
back to him for instruction: This constant referral is further ensured by 
for example Lewis having the files relevant to the subordinates work in his 
own office. This increases Lewis' Resource Allocator activity (15;j:22'.~). 
Practically every telephone call which comes into the organisation is put 
through to Lewis. The telephonist is not told that a particular subordinate is 
dealing with a certain matter. When he receives a call on a partially delegated 
matter, Lewis makes no attempt to divert the caller to one of his employees but 
rather handles it himself. This means that he must afterwards convey the contents 
of the call to the subordinate. This increases Disseminator activity (6;~:10~q. 
In the text Gordon's percentage is compared to Lewis' in that order. 












TABLE 12 RELATIVE PERCENTAGE TIME DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN ROLES 
--' 




LJ.J FIGUREHEAD 2,78 4,59 0.. 
0::: 
LJ.J LEADER 23,83 0,62 I-
z: ...... LIAISON 11 ,98 11 ,89 
I MONITOR 18,42 8,70 c::( 
~--' 
0::: c::( DISSEMINATOR 6,29 9,57 oz: 
1..1..0 z ...... SPOKESMAN 2,65 9,37 ...... I-
ENTREPRENEUR 
--' 
9,0 10 ,49 
c::( DISTURBANCE HANDLER 4,3 6,67 z: 
0 ...... RESOURCE ALLOCATOR 14,89 21 ,99 (/) ...... 
u NEGOTIATOR 3,38 13,24 LJ.J 
Cl 
UNACCOUNTED FOR 2,49 2,66 
TABLE 13 THE LEADER AND MONITOR ROLES 
GORDON LEWIS 
Solicited 12,44 6,48 
Unsolicited 5,98 2,22 
0::: 
0 Solicited 8,87 3,43 I-...... 
z: Inside 0 
~ 
Unsolicited 4,39 1,69 
Solicited 3,57 3,24 
Outside 
Unsolicited 1,59 0,53 
0::: 
L1.J Leader motivation 12 '71 0 '19 Cl c::( 












which is often done in an incomplete manner because Lewis has several 
communication disabilities: 
Many times I observed him begin to explain things to people and then after 
one or two sentences break off with: 11 We 11, anyway 11 and change the subject. 
The subordinate is left with the mere gist of what is happening and this 
further ensures that he will have to come back to Lewis for further 
information or instruction at a later stage. This inadequate dissemination 
further increases Resource Allocation. 
Because the subordinates deal with less matters themselves they are less 
able to bring him information, and so he hears less from inside his own 
organisation. In addition he blocks himself from information from within and 
without because he is not a good listener. When information is being passed 
to him he listens for a while and then either interrupts, begins speaking 
himself or literally shuts people up: 
On one occasion a man called back to provide Lewis with information which 
he had specifically requested earlier in the day. The total time of the call 
was 9 minutes. Lewis listened with few interruptions for the first 2 minutes 
and then spent the remainder of the time telling the caller how he believed 
the situation should be and how it should resolve itself. 
He has a characteristic way of ending conversations. Whether these are on the 
telephone or with subordinates face to face: When he thinks that he has heard 
enough he says: 11 We 11 okay" which he pronounces I AW KAY I. Several times I saw 
a perplexed look come onto subordinates' faces when they were cut off in the 
middle of an explanation and Lewis would return to doing other work or pick up 
the telephone. They had not learnt to read the signal. 
Because of the poor delegation subordinates are not able to support him in doing 
work which is necessary. And because he monitors too little (18%:9%) crises 
are precipitated. The Disturbance Handler role activity increases as a result 
(4%:7;) and this in turn further serves to increase the Resource Allocation. 
As the flow of instruction to subordinates increases he solicits greater help 












In fact I observed a fine line between Resource Allocation and Disturbance 
Handling. Often the allocation could quite easily be identified as a direct 
result of the crises which Lewis had caused. But in these cases, following 
the rule, the time was allocated to Resource Allocator no matter what or who 
performed. 
The handling of Disturbance also increases the Spokesman activity {3%:9%), 
not acting as a public relations man for his industry as Gordon does, but 
lobbying to outsiders as he jockies his way out of trouble. 
Looking at the remaining decision-making roles of Negotiator and Entrepreneur, 
we see that Lewis' negotiation activity is over 4 times more than Gordon's. 
This is an obvious reflection of his quest for the new and exciting ("I 
like to do deals and go on") without any follow-through or implementation, 
and leaving a void behind him. Does this make him a good negotiator? Maybe. 
Is this increased negotiation activity a good thing? I don't think so. 
Lewis 'runs' far faster than anyone around him and he does not look to see 
whether anyone is following him. 
The Entrepreneurial activity is only slightly higher than that of Gordon. 
{9%:10%). But even this does not tell us the whole story. We have to look 
at the quality of this long-term decision-making. Whilst Gordon is 
surrounding himself with experts from whom he solicits opinions, getting the 
reaction of senior subordinates to his plan, and mulling (sometimes agonising) 
over the consequences of this type of decision, Lewis is playing impulsively 
by himself: 
I saw him restructure a set of accounts in front of two outside auditors so 
quickly that they were left far behind. On another occasion he went into a 
meeting with Weatherstone and the manager of a subsidiary company, completely 
dominated the conversation, and emerged 81 minutes later with 6 pages of his 
pad filled with scribblings and balance sheets (all constructed during the 












of his proposed alternatives. Input from the other participants at the 
~ * 
meeting was minimal. He could well have held the meeting with himself. 
And yet this time could not be apportioned to any other role but that of 
Entrepreneur. Therefore it is not only the absolute amount of time spent 
in the performance of the role but also the quality of it which is important. 
We come now to our two role concentrations of Leader and Monitor. 
Lewis' almost complete lack.of delegation and his shortcomings in the area 
of communication of course not only affect his information and decision-
making but they have a very definite effect upon the human relations 
functioning. 
It can be said that not only does he not motivate people but he actively 
de·~·· .... ,.~:tes them by constantly interrupting, by keeping infonnation to himself, 
and by attempting to d~al with everything personally. This type of behaviour 
can only engender frustration in the subordinate. 
In spite of this I cannot say that there is a bad organisational climate 
persisting in this Company. The employees are not overtly dissatisfied. 
Rather they are 'neutral'. They appear to'like him. He is after all a 
likeable man. 
1 found that Lewis' hobby was drawing balance sheets. The fact that'his 
initial attempt at keeping a diary v1as written on financial analysis paper 













Lewis' score of total Leader role performance of 0,62 compared to Gordon's 
24% of course merits special discussion. It would be useful to chronicle 
those activities which were ascribed to this role: 
DAY l 






she did yesterday. (Motivator: 1 minute) 
The accountant Burke comes into the office to look for some files. 
Lewis remarks that he thinks that "we are going to have to 
actually write down responsibilities. At the moment there is no 
consensus, no division." Burke replies: 11 1 would like that too. 11 
Together they talk briefly of various files which Burke will need. 
They are (of course) in Lewis' office and he gets up to find 
the~. Burke remarks that he was "hunting all over for them. 11 
Lewis (instead of giving the file to Burke) opens it and starts 
shuffling through the contents. Some explanation of what was to 
be done followed. {Although the method was wrong, this was 
training and I therefore scored the total activity time to Builder: 
7 minutes) 
Weatherstone comes into the office with a query. Lewis answers 
him and adds: "That is good. 11 (Motivator: 1 minute) 
9.12 Lewis is talking to the Bookkeeper, Penny, about her assistant, 
DAY 5 
* 9.24 
the file clerk. Lewis asks: "what sort of work does she do?" and 
Penny replies that: "she is of great help and can do work up to Trial 
Balance. 11 
Le\'lis: "And so if I was looking for areas in which to save money 
next year, you would not advise me to save money in that direction?" 
To which Penny replied: "No certainly not." (One could put forward 
a good argument for costing this activity to Resource Allocator 
but I reluctantly saw it as organisation building and so apportioned 
it to Builder: 2 minutes) 
Lewis calls the Accountant in one of the Weavetex subsidiaries and 
blasts him for 2 minutes regarding his non-performance on preparing 
the set of accounts. (Builder: 2 minutes) 
At no other time during the 5 days of observation did Lewis praise or criticise 
any of his subordinates, guide them or train them. 
activity which fell even remotely into the category 
There was also no other 
of hiring and firing. 
I cannot decide whether there is any signficance in the fact that these few 












The Monitor Role 
The breakdown of monitoring activity (Table 13) reveals an extremely 
interesting picture. We have already seen that total monitoring by 
Gordon is approximately twice that of Lewis (18%:9%) and in discussing 
the other rQles have pointed to several probable reasons why. 
This ratio is maintained in their relative solicited monitoring activities 
(12%:6%) and so we can infer that the main differences must be in the 
amount of unsolicited informational input. Also, Gordon's solicited: 
unsolicited ratio is 2:1 whilst Lewis' is 3:1. And yet Gordon's solicited 
monitoring from outside is almost exactly the same as Lewis (3~~:3;.q which 
would point to a lack of adequate inside scanning by Lewis. This was 
strongly evident in the study (see Box). Regarding the unsolicited 
monitoring, we have seen how Lewis cuts himself off from information and 
as a result so much of what has to be solicited by him from outside and 
inside could/should come to him unsolicited. Considering the amount of 
time he spends on the telephone engaged in conversation with outsiders 
one would expect a higher unsolicited informational input. I n fact , very 
few incoming calls are unsolicited and he spends the time (as we have seen) 
in disseminating (opinion) and in Spokesman (lobbying) activity. He 
cuts outside callers short and discourage~ them from phoning him. 
If the channels of communication inside his firm were open, if Lewis' 
subordinates were assured of an interested audience as they are with Gordon 
("Lew came in and told me .... and we talked .... 11 ) then this information 
would come to him unasked for. But because of the lack of support, 
encouragement, and motivation, his subordinates are reluctant, are not 












THE ABSENCE OF SCANNING 
Whilst Gordon is constantly searching for information which might be 
relevant, reminding himself that "there are so many areas which have 
to be watched and covered, 11 and {randomly?) "deciding to look into ••. 11 , 
Lewis is indulging in quite different behaviour: 
During the course of the week, I had become increasingly intrigued -
I could say concerned - that Lewis appeared to manage only part of 
his Group. 
Reference to the family tree {Figure 12) shows that there are 2 major 
asset groupings from which Lewis is receiving no inf9rmation at all. 
These are the laundry company, Consolidated Cleaners and the commodity 
trader, J.J. Fraser. Consolidated is 51% owned by the Stanton Gro~p 
whilst Fraser is a 100% owned subsidiary. 
Previously I had not said anything to him on the subject because I 
did not want to prompt him in any way. On Day 5 as we walk uptown 
to a meeting just before lunch I can contain my curiosity no longer. 
I ask about Fraser and Consolidated: 
He explains that the interest in Consolidated was acquired in May 
1976 as the result of an approach made to him by a third party. 
11 ! told him {the Broker) if we could get shot of certain things 
{assets) then I would be interested. 11 Consolidated was bought, 
the asset-stripping exercise completed, and the Companies shown 
on the chart became part of Stanton. 
Since then what active part has Lewis played in their management? 
11 They are a law unto themselves. I don't know. Haven't had a 
Board meeting for 5 months. Having a meeting Monday. Then we'll 
find out. 11 
He goes on to say that there are certain activities indulged in by 
the present management of Consolidated that he would like to put an 
end to. For instance it irks him that a particular director has 
combined an overseas holiday with a visit to the European Industrial 
Fair: 11 ! know bloody well that he took a holiday at our expense. 11 
As for the rest, Lewis has not taken the trouble to find out. He 
receives no bi-annual, quarterly, let alone monthly management information 
from them and they are left entirely to their own devices. Why doesn't 
he do something about it? 
His stated intention to 'find out' at the Board meeting is in conflict with 
his next statement: 11 You know, I could get 75 cents a share (asset value 
plus or minus Rl,10), raise R540 000 and then I'd have no debts. 11 
His attitude towards J.J. Fraser is even more simple or direct: "The 
Group is very sma 11. I don 1 t know. I 1 11 1 oak at this next year. 
I don't sign. We don 1 t put money in and we don 1 t draw money out. 11 
In other words, his attitude is simply one of 'it can wait.• Whether 
Fraser will still be a viable entity when Lewis gets around to looking 
at it does not concern him at the present. Whether it can be m~de int9 
a cash generator which could help Stanton (and other subsidiaries) out of 
their present liquidity difficulties has not been investigated. He receives 
no information from the company and has no contact whatsoever with the 













In studying these two men we find evidence which strongly supports each of 
the propositions outlined in Chapter 9. 
The role set has been operationalised to the extent that it is possible to 
apportion any particular activity of the manager to one of the roles and 
an obvious inequality of time distribution between them has been shown. 
Although both the Leader and Monitor roles were very narrowly defined we 
see that Gordon spends far more time in leadership activity, overall 
monitoring, and also receives more unsolicited monitor imput from his 
subordinates. The numerical data is supported and c rroborated by a 
quantity of anecdotal material. 
Further, we not only find an absence of many (seemingly) important 
characteristics and role activities in Lewis' behaviour but we can in 
many instances outline a reversal of the role set dynamic which was 
proposed on the basis of the study of Gordon's role .linking. 
But although all this evidence is of sufficient strength to lead us to 
generalise, we cannot at this stage do so. The two pilot subjects were 
chosen because they were 'obviously' successful and unsuccessful: their 
selection was not in terms of any rigidly defined criterion. They 
operate in completely different sectors of the economy and are thus 
subjected to different sets of environmental pressures. Coupled to 
this we have not yet demonstrated any sort of correlation between the 
results of strategic implementation and leader and monitor role 
activity. 
A larger sample, selected against an independent measure was called for. 
We turn now to the main study and begin with a discussion of this selection 
procedure. 














THE FINANCIAL YARDSTICK 
In deciding which financial yardstock to use in the main study I naturally 
considered many analytical instruments outlined in the literature - some 
available as 'packages', others which can be derived from a variety of 
measures. A number of them are highly sophisticated and still others such 
as Shirley (1976) give historical sectorial averages from U.S. Stocks. 
However, many of these measures are theoretical and few of them are 'proven' 
in the sense that they have been consistently applied to the listings of a 
particular Stock Exchange. 
Above all, I believed it essential to employ a yardstick which was practical 
in its base, had been shown to work, and thus had predictive validity. A 
firm of *Stockbrokers have for the last ten years been applying six of what 
they consider to be the most important financial ratios to all listed shares, 
and for the past five years they have circulated the results of the analysis 
to their clients in the form of Risk Ratings. 
The Risk Rating for each share is worked out as follows : each of the ratios 
is calculated for a particular share which is then assigned points on a 
weighted scale for each of the ratios. The ratios employed and the maximum 
attainable points on each are 
Shareholders' Interest 25 
Return on Capital Employed 20 
Total Borrowings as a % of Total 
Liabilities 15 
Cash Flow to Total Borrowings 15 
Profit and Loss Gearing 15 
Current Ratio 10 
TOTAL 100 
Ivor Jones, Roy & Co. Inc., 'The Survivors', 
'The New Survivors', 
1 February 1977, and 












And so each share listing is assigned a single score out of 100: A high 
score being indicative of low risk and conversely a low score being indicative 
of high risk. (An explanation of the ratios and the scale of point scoring 
for each is contained in Appendix 3). 
The Brokers fully admit that the rating system is subjective insofar as, 
out of all the ratios that they could use, they have chosen only these 6. 
Further, that the method of weighting the importance of each is equally 
subjective, but 11 the results produced do appear to be meaningful and as 
each company is scored on the same basis, some relative comparisons of the 
ratings seem reasonable 11 • 
The shares are then grouped and divided into deciles ranging from 90+ 
(almost negligible risk) to 0-10 (inordinately high risk). The Authors 
say that they regard it as extremely unlikely that any company scoring 65 
and above will go bankrupt. On the other hand, any share falling in the 
•very high risk' and below (risk rating of 30 downward) is in very real 
danger. 
11 0ur conclusion is that when the risk rating gets down to 30 or lower 
the chances of survival are greatly diminished and the rate of decline 
from a Risk Rating of 30 to Bankruptcy can be very quick. 
The Chairman of the Franklin National Bank when he was asked 'how did 
you go bankrupt?' replied, 'gradually for quite a while - then all 
at once' . 11 
Obviously the primary purpose of the Risk Rating is not to predict bankruptcy 
but to highlight good investment stock. The Authors point towards the 
emergent 2-tier market developing where the 1quality 1 shares (commanding a 
high rating in terms of dividend yield and P/E ratio) which have good sound 
management will attract an increased amount of institutional cash flow, whilst 
the poor performers will be denied this investment inflow: 11 We believe this 
quality preference will continue to be exhibited and the 2-tier market will 
develop further". 
To what extent does financial performance reflect management expertise? 
It is contended that "it all comes out in the numbers". A company which 
consistently performs badly is employing inappropriate strategy and this is 
in turn a consequence of bad management. Also, a high risk rating does 
not necessarily mean that bankruptcy is unavoi dab 1 e: 11 If management realises 












TABLE 14 RISK RATING IN YEARS PRIOR TO BANKRUPTCY 
Company Sector Year Year Year Year Year 
5 4 3 2 l 
Consolidated Textiles 44 37 ·19 44 25 
Jersey 
Glen Anil Property 22 18 17 18 1 
*I.L. Back Clothing 64 31 31 18 29 
Penguin Pools {Leisure}· NA 70 58 35 3 
Spectra Electronics, Leasing 75 72 31 23 3 
Property, Farming 
Toll mans Hotel .. NA NA 33 19 27 
Van Achterburgh Property 22 23 22 19 3 
. 45,4 41,8 30 '1 25'1 11, 7 
' 
* I. L. Back was rescued from bankruptcy when taken over by Rembrandt. 
Source : Ivor J.ones, Roy & Co. Inc., 'The New Survivors', 11 May 1977 
, 
TABLE 15 RISK RATING OF RECENT NON-SURVIVORS 
Company Sector Event Risk Rating 
Lengro Property Shares suspended 
10.11.1977 0 Takeover by Trustbank· 
(Bank corp) 
Simba-Quix Food New Chairman and MD 
10.11.1977 7 
J 
Saved from Bankruptcy 
by parent Federalevolks 
Marsha 11 Retail/Wholesale Judicial management 
Industrials 14.11.1977 26 
Liquidation Order 5. 1.1978 
Fairweather Clothing Liquidated 23.1.1978 12 
Hof man Property Provisional Judicial 
Management 17.3.1978 19 
t 












FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
In reviewing all the empirical findings in Chapter 9 I argued that the manager's 
role performance _influences strategy formulation, that strategic implementation 
(if monitored correctly) influences role performance, and also proposed that 
effective monitoring of both the internal and external environment must be crucial 
for managerial success (page 145). 
Further, on the basis of the sequencing and linking of Gordon's role activity, 
the monitor role appeared to be central to a dynamic role set model (page 175). 
This notion .find$ support when the role performance of Gordon and Lewis are 
compared and one of the main differences found is in various aspects of monitoring 
activity (page 204) - notably the unsolicited internal component. Their Leader 
role activity is markedly different and a strong link between Leader and Monitor 
is suggested. In addition, when looking at Lewis' activity by itself, an actual 
reversal of the earlier proposed dynamic is evident (page 206). 
On the basis of this rationale the following hypotheses were formulated: 
HYPOTHESES 
Although a number of other statements suggest themselves on the basis of the 
results obtained so far, this was the first attempt at demonstrating an empirical 
link between managerial behaviour and the financial result obtained by an 
organisation and I thus wanted to confine the formal part of the study to the 
central issues. 
Therefore, employing the Risk Rating to isolate organisations, hence identifying 
their chief executives, and so defining sample groups of Successful and 
Unsuccessful managers, I contended: 
Hl Successful managers spend more of their time in direct leader role 
activity than do Unsuccessful managers. 
H2 High Leader and total Monitor role activity are a feature of 
Successful managers. 
H3 Internal monitor role activity is higher for Successful than for 
Unsuccessful managers. 
H4 Within the monitor role, Successful managers receive more unsolicited 
information from within their own organisations, and 
H5 Successful managers spend more of their time in external information 












SELECTION CRITERIA AND METHOD 
Although the Risk Rating was to be used to select the sample, there were 
a number of other criteria which I believed to be important to the study 
1. Any company chosen should not be too large : it should be of a size 
where the chief executive was not too far removed from the operating sphere, 
buffered by many layers of subordinates so that he is in fact a Figurehead. 
2. No subject company should have been involved in a major takeover, merger 
or acquisition in the past 2 years. 
3. Following from this, the chief executive of any chosen company must 
have occupied this position for a similar period. 
4. The firm's main sphere of operations should be as 1 pure 1 as possible. 
Forward or backward integration was acceptable, as was horizontal 
diversification - providing that it was directly related to the main sphere 
* of activity. Thus Pep Stores• purchase of Papillon would not have 
disqualified it: activity remains clothing sales with backward integration 
into manufacture. But Abercom, a conglomerate of diversified steel and 
engineering interests, disqualified it. 
Within these constraints, it was my intention to use the Risk Rating to 
identify pairs of companies which were matched for sectorial listing, 
type or sphere of activity, and (as far as possible), their size. 
Selection Method 
Excluding the Secondary Section, there are 524 listings on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, divided into 28 sectors. However, the Mining, Banking and 
Insurance sections have been excluded from the Risk Rating analysis. In 
addition, the analysis does not deal with Industrial Holding companies (which 
in view of the criteria of conglomerates and diversified companies is not 
material). Subtracting the excluded shares (see also Appendix 3) left an 
initial sample population of 19 sectors into which 318 analysed shares fell. 
These are categorised in Table 16. 
* No names of companies which took part in the study are given. Everyone 
in the sample group was given a firm undertaking that their identity 











TABLE 16 THE STOCK EXCHANGE . SECTORS AND LISTINGS . 
Category Number of Sectors Number of Shares Listed 
Mining and Mining 5 11 
Fi nanci a 1 
Banking, Insurance 
And Investment Trust 3 43 
Industrial Holding 1 44 
General Remainder 19 318 
TOTALS 28 524 
Now we have seen that the Authors of the Risk Rating claim that any company 
scoring a rating of 30 and below was in danger of ·failing. It therefore 
seemed appropriate to define the Unsuccessful (US) sample accordingly. 
To balance this, I took the Successful (S) group to be any company having 
a score of 70 and above. ('very low risk' and upward). 
Whilst this does mean that I am saying - in view of the extremely good 
predictive validity of the meausre - that the companies of US managers 
score 30 or less, it does not necessarily mean that all effective managers 
fall into the S group as defined: Many well-established companies headed by 
acknowledged business leaders fall into the categories 'moderate risk' and 
'low risk'. Some examples of companies scoring between 50 and 70 are 
Foschini, Huletts, SAAN and Barlows. 
Analysis therefore began by isolating those companies of the 318 analysed 
which had a Risk Rating. (-RR) of 70 and more or 30 and less,· and then 
categorising them by sector. There were 124 of these - 70 high raters 












TABLE 17 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES BY SECTOR 
SECTOR HIGH RATING LOW RATING COMMENT 
BEVERAGE AND HOTEL - 3 Eliminated 
PROPERTY l 14 No match 
BUILDING 3 6 No match 
CHEMICAL - l Eliminated 
CLOTH ING AND 
KNITWEAR 6 3 Samp 1 e l 
FOOD 3 3 Sample 2 
FISHING 8 - Eliminated 
FOOTWEAR/LEATHER 2 - Eliminated 
FURNITURE 3 4 Unsuccessful 
IRON, STEEL, 
ENGINEERING 16 10 Sample 3 
MOTOR 2 6 No match 
PAPER AND 
PACKAGING 8 - Eliminated 
PHARMACEUTICAL 3 1 Sample 4 
PRINTING 2 - Eliminated 
WHOLESALE/RETAIL 2 2 Unsuccessful 
STORES 3 1 Unsuccessful 
SUGAR 1 - Eliminated 
TEXTILES 3 - Eliminated 
TOBACCO AND MATCH 1 - Eliminated 












As can be seen from this table, certain sectors were auto.~.atically elminiated 
at this stage simply because there was no high or low rater with which to 
make up a pair. There were 9 of these. Ten categories thus remained, 
but in 3 of them, no adequate match of companies could be found, and I 
shall discuss each of these in turn: 
Property: The single high RR here is the subsidiary of a mining house with 
which its affairs are inextricably linked. 
Building: Although there are a number of shares listed in this sector, 
the companies are actually a mixture of construction firms, primary building 
component producers, and secondary goods manufacturers (some of which even 
have consumer/retail activity). The primary producers tend to score 
high (Golden Brick 91, Everite 81), whilst the secondary and component 
manufacturers tended to be low scorers (Masonite 27, Natven 7). 
Motor: Here too no adequate match of similar activity within the market 
sector listing could be found. There appeared to be little sense in 
I 
equating for example, General Tyre which is a motor vehicle component 
manufacturer (RR 71) with Schus or Robbs who are retail car dealers 
(RR 15 and 20 respectively). 
In all of the remaining 7 sectors, pairs of companies matched within 
acceptable limits of size and activity sphere could be found. In many 
cases of course, there were more than one (up to 4) possible companies 
in either the high or low categories of a particular sector. In these 
cases, a preferred group or pair was marked for initial contact with the 
others ranked in order of preference and kept in reserve. This preference 
was solely on the basis of the highest or lowest RR. 
Procedure 
The Stock Exchange Handbook was used throughout the study as a reference, 
but in several cases, it does not specify who the chief executive is. Thus, 
befare approaching any firm, I checked this fact with sharebrokers, or 
a financial journalist, or in some cases, by getting another person to 
telephone the receptionist in advance. In this way, I was certain that 
data, if forthcoming, would be generated by the right person and it also 
helped of course in 'running the gauntlet' of the Secretary who exists as 













WHY CHIEF EXECUTIVES ? 
There are 2 overriding reasons why chief executives of public companies 
were chosen for the study : 
1. A number of the roles (Liaison, Monitor, Spokesman, especially) 
are performed outside of the system in which the manager wholly or iD 
part works. In the case of the chief executive, these outside role 
functions are performed outside of his own firm. It is therefore far 
easier to detect when a given executive steps outside of his own 
organisation in the performance of a particular role function (for 
example, picking up a telephone to extract infonnation from an external 
source, socialising over lunch with his peers) than it is to detect when 
a midd_le manager interacts external to his own department. 
The manager on a lower level performs the internal role activity 
exclusively within his own department and any external role interaction 
is performed either in the rest of the organisation or in the external 
environment. Both are part of the lower level Manager's external 
environment. It therefore becomes more difficult to detect outside 
role behaviour when studying Managers on lower levels. For example: 
When exactly does the Section Manager of, say, an insurance company 
receive information which is absolutely pertinent to his division 
emanating through formal organisational channels, and when can this 
same information be considered to be coming to him from an 'external' 
source? · 
Thus on the lower levels there is a blurring in the performance of 
some roles precisely because of the overlapping lateral and (horizontal) 
communication flows. These are part of the informal system. 
2. By employing quoted companies, I was able to use a conman financial 
measure with which to compare role perfonnance with the result of 
strategy implementat on. Also, we have as yet no way of measuring 
the effectiveness of middle managers across companies. 
The method of initial contact varied according to the geographical locality 
of the company: Local companies were telephoned in the first instance. 
I introduced myself, explained that I was conducting research into 'management 
behaviour', emphasised that this study was essentially practical, and further 
explained that "the activities of a number of chief executives heading companies 
in several sectors of the economy are being studied with a view to isolating 












I wrote to companies in Johannesburg and on the Reef in the first instance. 
This letter contained the same information as the local companies received 
by telephone. I set aside certain dates and asked for an appointment. 
In approximately 50% of the cases, no reply was forthcoming to this letter 
and here .I followed the letter with a telephone call and treated these 
finns in the same way as the local sample. 
In both cases, the objective of the initial approach was simply to gain an 
appointment. In only one case (below), was this refused. 
At first interview, I essentially repeated the information outlined above, 
emphasising the practical nature of the study ~ I wanted to try and find 
out how he as a successful head of a public company ran his finn - and 
waited for some sort of tentative commitment to help me before going on 
to explain exactly what it was that I wanted from him. 
Data required : Here I should like to digress for a minute to discuss the 
nature and detail of the data which I requested from the participants. 
I was very much aware that each subject was going to carefully weigh up 
time and effort involved before finally agreeing to participate. And 
the nature of the data needed for the study was going to cost a considerable 
amount of bqth. So the less detail I asked for, the more likely I was 
to be successful in soliciting his help. On the other hand, certain detail 
was essential in order for it to be meaningful. There was therefore a 
decided dilenma situation, but the latter consideration weighed more heavily, 
and I decided to 'pitch' the request slightly on the side of asking for a 
little more detail than was in fact needed for the analysis. 
After obtaining an initial indication of willingness to co-operate, I went 
on to specify that what was needed was an activity record covering a period 
of one week (with a note on after hours and weekend activities). He was 
handed an instruction sheet (reproduced in Appendix 4) which explained 











1. Starting Time 
2. Type of Activity: 
3. Nature or Purpose of 
the Activity 
Meetings 
Te 1 ephone Ca 11: 
4. Who participated in 
each activity 
5. Duration of each activity 
219 
Whenever this is on a particular day 
Meeting, telephone call, etc. 
(In general terms only) 
Scheduled or unscheduled 
What was discussed 
Who initiated it 
Was it from or to 
Did your:ecei ve1nformation or give orders 
6. Stopping Time Whenever this is on a particular day 
I.shall now outline the events which took place between isolation of the 
initial pairs of companies and the selection of the final sample : 
In both the Clothing and Food Sectors I was fortunate in soliciting the 
co-operation of the executives heading both initially-selected pairs. 
(Although Clothingman A took just short of 7 months to deliver his data). 
Things did not work out as smoothly in the Furniture division and here I 
was to have 2 of the 4 withdrawals from the study. Like many other sectors 
on the Exchange, companies with widely differing spheres of activities are 
lumped together under this heading. I wanted to concentrate on companies 
engaged in basic furniture manufacture and thus the initial choice of 
company to match the low-rating Hugh Parker (RR 2) was Bakstey with a 
RR of 85. I initially obtained the agreement of the executives of both 
these companies to participate. However, some 2 months after interview 
the managing director of Bakstey telephoned and said that he felt, upon 
reflection, that he was unable to see his way clear to providing me with 
the data. Meanwhile letters to Hugh Parker enquiring when the data would 
be forthcoming were ignored, and finally I telephoned. I was again told 
that the data would be sent but it never arrived. This meant that I had 
to mark the furniture sector as Unsuccessful because other companies either 
had their activities bound up with the motor industry {for example Asmar, 












WHY PERSONAL VISITS? 
I belieye~ tha~ it was essential in a study of this nature for the subjects 
to be v1s1ted in person. I am now absolutely convinced, having visited 
them, that I would not have been able to solicit their co-operation by 
letter or by telephone. Personal visits were necessary not only to 
explain to the subject in detail what it was that you wanted from him, but 
to become known to him - indeed to 1 sell 1 oneself, to the extent that he 
would go out of his way to provide the data. For after all, I was not 
asking for a simple half hour to fill out some questionnaire, but was 
rather asking for a good deal of his time, effort, and thought. 
In fact, two of the Reef subjects, on hearing that I was from Cape Town, 
rummaged around on their desks and produced (unanswered) questionnaires 
which they had received from researchers. One of the men had three of 
these, one from the G.S.B. He was more interested to know whether I 
knew the sender than in the fact that it was a month old! 
That was necessity. Personal interview also meant that I got to know 
the man, his working environment, and sometimes his subordinates. As 
important, talk of practicality invariably led to more general conversation 
and I here learnt of his philosophy about management in general and his 
company in particular. These anecdotes are quoted in the text. 
WHY ONE WEEK OF DATA? 
The Diarists collected data from their subjects over lengthy periods. 
Twenty-four days in the case of Carlson (1951), 20 in that of Burns (1957) 
and Stewart (1967). 
The Observationtsts studied men at their work for shorter periods :Guest 
(1956), Jasinski (1956) - for one day. Ponder (1957) and Landsberger 
(1962) collected data for 2 days. 
Mintzberg•s (1968) observational period was 1 week or 5 days, and Choran 
(1969) - in a validation of the Role Set - gathered data for 2 days. 
What then is the 1 correct 1 period of time to gain data representative of 
a given manager's work pattern? 
In choosing to study the managers for 5 days I was guided by Mintzberg 1 s 
conclusion that "the evidence from this study and from other work suggests 
that the one-week periods were representative of each man 1 s work" and by 
his own finding that, with minor exceptions, no activity patterns were 
evident : 
11 It cannot be argued, based on the data avai 1 ab le, that mornings 
differed from afternoons, that certain activities took place at 
special times of the day, or that certain days of the week differed 












THE ATTITUDE OF THE SUBJECTS TO THEIR SECRETARIES' INVOLVEMENT 
Most of the subjects willingly and enthusiastically agreed to help. 
They spoke to me with a great deal of candour and my emphasis that 
I did not need to be exposed to confidential information was sometimes 
treated with a wave of the hand - as if to say "I would be quite happy 
to, anyway". 
But not one of them elected to dictate on tape for subsequent 
transcription by myself, but rather chose to write or make notes and 
have the data transcribed by their own secretaries. Further, they 
became very reserved when I made any mention of possibly soliciting 
their secretaries' involvement any further. I make mention of this 
because it was suggested to me that I might use the secretaries as 
a check on their bosses - to corroborate their time expenditure. 
This would not have been possible for two reasons : (1) A large amount 
of the Manager's time in meetings, on the telephone, is spent away 
from his Secretary's eyes behind closed doors and (2) we have the 
attitude of the Managers towards their Secretary's further involvement 
as outlined above. 
Experience was similar in the Iron, Steel and Engineering sector where I 
had the third withdrawal from the study. The company of choice here was 
dictated by high rater Prima with a Risk Rating of 99. Initial interview 
with the chief executive of this company on the Reef was cordial and we 
in fact spent approximately an hour talking about general matters after 
I had obtained his commitment to co-operate. Approximately 2 months 
passed and no data arrived. Meanwhile I had 'recruited' Steelman X who 
headed the other company in the pair with a RR of 16. I telephoned 
Prima's MD and asked him whether he perhaps was having difficulties in 
generating the data and was told that he had lost the instruction sheet. 
I wrote enclosing new documents. Another month went by and a further 
telephone call elicited yet another promise to do the work. I finally 
had to mark him down as a withdrawal when, after a further 6 weeks, no 
data had been received. However, this pair was saved with the subsequent 
recruitment of Steelman A who heads a company very similar in activity 












In Pharmaceuticals, the chief executives of both companies in the original 
choice pair agreed to co-operate. 
In a study of this nature, there is bound to be an element of what might 
be described as plain bad luck and this was the case in the Wholesale/Retail 
sector: A company with a RR of 80 was isolated as being suitable for 
pairing with both Katz and Lourie (RR 4) as well as Marshall Industrials 
(RR 26). First of all, Katz and Lourie declined to give me an appointment 
- and thus became the first and only outright refusal - saying that they 
had a 11 very tight schedul e11 and therefore could not spare the ha 1 f hour 
for interview. A second attempt at gaining an appointment later met with 
a further ref us a 1 together with a comment that they were 11 very busy". 
Then Marshall Industrials was placed under judicial management (prior to 
liquidation) one week before I was scheduled to visit them in Durban. 
Meanwhile, the original Wholesaleman A (RR 80) had been interviewed and 
had contributed his data. Extracts from this are quoted in the study. 
The Stores sector remained. Here the single low-rater (RR 29) is a fairly 
small firm, Harrowe's and yet its activities could best be described as 
those of a departmental store. I therefore had a choice of matching with 
a company of similar size but different activity, or the same activity 
but of a much larger size. I obviously chose the latter as data from 
this management might in fact point to why it has failed to grow in the 
many years that it has been in existence. It was matched with one of 
the large store groups (RR 74). 
As with Prima, no data arrived from Harrowe's MD. Initially calls elicited 
promises to write, but then further calls were not returned. Storeman A 
contributed his data, but there was no-one with whom to pair him. 
Table 18 shows the Risk Rating and Market Capitalisation of the final 
selected sample. It can be seen that in each pair size (as reflected 












cases, the low-raters have a smaller capital employment but this trend is 
completely reversed in the case of the Phannaceutical pair. 
TABLE 18 THE SUBJECT COMPANIES 
Capital RR Capital 
Company Employed Company Employed 
(R'OOO) (R'OOO) 
Clothing A 3 000 87 Clothing X 2 500 
Food A 14 000 82 Food X 11 000 
Steel A 13 500 91 Steel X 9 600 
Pharmaceutical A 720 97 Phannaceuti cal x l 850 
Let me at this stage summarise by saying that at the time that a given 
subject agreed to participate in the study and to record data for it, he 
had no idea that the company which he headed had been selected on any 
sort of financial or result basis at all. I in fact told all subjects 
that the selection of companies had been random and at the same time 
emphasised that it was the company and not himself that was being studied: 
I knew nothing about him in his personal capacity and was merely seeking 
to isolate characteristics of management of the company as personified 
by himself. Also, no subject was given any idea of what the true 
purpose of the study was and at no time during interview or subsequently 
was the word 'role' mentioned. 
THE DATA 
The data which initially came in from the subjects was disappointing. 
Generally, there was nothing wrong with the time sequencing and in this 
area, they had followed instructions, but many of the activities lacked 
essential detail as to the purpose. One example will suffice here. If 

















whether it is (1) a personal call, (2) an interpersonal or liaison activity 
on behalf of the Company, or (3) a Resource Allocator activity. With the 
addition of the three words 11 about our overdraft 11 the confusion is removed 
and it is clearly a Resource Allocator activity. 
Because of this type of omission, I had to telephone or re-interview 5 of the 
subjects. Three of these had to be re-interviewed because I felt that the 
additional information they had given me over the telephone was not sufficient. 
Three subjects, Foodman X, Foodman A and Steelman A produced very comprehensive 
records and it was not necessary to clarify any of their time periods. 
Foodman X's record resembled Gordon's although it was not as comprehensive. 
Mai 1 Record 
One further problem remained before analysis could begin and that was with 
the mail record. Although I had had the opportunity of analysing Lewis' 
mail input and output in detail (Table 10) I was certainly not prepared 
to take this as being characteristic of all managers and further, Gordon 
and Lewis spent different amounts of time (4% : 8%) on mail activities. 
What was wanted was a simple (but realistic) and reasonably accurate 
breakdown of mail activity against which I could cost the time recorded 
by the subjects. 
Attendance to mail is to the manager just that : he does not see it in 
terms of performing various role functions but simply in terms of performing 
a single activity, and therefore the records that they sent me simply 
reflected the time spent without any further detail : detail which was not 
able to be collected in a study of this nature. 
Fortunately, Mi ntzberg gives a very comprehensive breakdown of both mail 
input and output by purpose in the Appendix of his study (1973:244-245). 
Analysis of this record showed that mail input could quite reasonably be 
apportioned in the percentages of 25% to Figurehead, 50% to External 
Monitor, and 25% to Internal Monitor. This breakdown ignores 5% of 
mail input time given to the purpose of 'acknowledgements'. Similarly, 
mail output could be roughly divided between Liaison and Disseminator with 











TABLE 19 RELATIVE PERCENTAGE TIME DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN ROLES 
FOR A SAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL EXECUTIVES 
-
ROLE Clothing Foodman Pharmacy Steelman . Hiqh Rater Clothing 
man A A man A A Mean SD man X 
FIGUREHEAD 3,92 1,38 . 2 ,20 7,87 3,84 2,89 2,45 
LEADER 9 ,66 6,5 4,52 9,88 7,64 2 ,59 I 3,5o 
LIAISON 11,72 27,55 5,61 25,07 17,49 10,54 i 6,31 
MONITOR 30,43 33,79 35,95 24,5 31'17 
I 
4,99 114,30 
DISSEMINATOR 3,11 5,64 6,48 4,94 5,04 1,43 8,06 
SPOKESMAN 2,39 7,69 4,52 2,64 4 ,31 2,45 14'19 
ENTREPRENEUR 18,90 2,96 10,74 10 ,41 10,75 6,51 4,73 
DISTURBANCE 
HANDLER l ,91 0,59 4,52 l ,06 2,02 l '75 8,76 
RESOURCE 
ALLOCATOR 9 ,81 13,85 19,22 10,95 13 ,46 4,20 25,59 
NEGOTIATOR 8, 13 -- 5,65 2 ,64 4, 11 3,54 12,09 
Foodman Pharmacy 
x man X 
12 ,68 1,68 
l ,75 l '17 
11,06 . 7 ,03 
10,80 11, 18 
5,66 0,58 
5,66 l '17 
13, 17 4,69 
7 ,85 4,30 



















































TABLE 20 ANALYSIS OF MONITOR ROLE ACTIVITY FOR A SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL EXECUTIVE SAMPLE 
Clothing Foodman Pharmacy Steelman High Rater Clothing Foodman 
man A A man A A Mean SD man X x 
TOTAL 
MONITOR 
4,99 I 14,30 
ACTIVITY 
% 30,43 33,79 35,95 24,50 31, 17 10 ,80 
i . 
l 
TOTAL : i . 
5 ,97 ! 13 ,81 SOLICITED 25,60 30,24 30,30 17 ,62 25,94 10 ,40 
-
TOTAL UN-
SOLICITED 4,83 3,55 5,65 6,88 5,23 l ,40 I 0,49 0,40 
i 
INTERNAL i I 
SOLICITED 10,33 24,79 12,55 6 ,64 13,55 1 ,86 I 8,38 7 ,77 
INTERNAL ! i 
UNSOLICITED 3,39 2,96 2,26 6,0 3,65 l ,63 I {) ,49 0,22 
I 
TOTAL 
INTERNAL 13 ,64 27 ,75 14 ,81 12 ,64 17,21 7 ,08 l 8,-7 . 7,99 
TOTAL 








ACTIVITY 9,66 6,5 4,52 9,88 7 ,64 2 ,59 I 3,50 1 , 75 
l 
Pharmacy Steelman 
man X x 
11 , 18 13,06 





2, 19 3,78 
1 , 17 2,52 
Low Rater 
Mean SU 
12,33 l ,64 






3,55 1 ,41 















Thus, when a subject recorded 11 attention to mai 111 , 11 morni ng mai 111 , or 
"dictation", "general correspondence", this time was costed to the roles 
according to these respective percentages. 
Analysis of the Data 
The data was analysed in exactly the same way as Gordon's and according to 
the same criteria. Firstly, starting and stopping time of each day was 
noted, th~ record checked for time gaps, gross and net times calculated, 
and finally the activities were apportioned to the roles. Where subjects 
recorded after-hour work activities these were included in the recorded 
time, but office work by 2 subjects on Saturday morning was not included 
so as to make the diary record a unifonn 5-day study for all subjects. 
No additional assumptions about the roles had to be made and any difficulties 
experienced during the analysis stage are discussed in the next Section. 
The results of the analysis for all subjects are presented in composite 
form in Table 19. Table 20 analyses the· Monitor role activity for each 
of the 4 subjects and again, ltsts the total Leader activity for comparison. 
Perhaps I should state quite categoric~lly at this stage that the results 
do not show an absolute but a relative time expenditure between the roles: 
I cannot contend that any given subject spent say 20% of his time solely 
gathering information (monitoring) but only that 20% of his activities 
were initiated for that purpose. Also, the results of the pilot and main 














A Hotelling's T2 was first of all performed on the results. This produced 








17,361 at 0,05 level 
Because the T2 was significant, the individual t-scores were then calculated: 
TABLE 21 CALCULATED t-SCORES FO~ THE 5 INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 
** Variable tcalc. df 
Total Monitor 1 - 6, 10 3 
Internal Unsolicited 2 - 5,36 3 
Tota 1 Internal 3 - 2,21 3 
Total External 4 - 3,08 3 
Total Leader 5 - 6,23 3 
Now we have adequate grounds for making a priori assumption concerning the 
influence of variables 1, 2 and 5. Thus here the tcalc. was compared 
with normal student-t tables : 
* T2 = 408,045 f = 27 ,203 df = 5, 2 
** The variables are extracted in order from Table 20 - numbering does not 












TABLE 22 COMPARISON OF t-SCORES FOR 3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable tcalc. df tcri t. level of signif. 
3,18 at 0,05 
* 1 - 6,10 3 0,01 
5,84 at 0,01 
3,18 at 0,05 
2 - 5,36 3 0,05 
5,84 at 0,01 
3,18at0,05 
5 - 6,23 3 0,01 
5,84 at 0,01 
--
However, we have no such grounds for making these assumptions about variables 
3 and 4, and so we are here obliged to square the calculated t values and then 
compare them to Hotelling T2 .t values from tables in order to maintain an cr1 . 
overall level of significance at the chosen value : 
TABLE 23 COMPARISON OF SQUARED t-SCORES FOR 2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Vari ab le tcalc. (tcalc. )
2 2 
T crit. level of signif. 
3 - 2,21 4,88 17 ,361 at 0,05 not signif. 
4 - 3,08 9,49 17 '361 at 0,05 not signif. 












Concerning Hypothesis 2, we are wanting to show that a successful Manager 
will indulge in more Monitor and Leader role activity than the unsuccessful 
wi 11. 
Now it has been shown that there is a significant difference between the means 
of S and US in regard to both Monitor and Leader. We therefore now want to 
show that when Leader and Monitor activity of the S group are compared there 
will be significantly less of a difference between these means than for the 
US group. 
COMBINED LEADER AND MONITOR t-SCORES . TABLE 24 . FOR S AND US SAMPLES 
Total Leader Total Monitor tcalc. df tcrit. Signif. level 
9,66 30,43 3, 18 
at 0,05 
6,50 33,79 6,37 3 significant at 
0 ,01 
4,52 35,95 5,84 
at 0,01 
9,88 24,50 
3,50 14 ,30 
1 '75 10,80 26,12 3 3'18 significant at 
at 0,05 0,01 
1 '17 11 '18 













Discussion of. Statistics 
The differences between the means of the Leader scores have been shown to be 
significant and 'on the basis of this result Hypothesis 1 is accepted. 
The validity of Hypothesis 2 is very strongly confirmed: not only is the 
combined Leader and Monitor mean significantly less for the S group, but over 
4 times so. On the basis of this result the link between Monitor and Leader 
roles can be taken as well established. 
Within the Monitor role we find support for the significance of the unsolicited 
input {H4), but not for that of either total internal (H3) or total external {H5). 
But even this supposedly •negative• result has two strong meanings, the one 
absolute, the other implied: 
Remembering that Total Monitor activity is significant, by logical deduction the 
only difference can be in the unsolicited internal component, and so indirectly 
we find support for H4. {Figure 13) 












~H2- TOTAL MONITOR 













If External and Internal monitoring components are not significant, but 
overall Total monitor is, then the implication is that the S and US groups 
are indulging in a different type or quality of monitor activity. Following 
from this the inference would be that the successful manager has learnt to 
use his time more efficiently - to select that information which is 
important or crucial to him, and further to so conduct himself (Leader role) 
that he has easier access to information which he needs (unsolicited). 
Again a dynamic is indicated. The unsuccessful manager has not learnt 
this. 
We move now to a more full discussion of the results. Additional data 


























THE ROLE OF SUCCESS 
{and non success) 
A cold analysis of results and a statistical indication of their validity 
does not answer the primary question of why it is that these groups exhibit 
such different role profiles. 
I now propose to introduce each of the subjects, ta 1 k briefly about their 
work characteristics and to provide some information on their organisational 
environment before moving on to an isolation of their commonalities. 
They are all very different men and an individual description will I 
believe help the reader to understand the role behaviour of each man. 
Although the analysis was not done in this order {see Box below), the 
descriptions of the unsuccessful group are given first as this is useful 
in providing a 'backdrop' to understanding the reasons for the successful 
executives performing so very differently in their role functions. 
Each subject has been given a title. This is without praise or 
prejudice: it reflects what I believe best describes the dominant 
characteristic of each man. 
Whole numbers are given in the Text. The exact percentage figures appear 













It is usual in a study of this nature - especially where an instrument is 
being developed - to have a number of people score the data so as to ensure 
accuracy of the results obtained. This was not done. 
The most important reason for this was the question of confidentiality. Each 
subject had been given an absolute assurance that not only would his Company's 
identity not be made known, but that the personal information which he 
provided would be treated with discretion. I have tried to honour that 
commitment. 
Further, although the scoring was done against a list of criteria, it requires 
not only a certain knowledge of management, but also practice. This was made 
clear to me when I re-costed Gordon's data after a break of some 11 months 
and found that I had to begin the analysis almost from scratch. 
It was not possible to score blind: The data was in most cases provided 
on Company letterhead, I had discussed and rediscussed activities with each 
subject (see Text) getting further information, and by the time that scoring 
commenced I knew the data fairly well. 
There was thus danger of bias creeping into the scoring. Recognising this, 
I waited until all the results were in before doing any scoring at all: only 
when it became evident that the Storeman was not going to contribute did I 
begin. All scoring was then done fulltime over a period of 6 days and randomly 
across S and US samples and between company pairs. 
I strove to maintain objectivity and cost the activities according to the 
assumptions made (Appendix 2). In doubtful cases, I always 'let the list 
decide' - I was after all looking to define what is and 'negative' results 
could have been just as interesting. 
As it turned out, the data support the main hypothesis. Perhaps after reading 












Clothingman X The Pretender 
After an unhurrfed 2-hour initial interview, I was surprised to receive 
very brief and inadequate data from him. Consulting my notes, I found 
that in the 2 hours that we had spent together, he told me a lot about 
himself and his philosophy, and a lot about his firm, but very little 
about his own involvement in his firm. This was ·Curious, as was the 
fact that he had given me the impression that he was quite happy to go 
on chatting all afternoon, but at the same time had appeared to be 
reserved and aloof. 
Arriving for the second meeting, I was ushered into the office where the 
senior managers had been having lunch at a table in Clothingman's office. 
As they filed past me, I noted the absence of conversation between them 
and the glum look on their faces. 
His Monitoring certainly appears to be adequate - indeed impressive - until 
one begins to realise that he is the detailed infonnation clearing-house for 
the whole organisation. He sees every peice of mail which comes in, notes 
the value of each cheque and a daily report on production is put on his 
desk: 11 1 like to know what is going on. 11 11 1 see every telex that comes 
into the factory - it is given to me. 11 Processing this mail input does 
not take very much of his time (an estimated 30 minutes per day), but 
then each piece of mail generates an instruction to one or many of the 
employees - and he is just as likely to issue an instruction on payment 
periods to be allowed a customer as he is to query the price of one particular 
item on an order. Files in his office list all purchases of raw material, 
production figures, orders placed, debtors and outstanding accounts, in fact 
all conceivable type of information. 
His senior subordinates are given very little discretion in their decision-
making. Members of the "executive team" discuss every 11 important 11 decision 












His Monitor activity of 14% is the highest of the US group but is all totally 
inwardly-directed at this detail: 9% is internal and only 5% collected from 
outside. And as a result of the time spent issuing instructions, 26% is 
spent in Resource Allocation. 
There are no clearly-defined areas of authority. Everything is discussed 
with everybody and the overlap of responsibility as shown on the organisation 
chart {Figure 14) is considerable. 
Entrepreneurial role activity is low and attempted with inadequate information. 
Expansion into a new market area is discussed at one meeting and "we were 
not sure of the price brackets that we should market into and we then 
discussed the fabrics that we thought might be applicable for us to use 
and we then went on to discuss in some detail the type of marketing measures 
we may have to take to get in there. 11 There is no preparation, information 
gathering, detail of competitor's market share, or similar much-needed 
information available. 
How then are decisions taken? Well the guessing is replaced eventually by: 
11 obviously you are advised by your sales directors but then l direct them from 
the angle of deciding price brackets, 11 and 11 1 have to direct them into the 
avenues into which l want them to go as far as design and colour are concerned. 11 
Naturally an organisation run on these lines with decisions being taken on 
inadequate information inevitably has problems and Clothingman has his 
fair share. He handles disturbances on, inter alia, the late delivery of 
fabric, quality control and delivery of garments to customers, production 
scheduling, the sale of surplus {unsold garments), and as an inevitable 
consequence of all these, financial pressures. 
The description of 'pretender' is warranted on a number of counts: He pretends 
joint decision-making {"you can't run a factory as a one-man show, it is not 
possible to do that. 11 ) but he is in fact an autocrat. Secondly, he pretends 
to want to "keep contact" by embarking on tours around the factory which 
11 1 try to get done at least twice a day. 11 whereas in reality these tours 
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role activity of only 3,51~ is reflected in his unsolicited informational 
input (0,5%), and like our friend Lewis, he disseminates opinion (8~) 
and spends a large amount of time (14%) in Spokesman (lobbying) activity. 
Foodman X The Abrogator 
This man's role activity is in many ways very similar to Clothingman's 
but the personality of the man is very different. Just as Clothingman 
talks too much, Foodman is the quiet silent type. 
But there is a similar lack of defined responsibility and no measure of 
authority given to subordinates. As a result, 23i~ of time is spent in 
Resource Allocator - mainly giving instructions and authorising intended 
actions. Notwithstanding this inadequate base on which to run the present 
operations, Entrepreneurial activities include grandiose schemes such as the 
setting up of a factory in a foreign country and time spent in this role 
(13%) is coupled to the Bio spent negotiating to put it into operation. 
Monitoring is largely confined to internal operations (8%), is of course 
almost totally solicited, and confined to the miniscule 
11 ! visited the label store and the label office to inspect and 
check up on the surplus and current 1 ab el stocks. 11 
Thirty minutes were spent on this activity and (worse than Clothingman) 
this subject does not even issue instructions for this detailed information 
to be delivered to him : He goes to find it. He records that he "walked 
down to the accounts department to enquire about the progress of the monthly 
accounts from the accountant." 
Leader role activity was confined to two instances in the 5 days of study: 
he spent 15 minutes counselling an "apparently" sick employee and 25 minutes 












This man is so inner-directed and cut off that he records placing a "call 
to the Chairman's Secretary to keep up to date on the *holding company 
gossip'.;. 
One wonders what prevents him from phoning the Chairman himself . 
Pharmacyman X . The Autocrat 
Earlier I reported ensuring that data was collected from the chief executive 
of each company. Now I was aware that Pharmacyman had a Joint MD. I 
asked for an organisation chart and was particularly interested in this case 
to see the split of responsibility before analysing the results. There 
was none. "But I can tell you" said Pharmacyman. He spoke and I drew. 
I checked that the representation was correct. It was. This chart is 
reproduced in Figure 15. It shows inter alia, no manager for the chemical 
factory, an incomplete split between production and marketing (5 sales 
reps. directly responsible to the chief.executive), and despatch responsible 
to finance. Altogether a completely unorthodox structure. 
This results in a rather comical - but nevertheless tragic - situation of 
the chief e>Zecutive of a public company meeting with 9 (chemical) factory 
workers in his office for an hour on each of. 4 occasions during the 5 days. 
A total of 11 hours was spent selecting ranges of new products without 
the sales manager or the Joint MD being present. He therefore cuts into 
the other man's area of responsibility. 
Pharmacyman has an additional quirk: not only does he open all the mail 
("a 11 post .is centralised throuQh me") , but he goes th rough it in front 
of an audience who are then given their instructions. Normally these 
people are the finance, indent and production managers. Mail input time 
for the week was 2 hours. · 
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As a result of these activities and the inadequate structure, his Resource 
Allocator time is an incredible 66%, mainly spent issuing instructions and 
programming the work of junior employees. 
This preoccupation with the lower levels of the organisation is mirrored in 
his Monitoring activity which totalled 11%. Nine percent of this time is 
spent on internal information gathering which is typified by one 2-hour 
activity which consisted of going to inspect the outstanding accounts and 
his subsequent statement: 11 I tend to follow it all the way through from 
sale to cash collection. A great deal of my time is taken up in this. 11 
Contact with the Joint MD was confined to one lunch-hour discussion during 
the week. Then how with this incomplete and overlapping split of 
responsibility is co-ordination of this organisation maintained? 11 We 
have a formal meeting once a month. 11 
Is this man an autocrat? Yes, self-confessed: 11 I am forced to run this 
place as an autocrat. I do everything. 11 
Steelman X The Report Writer 
This subject is a somewhat colourless man: bland. In many ways , he 
resembles Foodman X and their time spent on Resource Allocator, Disturbance 
Handler, Liaison, Disseminator, and total Monitor as well as Leader varies 
only a few percentage points. The split between internal and external 
Monitor is similar. 
There is though a difference in the type of activity that constitutes the 
Resource Allocator time. Steelman X loves writing reports. In the 5 
days he spent 285 minutes spread over 10 deskwork sessions in this activity. 
This accounted for just over 16% of his time. 
A completely neglected area is that of Entrepreneur. There was not one 
activity which I felt could be allocated to this role. There was never any 












with him by telephone. 
Also like Foodman, he appears to be a little lost and out of his depth. 
His activities are mainly directed at holding together what there is rather 
than improving upon it. 
The Successful Men 
Cloth i ngman A The Entrepreneur 
This man's whole organisational life consists of improvement projects and 
he seems to be constantly asking himself if what he has cannot be made 
better or what else could be done. The innovative programme is total and 
ranges through simple reallocation of workl..oad to 11 impr ve the control of 
administration", consideration of a neyJ trimming on a dress, to the 
introduction of a completely new garment range. 
One activity concerned a decision to be taken on an order from a customer 
\ 
for a new type of garment. I asked him to expand on the purpose of this 
meeting: "We 11 it was a request for a new garment and so I \'Jas trying to 
decide 1 Will- it work? 1 
will go ahead'." 
1 Is it practical?' and then I decided 1 Yes, we 
All this entrepreneurial activity (19%) of course requires adequate information, 
and the total monitori g of 30% has a higher input from outside the organisation 
(17%) than from within (14%). 
But the internal functioning of the organisation is not neglected in this 
quest for new ventures sought on the outside: responsibilities are delegated 
as far as possible and even then decisions are taken jointly. After one 
activity he reports: "I always consult my man before an occasion like this." 
And so the monitoring is linked to the entrepreneurial decision role and at 













Two of the Companies in the sample are subject to Foreign control. One 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a United States Corporation and the other 
has 52% of its shares held by a British group. 
The question then arises: To what extent are these companies masters of 
their own destiny, and following from this, how much of the chief executive's 
decision-making discretion is predetennined by parental policy? 
I asked these executives how much of their policy-making was dictated 
from overseas. The 'British' executive replied: "Not at all. We 
are completely autonomous." 
The U.S. subsidiary executive's reply w~s somewhat more lengthy: 
"We are treated as being completely autonomous as far as day-to-day 
running of the firm is concerned. However, when a major decision 
has to be taken such as a new product launched then we have to 
submit plans for overseas approval. Thus any real material 
decision requires authorisation. But I'm looked to to propose 
these changes. They are not imposed from America." (underlining 
mine) 
Writing reports for head office and other activities such as instructing 
an auditor to redraft the balance sheets because certain allocations are 
not allowed in U.S. Law cost this executive 2 ho~rs of his time in the 
5 days of study. He summarises his position as follows: 
"It is a case of confidence building - when I started with the 
Company some 3 years ago everything had to be approved by them. 
Nowadays, I am 1 eft more or less to my own devices." 












Specifically, the Leader role is commonly performed by means of tours through 
the factory. But unlike Clothingman X who neglected this aspect, Clothingman A 
undertook tours on 8 occasions in the 5 days. The average duration was 33 
minutes and they alone accounted for 13% of his time. The purpose? 
11 ! go into the factory at least once a day - sometimes twice. The 
purpose is twofold. One must keep a finger on the pulse - find out 
what is happening. Also, the staff must see that one is taking an 
interest." * 
The total Leader role time of 10% can be compared with a very high unsolicited 
input of 3% and (because of the delegation) Resource Allocator at 10% and 
Disturbance Handler of 2% are both extremely low. 
Foodman A The Public Relations Man 
This successful manager represents a profile which can be compared to 
Clothi~gman A's for its similarity in a number of respects and its absolute 
difference in others. Like Clothingman, Foodman presides over an organisation 
in which responsibility has been delegated, matters run fairly smoothly and 
Disturbance Handling is limited to less than 1%. His Resource Allocation of 
14% is slightly higher but is confined to 4 rather lengthy activities during 
the course of the study. 
Monitor activity is high at 34% and Leader time of 6,5% brings him 3% of 
unsolicited information from within the Company (the total internal being 
25%). 
There the similarities end, for Foodman A uses the remainder of his time not 
in entrepreneurial activity (limited to 3%), nor in negotiation with outsiders 
(nil) but in an inordinately high 28% spent performing the Liaison role. 
He plays golf with customers, entertains them to lunch, and to dinner. 
Perhaps negotiation takes place on the golf course but it was not recorded. 













We notice, though, a defect because the high Liaison activity only results 
in 5% of Monitor activity obtained from outside. We could say of this man 
then that in the absence of a very strong number two subordinate looking 
after improvement projects, there is a danger in the medium and long term 
of overall results obtained by the firm declining - precisely because the 
variety of his outside role performance is not great enough. 
Pharmacyman A The Investigator 
Scanning is epitomised in this subject. He investigates everything inside 
and outside the organisation all the time. He lives on a diet of information. 
Like Clothingman, he is not satisfied to maintain the status quo but is 
engaged in a number of improvement projects (11%) and his external Monitor 
input (21~) is higher than internal. 
However, the organisational functioning is also not neglected. Delegation 
is not quite as much as for the other successful subjects and he has to 
spend 19~ of his time in Resource Allocator - mainly telling people what 
to do. This is as a direct result of his quest for information and his 
11 fol low-up system 11 : Information on a certain subject is scanned for, 
disturbances are dealt with (5%), and a reminder is put in a follow-up 
folder to again be investigated on a particular date. This invariably 
results in a further meeting with the subordinate to solicit whether the 
matter has in fact been dealt with {30%) and inevitably a further instruction 
{Resource Allocator) results: 
11 Whenever I pick up a problem I discuss it with the staff member 
conce.rned and then di arise it for a forward date and check with 
them that the problem has been satisfactorily settled. 11 
Pharmacyma.n is more controlled and disciplined in apportionment of his time 
than the other 3 successful executives. Meetings wherever possible are 
scheduled and when unscheduled, they are treated as if they were scheduled 
insofar as he makes himself completely unavailable and devotes his whole 
attention to the problem at hand. Once it is dispensed with, he goes on 












fragmentation in his working day as a result of this discipline which he 
imposes upon himself. He feels that working like this enables him to be 
11 more efficient. 11 
He always begins and ends his day with a mail period, messages which come 
in whilst he is busy are accummulated and then dealt with as a block and, 
excepting for one day, he always arrived and left work at the same time. 
But his quest for information does not cause him to neglect his Leader role -
although at 5% it is lower than the rest of the sample and it has a strong 
infonnational component: 
11 Two of our staff are presently on training courses and I asked them 
in to find out how they were getting on and generally to encourage 
them in their efforts. 11 
{Digression: As analysis progressed I became increasingly concerned by the 
Leader role split. There were a number of activities where the distinction 
between Motivator and Builder was vague. The above example - counselling 
a man about his training programme, illustrates this dilemma. Although 
I continued the split analysis, as I cannot be sure of its validity or 
accuracy, the reported results are shown as an overall Leader score.) 
What this subject does neglect is his Liaison activity. At 6%, it is 
lower than that for all subjects in the study and was mainly confined to 
office hours. He reports only entertaining business associates approximately 
10 times a year and attending charitable functions approximately 6 times. 
Steelman A The A 11-Rounder 
With entrepreneurial role activity time of 10% and Leader activity time of 
10%, Steelman resembles Clothingman. Liaison activity is high at 25% but 
unlike Foodman, this time is not spent with a limited number of contacts 













What is perhaps hard to convey to the reader though is the ease with which 
this man switches activity from attention to seemingly unimportant trivia 
to larger issues. From outside Boardroom lunch to unsolicited information 
from his personnel manager on black workers commuting by bus, to inventory 
level, to revised salary scales for the production personnel, to a new 
distribution arrangement for post 1980, to : 
"Discussed the prov1s1on of facilities for the new marketing manager 
due to commence duties on 1978-05-25 and of the progress on the 
induction programme for him ... " 
all happens in a matter of a few hours. In this he is very much like Gordon. 
He is interested in everything and everybody at all time. 
The total Monitor time of 24% is lower than the other 3 subjects in the 
successful group, is fairly evenly divided between internal and external 
input, and yet the internal unsolicited input is an incredibly high 6%. 
How does Steelman achieve this? After a detailed study of his record 
I am convinced that the answer can be summarised: By having trained 
personnel each of whom has specific responsibilities and who are motivated 
by him. Subordinates bring him information which he reports being of 
' direct use and news of problems already solved by themselves in which they 
feel he will be interested. Unsolved problems are usually brought to 
him only when the subordinate has tried and cannot deal with them himself. 
Resource Allocator time is approximately 11%, but after coming across the 
entry that (whi 1st he was at a meeting in the City): "Secretary received 
a call from Mr. Smit of ..... which was transferred to the production 
di rector in my absence", and knowing that he usually began each day with 
a brief discussion with his Secretary 11 regardi ng the day• s acti vi ti es 11 
and gave her instructions, I further analysed the Resource Allocator role 
to exclude that time whi~h was spent instructing his Secretary. This was 
4%. This left the Resource Allocator time of 7% for all other subordinates. 
The whole organisation runs like clockwork and Disturbance Handling is a 
minimal 1% confined to 2 periods over 5 days. 
After that brief look at each of the successful and unsuccessful subjects in 










 TABLE 25 COMPARISON OF GROSS AND NET TIME WORKED 
Average Times Over 
HIGH RATERS 5 Days of Study (Mins.) LOW RATERS 
Gross Net Gross 
- Net 
CLOTHING MAN 471 418 53 CLOTH ING MAN 
FOOD MAN 540 507 33 FOOD MAN 
PHARMACY MAN 583 530 53 PHARMACY MAN 
STEEL MAN 588 566 22 STEEL MAN 
X (mins) 545 505 40 X (mi ns) 
' 
HOURS WORKED + LOST 9.05 8.25 .40 HOURS WORKED + LOST 
.. 
Average Times Over 5 Days 
of Study (Mins.) 
Gross Net Gross 
- Net 
606 571 35 
513 456 57 
549 511 38 
412 349 63 
520 471 48 















IHE ROLE OF SUCCESS 
Delegation has been defined simply as "the art of getting work done through 
other people". It is much more than that. It can also be seen as having 
two majior effects: The one is an obvious freeing of a large part of the 
manager's time because he does not have to attend to needless detail and 
spend time issuing instructions to subordinates. The other is the creation 
of a situation where, solely because of the responsibilities entrusted to 
them, subordinates are motivated. This process is of course carried down 
through the organisation. Structure is built. 
The executive then has time to cast around for new opportunities to keep 
abreast of what is happening in the outside environment, and to remain 
informed as to the internal status of his organisation. As important, he 
then has the time to encourage, train, sympathise with, and criticise. 
Subordinates become even more motivated. Synergy is at work. * Growth 
results. 
Now one of the most obvious general findings is that all the managers in the 
successful group practised delegation whilst it is absent ·amongst the 
unsuccessful sample. Thus if this brief reasoning is correct, then 
logically delegation must underly many if not all the phenomena that we 
have observed, and further, we should be able to point to specific instances 
and activities in this study which link these phenomena together. Can we? 
When I arrived to interview Wholesaleman, I found that he had prepared some' 
notes. One of the first points that he mentioned was that 11 ! believe in 
complete delegation with report back by my senior employees to myself. 
I believe that it is encouraging to them. 11 And Clothingman, in answer to 
my question of what his general philosophy of general management was, answered: 
11 ! believe it is a question of motivating people. Previously we 
were run on a semi-dictatorial basis. I am encouraging my staff 
to take on more authority without referring back to me all the ti me. 11 
* Growth is defined as an increasing ability to deal with the total environment 












The link between delegation and Leader role (motivation) is strong and this 
is shown up in the results where we see that the successful managers do 
spend more time in Leader activity (Hl). And delegation is not just 
something that they do, nor is it a belief that they practise. With some 
there is an actual fear of not delegating. Gordon : 
"I am detennined to keep this feeling of decentralisation and not to 
have central head office control. It is a matter of principle and 
I want to be sure that there is a clear understanding of this. 
We don't want to break this principle of controlled decentralisation. 
I don 1 t want to become a centralised company. 11 
The results also show that the amount of unsolicited information that they 
receive from their subordinates is higher (H4). But is this as a result 
of increased motivation on behalf of the subordinates as we postulated or 
not? Is there a link between the Leader and Monitor role? 
We saw how Clothingman embarked on regular factory tours "to find out what 
is happening ...• and let the staff see that one is taking an interest." 
Storeman does this as well "to observe what is going on and talking briefly 
with members of the staff. 11 And this linking of the motivational aspect 
of Leadership and the Monitor role via the observational tour was endorsed 
by yet another man to whom I spoke. A retired executive director of Anglo 
American, it had been his function to "look after" a number of the Corporations's 
mines. He recalls : 
"Whenever I arrived at a mine I always immediately went into the 
field to speak to the manager. They were always pleased that I 
had t~ken the trouble. Later when we talked in their office I 
was far better informed about their progress and any problems, 
and inevitably they open'ed up and talked to me enthusiastically." 
We can therefore quite safely con~lude that : 
*Pl. The absence of delegation is inconsistent with the successful management 
of large organisations. 
* In this Section a number of statements or propositions are generated by 
review of the results. Proposition is defined as 'something proposed 












None of the unsuccessful group practised delegation and Phannacyman at least 
is actively and vociferously opposed to it {below). What is the result of 
this? Two possibilities seem to suggest themselves. Either the manager 
is forced to spend his time on petty internal functionings and like Pharmacyman 
and Clothingman, to turn his attention inward and to become myopic with 
regard to the external environment, or like Lewis and Foodman, they do the 
opposite - they become abrogatory with regard to the internal organisation 
and spend all their time on unrealistic improvement schemes. I say 
unrealistic because this latter type finds himself presiding over an 
organisation which lacks the capacity to deal with present operations let 
alone to carry the load of implementation of any new project. 
The result for both types is the same: part of his environment must. be 
neglected. The time is not spent monitoring (but certainly in the case 
of the myopic man) has to be spent programming the work of his subo~dinates 
and dealing with problems. He just does not have any time to spend 
monitoring externally, his subordinates are unmotivated and in some cases, 
frustrated. An increase in problems and a concommitant expenditure of 
time by the manager solving them are inevitable. 
P2. Successful managers spend less time in Resource Allocator and 
Disturbance Handler role activities than do their Unsuccessful counterparts, 
and conversely, 
P3. An increase in time spent in Resource Allocator and Disturbance Handler 
roles is indicative of an ineffective manager. 
This brings us to the question: which of his roles can the manager delegate? 
Mintzberg points to what he calls the "dilemma of delegation" which the 
manager faces. He has the information, and to delegate responsibility for 
carrying out the tasks not only must he delegate the usual authority and 













His manner is calm and unhurried as he explains that: "The greatest 
failing of Managers is that they don't have the time to think." I 
have no respect for a man who carries home a pile of work every 
evening. I am not impressed by the Saturday worker. Of course 
there are always exceptions - such as year-end accounts to be 
prepared or stock-taking time, but if a man is so overloaded that 
he can't finish his work during the day, it means that he is not 
delegating properly - for if his job is genuinely too big for him 
or he has no-one to delegate to, all he has to do is to .say so and 
more personnel will be appointed. 
I wi 11 go further than that: 11 I don't need a man who can't make 
two hours a day to come in and talk to me. 11 
Wholesaleman (Risk Rating 80) 
subordinate to carry out the job. This he must disseminate. His dilemma 
comes because he must either spend time in the dissemination and have the 
subordinate carry out the job with inadequate information or do the job 
himself and spend time that way. The information must always be inadequate 
because transmission of all of it is too time-consuming: 
"Hence the manager is damned by his own information system either to 
a life of overwork or to one of frustration. In the first case, he 
does too many tasks himself or spends too much time disseminating 
verbal information; in the second case he must watch as delegated 
tasks are performed inadequately according to his standards, by 
the uninformed." (1973:75) 
It therefore follows that skill in the transmission of information is not only 












the 1 dilemna 1 in which he finds himself. Now I can point to no specific 
instance amongst the successful group where this skill was demonstrated: 
They all appeared to be good communicators. However we have seen that 
Lewis is very bad in both his reception and transmission of information. 
Also; Phannacyman X speaks in a staccato and clipped manner. Foodman X 
is at times monosyllabic when speaking but is quite lucid on paper. 
Clothingman X is extremely verbose but conveys little information which 
is relevant to the subject under discussion. There is therefore strong 
evidence that unsuccessful managers are bad communicators. The results 
of the study tend to support this statement albeit in a negative manner: 
We can see no meaningful relationship in the amount of time spent in the 
Disseminator role between the two groups. . The means are approximately 
the same and the only strong variant is Pharmacyman X with his very low 
score (0,58%). The difference then must come in the quality rather than 
in the quantity of their dissemination. 
P4. The Successful manager is a more skilled communicator or conveyor of 
information than is his Unsuccessful counterpart. 
The interrelationship between the Leader and Monitor roles have I believe 
been amply demonstrated in the study. Let us for a moment consider what 
would happen if the manager decides to delegate the Monitor role itself. 
He would quite obviously be deprived of information needed to make decisions 
both internally and externally in the organisation and he would lose (because 
of the interrelationship) the ability to motivate his employees. The result 
would therefore be very akin to a state of complete abrogation: 
PS. Retention of the Leader and Monitor roles by the manager are essential 
for efficient management: delegation of these roles is the same as abrogation. 
I should now like to consider the Leader role a little more closely. In the 
study we saw amongst the unsuccessful group an example of consistent 












successful group: they appear to adopt a mode of behaviour which belongs 
to neither of the two extremes. Does this mean that this Leadership 
behaviour is equidistant between these two points, somewhat in a 9,9 Blake 
and Mouton style? 
Earlier, in evaluating the contribution of the human relations theorists 
we suggested that the prescription for effective management could include 
giving orders and generally behaving in a manner which appears to be 
detrimental to subordinate relationships from time to time, and further 
posited whether this would force us to advocate a transgression of the 
strict behavioural science creed that this should never be done. 
We find that this is so. The successful manager, in seeking to deal with 
the changing environmental forces, maintains his balance on the knife-edge 
by exhibiting behaviour which is appropriate to the given circumstance: 
Gordon's monitoring picks up 11murmurings 11 amongst his trainee store managers 
about working long hours due to late night shopping. He investigates, 
finds out that the arrangements are in his opinion "extremely fair" and 
·reacts: 
11 I will not have this Company turned into a trade-union styled 
operation. We are giving these guys more time off than anyone 
else ..•• and they have got to realise this or go to another 
company. 11 
There is no discussion, no compromise. He just will not {one feels sure) 
be manipulated. But can this be the same man who has a pennanent sub-
committee looking at the provision of staff housing,. who has tremendous 
social responsibility, pays top wages to his lower-level employees, and 
steps in personally because he feels an employee is being treated 
11 insensitively11 ? It is. 
It is.also the same man who reported to me that on a particular morning he: 
"was given hell by my secretary because I had three rows with people before 












which did not appear as planned to coincide with a store promotion. He had 
the employee on the carpet and was given the explanation that the advertisement 
was 11 late. 11 How did Gordon react? 
"Late? I'm not interested in 'late.' Any man with guts and 
gumption would have gone to see the works manager (of the newspaper) 
and ensured that the thing got in. 11 
This from a man who has a permanent open-door policy, will always - often at 
short notice - find time to talk to any employee who cannot get satisfaction 
from anyone further down the hierarchy, and who has even been known to 
interview a man with his wife to sort out some personal problem. 
The key to understanding Gordon is of course his complete conviction that 
'business is people.' He asks his subordinates no more than he is 
prepared to give and expects no less. In his dealings with them, he 
adheres to the single principle that "fairness is crucial" (the question 
of whether he does this out of a true belief in people or not is not at 
issue). Thus in meeting every situation he weighs up their needs and 
the needs of others with those of the company, and acts accordingly. As 
a result his behaviour fluctuates between the widest possible extremes. 
I have also suggested that acceptance of the cause-and-effect relationship 
between productivity and satisfaction would result in periodic authoritative 
leadership action - provided it is effective - in time feeding back as a 
positive influence on the human relationships. This, I believe, is true. 
It is also a somewhat passive way of looking at the dynamic: a sort of 
'no harm done if you have to do it.' 
I should now like to carry this thought further by suggesting that in cases 
such as non-performance of a task or sloppy work this is the correct behaviour 
for the leader to adopt not only from the standpoint of productivity but 
from motivation as well: If an employee knows that he is guilty, if it is 
explained to him why, then he expects to be castigated. And not to do so 
is going to engender in him the same feeling of 'the boss doesn't care' as 












My argument then is that criticism (if deserved) is just as important as 
praise. Both are indicators given by the leader that he cares and are thus 
both positive motivators. How else can one explain behaviour of men such 
as Gordon resulting in respect, liking, and positive motivation by his 
employees who also regard him as 'tough but fair.• 
P6. The successful manager exhibits a high degree of flexibility in his 
Leader role behaviour. And the evidence for this is so strong that in 
contradiction of much accepted behavioural science teaching, I contend: 
P7. Inflexibility of leadership style is an indicator of the unsuccessful 
manager. 
So far in the study we have examined a number of reciprocating dynamics of 
the open system. For instance on the total organisational level outputs 
feed back to influence input and on the group level we have shown that 
productivity is linked inter alia with satisfaction. What about leadership? 
This latter dynamic is said to take place "under the umbrella of leadership" 
which is always spoken about in the literature as if it were a one-way-top-
to-bottom influence ("leadership is followship 11 ) and nowhere is there ever 
any mention of a reciprocal influence. Is this in fact correct? , 
Simply because of their relative positions of ultimate authority, there can 
never be an equality of exchange (Gouldner) but if the manager is goal-effective, 
encourages open channels of comnunication, guides and motivates his 
subordinates - in short creates an all-round positive organisational climate -
is he not in turn motivated by his subordinates? I suggest that this is true. 
Certainly it ~ lonely at the top where the manager carries the burden of 
responsibility. But this can be lessened not only be delegation of task 
but also by support and encouragement which is subordi_nates give him: 
the positive dynamic initiated by the manager is reciprocated in appreciation 












Precisely because he~ alone he needs the encouragement of this feedback. 
From whom else can the manager receive motivation to carry on? 
Most of this feedback is unsolicited, some the manager invites. Gordon: 
11 ! had a call from Lew and I was pleased to hear that after deep 
analysis he has decided .... 
11 1 spoke to Roy Waldek to get his result which is really fantastic 
His result figure is absolutely phenomenal ... he is achieving 
wonderfully. 11 
These two men are Regional Managers and Gordon has no control over the 
decision of the one or over the financial result of the other: both have 
the necessary authority and responsibility delegated to them. And yet 
the information encourages him, and increases his belief in the subordinates 
concerned and in the way he has managed them. This is yet another example 
of the successful manager building teams. 
The reverse also applies: the manager who either by abrogation or autocracy 
shuts himself off from his employees not only denies himself access to 
information but also the encouragement which it often brings with it. He 
is isolated and the result is at best, despondency. Especially in time of 
tro~ble this manager will have no-one to turn to, no 'family' on whom to 
rely for support. Why then would the literature go on having us believe 
that leadership from the subordinate's point of view is passive? It is 
simply not true. 
P8. Successful managers receive reciprocal encouragement and motivation from 
their subordinates via the Monitor role. 
Underlying this reciprocal communication and encouragement is a confidence 
by the manager in his own personnel and a belief in them as people. There is 
an awareness, a certain nurturing and an overt absence· of preoccupation with 
his own status position: Wholesaleman led me into his office and indicated 












"Notice that we are sitting at a round table ...• There must never be 
present the feeling of superior and subordinate and for that reason 
the table must always be round." 
Steelman emphasises that: 
"One also can't afford to become too far removed from the people on 
the shop floor. You are dependent on the lowest man in the line 
for your very existence. 11 
And we can also recall Gordon's words of "in a Company such as ours relying 
on dedication, loyalty, and enthusiasm." 
One is almost tempted to postulate that there could be a positive correlation 
between the amount of time spent talking to people about people (not direct 
task) problems and success. 
This quite naturally brings us to the method of decision-making by the suceessful 
manager. In essence this is done jointly. There is consultation, in many 
cases participation, even though the final decision may be taken by the chief 
executive himself. Delegation is carried out to the extent that the decision-
making ·is shared. Clothingman: 
"This was a joint decision as to what we should offer him (customer). 
I always consult my man before an occasion like this. 11 
P9. Successful managers are team builders. 
No analysis of the content of the Entrepreneurial role was made, but in 
description of the subjects we saw several instances of what could be 
termed unrealistic or grandiose schemes. The successful groups spent time 
in investigating various improvement projects which were controlled and 
compatible with the total circumstances of their organisations. The 
Successful managers' time in this role was approximately twice (11%:6%} 
that of their counterparts. They are thus distinguished by a difference 
in both the quality and quantity of this role activity. 
PlO. Successful management cannot be sustained without decision-making 












THE UNSUCCESSFUL A BRIEF COMMENT 
In starting this Section with a discussion of delegation we have of course 
begged the question: Why don't the unsuccessful managers delegate? And 
from this flow a number of others: Are they aware that delegation is one 
key to solving their problem? If so, do they choose not to delegate (and 
if so, why?), or do they try unsuccessfully and find themselves unable to 
do so? In that case, what is the fundamental cause of this disability? 
The study is certainly not directed at answering questions such as these, 
but a number of remarks made and incidents noted during the course of the 
study have a certain coherence which I believe suggests a common failing 
amongst the unsuccessful group. 
Firstly we can point again to Lewis' communication disabilities which are 
shared by the 2 autocrats, Pharmacyman X and Clothingman X - the one curt 
and the other loving the sound of his own voice. Both autocrats, and 
both their organisation charts show (inter alia) a situation which can be 
described as one where there are 'too many supposed chiefs and too few 
Indians'. Pharmacyman has given the title of 'manager' to everyone in 
his organisation. There is also a certain preoccupation with status: 
Clothingman X 11 chairs 11 every meeting. 
Pharmacyman X writes and says: "but as I warned you, my span of control 
is too large and I am involved in more detail than I need." He then 
reports spending (as we have seen) two hours going to the credit control 
department to personally go through the debtors' ledger. 
What motivates Foodman {whom we should remind ourselves is the chief 
executive of a public company) to walk to the Store (again personally) 
to check on the number of labels which are in stock? Behaviour such as 
this must surely result from distrust and an absence of belief in people -
an incapacity to rely upon others. Pharmacyman X: 
"I find delegation tmpossible. It is a theoretical exercise which 
exists on trust between the participants. This I find very hard 













The lait part of this statement is I suggest a pure rationalisation for the 
fact that 'he cannot bring himself to trust others and he knovJs it. 
On a particular morning I walked into Lewis' office and as usual he was just 
finishing the newspaper. He said that he had gone to watch tennis the 
night before but .that it had been rained out. I remarked that I knew and 
indicated that there was a picture (large with caption on page 2) ·in the 
newspaper. His reply: "Oh, is there? I never l oak at pictures. Funny. 11 
Now if the selective perception of this man is such that he can completely 
ignore the informational input of a large newspaper picture and concentrate 
on the fine print in the Smalls, how much does it affect his overall Monitoring 
ability? And being an intelligent man, he almost certainly knows that 
not studying photographs (paying attention to part of his environment) is 
cutting him off from this valuable information. 
LevJis says: "Anyone can subvert me. 11 (which they can), Foodman X writes 
on his questionnaire that he believes the single factor which would help 
him to be more effective would be 11 aggressiveness 11 (which is true) and 
Pharmacyman .. in answer to the same question, writes: 11 a larger net profit 
before taxation." 
May I merely state that there is strong evidence that each of these men 
is aware of his deficiencies, but they also possess an inherent inability 













One striking general facet of the results is that although the subjects 
were carefully selected and matched for industry size and sector, the role 
profile of any gi.ven man bears absolutely no relation to the other of his 
industry sample pair. Rather, each subject in the group is more like the 
others within the same successful or unsuccessful group. Why is this? 
If we look at the 3 role groupings in the set, Interpersonal Competence and 
Decision-making ability can be seen as characteristics which belong to the 
man and are largely independent of his industry. These 2 sets of 
* characteristics can thu·s be thought of as being universal. 
This leaves the Informational roles which can be regarded as specific. But 
these roles can be divided into information gathering (knowing what is 
important and how to get it), possession, and implementation (knowing what 
information to disseminate: what must be built into decisions and how to 
do it. 
Now a successful manager new to an industry lacks only the possession of the· 
information specific to his own sphere of operation in that organisation, 
whereas an unsuccessful manager who has been in a firm for years and 
possessing all the relevant specific knowledge still will not know how to 
go about using it. He remains incompetent. 
Above we have.seen that this competence largely rests upon the Leader and 
Monitor roles and so we can therefore postulate: 












Pll. Successful managers have more in common with others of their own kind 
in different industries than with their unsuccessful counterparts in the 
same industry sector, and 
.. 
Pl2. The ability to manage successfully is a universal general characteristic 
which depends more on the behavioural characteristic of the man than on the 
possession of specific information. 
Pl3. The role behaviour of successful managers is largely independent of 
technology, and thus 
Pl4. The key to our further understanding of successful management lies 
in research which concentrates on isolating their similarities and not 
their differences. 
Chapter 14 attempts a synthesis pf all the empirical work in terms of 
communication channels in the organisation. Implications of the study 













STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE A CERTAIN SYNTHESIS 
In reviewing the empirical school earlier I pointed to the diverse number 
of seemingly unrelated pieces of data before sketching a tentative dynamic 
between them. We are now in a 1worse 1 position for, having made dents in 
several managerial myths, the task is to bring about a synthesis to the 
findings. Brief consideration of two views of the organisation, the 
first empirically based and the other a conceptualisation would here be 
useful: 
Michael Maccoby is a clinical psychologist trained by Erich Fromm. In 1977 
he turned his attention from more conventional pursuits to an analysis of 
250 New York executives whom he observed and interviewed. As a result he 
formulated a picture of a new kind of successful manager who was not like 
Whyte's (1956} security-seeking Organisation Man nor the archetype fearless 
entrepreneur ('Jungle Fighter•), but a man who "best fits the leadership 
needs of the organisation." This manager is competitive, innovative, a 
builder of teams who is fast-moving and flexible. Maccoby calls him the 
Gamesman: 
11 The modern gamesman is best defined as a person who loves change and wants 
to influence its course. He likes to take calculated risks and is 
fascinated by technique and new methods. He sees a developing project, 
human relations, and his own career in terms of options and possibilities, 
·as if they were a game. His character is a collection of near paradoxes 
understood in terms of its adaptation to the organisation requirements. 
He is cooperative but competitive; detached and playful but compulsively 
driven to succeed; a team player but a would-be superstar; a team leader 
but often a rebel against bureaucratic hierarchy; fair and unprejudiced 
but contemptuous of weakness; tough and dominating but not destructive. 
Unlike other business types, he is energized to compete not because he 
wants to build an empire, nor for riches, but rather for fame, glory, 
the exhiliration of running his team and of gaining victories. His main 
goal is to be known as a winner, and his deepest fear is to be labelled 












The Gamesman then actually precipitates win/lose situations and has no desire 
for approval of authority but for power.* ("I experience power as not being 
pushed around by the company; it's a kind of freedom"). At the same ti me 
he is flexible and supportive of his fellow worker and subordinates: He is 
"driven" to promote winning teams - providing that he can be its leader in 
order to create his own power base within the organisation. This of course 
requires delegation: Altogether a not very different picture from a Gordon 
or a Clothingman or a Steelman. 
The findings of Maccoby are also not very different from the conceptualisation 
of Schumacher who sees the large organisation divided up into semi-autonomous 
units which he calls 'quasi-firms', each having a large amount of freedom 
in order to give the greatest possible chance to creativity and entrepreneurship: 
"The structure of the organisation can then be symbolised by a man 
holding a large number of balloons in his hand. Each of the balloons 
has its buoyancy and lift, and the man himself does not lord it over 
the balloons, but stands beneath them, yet holding all the strings 
firmly in his hand. Every balloon is not only an administrative 
but also an entrepreneurial unit. The monolithic organisation, by 
contrast, might be symbolised by a christmas tree, with a star at the 
top and a lot of lights and other useful things ·underneath. Everything 
derived from the top and depends on it. (In this case) real freedom 
and entrepreneurship can exist only at the top." (1974:204) 
And if I can at this stage recall just one of the many propositions contained 
in James Thompson's 'Organisations in Action': 
"Under conditions of complexity, when the major components of an 
organisation are reciprocally interdependent, thes,e components will 
be segmented and arran ed in self-sufficient clusters, each cluster 
having its own domain. un er in1ng mine) 
The whole concept of power has been subsumed throughout. This is a serious 
flaw, but a necessary one: Consideration of this very important input to · 












This postulate is confirmed by Maccoby's finding that entrepreneurship -
far from being unnecessary in the organisation - is possessed and practised 
at several levels in the hierarchy. But this should hardly be surprising 
remembering that our successful managers in practice delegate, decentralise 
influence, practise joint decision-making, and therefore must require of 
their subordinates that they introduce new ideas into their job functioning 
and not merely slavishly follow a pre-planned path. 
If, as all the empirical evidence suggests, this is the method by which 
strategy in an organisation is successfully implemented, then there must 
be two major effects both of which go largely unaccepted in the traditional 
literature: The communication patterns within the organisation will be 
radically altered and structure will not follow the normal hierarchical fonn. 
The Successful manager then does far more than simply delegate authority 
down the vertical line in order to please himself. He is a team builder. 
He creates a structure of interlinking communication networks - clusters of 
subordinates, loosely structured, which, like the environment in which the 
firm operates, are constantly changing. In this way both he and his finn 
can better deal with the results of strategy implementation which feed back 
to the organisation and are monitored by him. Structure of the successful 
firm is thus characterised by plasticity. 
How are these teams organised? Galbraith (1973) advocates 'slices' across 
traditional organisation chart lines, and in his later work 'Organisation 
Design' develops this notion further by stressing that the task force is a 
temporary group which exists only as long as the problem remains. There-
after it disbands. Operating formally or informally these decisional units 
"remove problems from higher levels in the hi erarchy11 ( 1977: 116). They 
are therefore a natural follow-on of traditional delegation. 
The picture of structure which we are building up is very much in keeping 
with Pfiffner's {1960) conceptualisation of 'Communication Overlays.' But 
exactly how is communication related.to structure? After citing the work 












"The suggestion has been made that organisations can be. compared to 
anatomy and administration to physiology, but even those who draw 
such easy analogies would undoubtedly protest against complete 
compartmentalization. Just as anatomy and physiology are interrelated 
so are structure and process. It is nevertheless helpful~from the 
standpoint of organisation analysis to emphasise structure~at this 
point, and a number of authorities have referred to communication as 
a basis for organisation structure. The term structure as utilised 
here connotes a stable set of relationships. 11 (1960:296) 
(underlining mine) 
Now 'structure' to the management school is as laid down in the organisation 
chart. It is as Chandler tells us "the organisation devised to administer 
these enlarged (strategic) activities and resources" (1966:13)* - in other 
words, structure follows strategy. 
But we know from the empirical work of Mintzberg (1976b) on policy making, 
as well as from the findings amongst the successful executives in this study, 
that strategy follows structure both in terms of joint decision-making and 
communication {monitoring) channels. 
Also, by contrast, the unsuccessful managers, locked into a structure of 
centralised decision-making and poor co1TD11unication channels, reflected poor 
strategy (the result of its implementation) as measured by the Risk Rating. 
The prognosis of Wrapp has been proved correct: 
"Preoccupation with d tailed statements of corporate objectives and 
departmental goals and with comprehensive organisation charts and 
job descriptions - this is often the first symptom of an organisation 
which is in the early stages of atrophy." (1967:95) · 
This is the problem with organisation charts. They are useful in denoting 
who is fonnally responsible to whom but they do only indicate the formal 
lines of authority,and the paths of communication within the firm follow a 
completely different pattern. 












However, the extent to which a given executive slavishly follows their lines 
is not only going to determine his overall effectiveness, but it also gives 
us good insight into his attitude. We have only to look at Clothingman X's 
conception of how a company should operate {Figure 14) with its mixture of 
functions and people intermingled as if both were inanimate to show t~is. 
In summary then we find that the truth of organisational functioning lies 
in neither the behavioural science nor management schools. Each has 
attempted to view the firm from its own limited perspective and has 
advocated (like the early leadership theorists) a one-best-way prescription. 
The empirical findings show that it is not a question of "either...;or" nor 
of "both", but both with a new added dimension: reality. True synthesis 













IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
It was almost twenty years ago that Pfiffner warned us that we would have 
to be prepared to accept a more complicated view of the organisation and 
he emphasised the difficulty in developing a new body of 11 acceptable 
doctrine. 11 
11 For example, different people argue the primacy of such factors 
as role, structure and function, interaction, decision, fusion, 
communication, power and influence, individual motivation and 
satisfaction, leadership, and bureaucracy. The list is not 
comprehensive, but it does reveal the complexities which beset us. 
Each of these categories involves the others; and the real argument 
is over which deserves the greatest emphasis. 11 (1960:463) 
We now know that the answer to the argument is that each should receive 
equal emphasis because not only does each involve the other, but is part 
of it. One might ask why it has taken us so long to reach this stage in 
our knowledge? I would advance the reason that although we have been aware 
of the open system for a long time we have merely paid lip service to it 
and there has been no true acceptance. This must change. I am speaking 
not of recognition nor even of a commitment, but of the necessity of an 
internalising of open systems principles into all our future endeavours. 
There are other obvious implications of the study which have been pointed 
to in the text. Many of them have relevance for us as teachers and as 
trainers and it is on these areas that I should now like to concentrate. 
The empirical findings in the study have direct implications for our efforts 
in the direction of organisation development. Reflection shows that the 
principles underlying these programmes are all based (like much management 












in a successful organisation ought to be like and not on what it in fact is. 
After these OD packages have been sold to industry, myriad problems are 
encountered in implementing them, and (because they are not based upon reality 
principles) we cannot in the majority of cases adequately specify criteria 
with which to measure their effectiveness. The literature carries reports 
of positive effects lasting only a few months and, frantically casting around 
for a scapegoat, we inevitably put the blame not on the programme (where it 
often belongs) but on the worker participants for their ''lack of cooperation." 
In the Behavioural Sciences students are trained as future organisation 
researchers and as practitioners such as personnel specialists. Schooled 
in neat research design methods and armed with a bundle of sophisticated 
techniques (the business schools do it too only with different techniques) 
they are sent out ignorant not only of basic organisational functioning but 
also completely without the ability to communicate with the people from whom 
they are going to gather data or with whom they are going'to work. The 
,result? Disillusionment on the part of the practitioner and more limited 
findings from the researcher. 
I just do not believe that it is possible to adequately educate an organisational 
psychologist without including training in organisational principles and 
basic managerial functions in his curriculum. He must at least have a basic 
knowledge of the parameters of the organisational totality and have a working 
vocabulary of the functions performed in it. 
Ours is an applied 'science' and we must accept that the limits of its 
applicability are going to be directly proportional to the extent that we 












That is the problem with much of the behavioural scientist's work: He grabs 
hold of the right stick and holds it aloft proclaiming it as the answer to 
almost every situation with which he is faced. Some objectivity would show 
him that in many cases he had hold of the wrong end and that the particular 
instrument had limited applicability - either for type of circumstance or in 
depth of usage. 
Let us take the subject of Teams and Team-Building as an illustrative example. 
We have seen that successful managers do inter alia build teams but our human 
relationist takes the concept to extremes: All decisions must now be joint 
ones, everyone must participate in all issues, consensus becomes essential 
in everything, and competitive situations are barred. 
This has the effect of reducing everything to the lowest common denominator, 
individual initiative becomes stifled, and one begins to approximate to a 
committee situation. It is also very time-consuming and inefficient. 
Because it is inefficient it does not produce the best results in all 
circumstances and, because of this, this is not the way that task forces 
function in reality: The manager adopts just one single criterion against 
which to measure the worth of any particular technique or principle and that 
is its practical use in terms of the positive results obtained by its employment. 
This is because exactly the same criterion is used to judge him and his whole 
organisation. I do not believe that we are going to change this attitude of 
management because I do not see society at large adopting a different yardstick 
with which to measure the success of the company as a whole. This being so, 
we must adapt our methods and approaches accordingly. 
There are signs that this adaptation is beginning to take place: In his 
'Feedback and Organization Development' Nadler (1977) advances a refreshingly 
different approach to the whole OD process. He cautions against the over-use 
of questionnaires and advocates instead constant information-gathering and 
monitoring of the whole process by iQterview as being preferable. In addition 
he says that it behoves us to constantly view the organisation as a complex 
and interdependent open system, and to study the content (the 'what') as well 
as the process (the 'how') of organisational interactions. In order to 












Another recent work is that by Davis and Lawrence (1977) out of Columbia and 
Harvard. Simply entitled 'Matrix', they warn against 11 groupitis 11 resulting 
from the overadoption of matrix (team) principles: Matrix functioning does 
not mean that all decisions must be "hammered out" in group meetings. If 
all team members have to listen to all issues being discussed until a 
decision point is reached it wastes time and has a demotivating effect upon 
members because they begin to worry about their specialist identities. 
Further, senior management becomes "concerned about the speed and flexibility 
of organisational response." 
In discussing one of their cases they state: 
"There was nothing sacred about group decisions and it 
sensible to have all product team members involved in 
... The concept of team work was put in perspective. 
decision-making should be done as often as necessary, 
little as possible." (1977:134) 
(is) not 
all decisions . 
Group 
and as 
We also find additional implications for our training of business practitioners, 
and one of the most striking of these involves communication. If the 
manager spends more than 50% of his time in personal interaction with his 
peers and subordinates then it follows that better communication skills 
(Monitoring and Disseminating ability) is going to increase his effectiveness. 
And yet no training is given to the business school student in how to transmit 
information or how to conduct a meeting. It should be. 
I have drawn attention in a number of places in the text to the narrowness 
of the business school's prescriptive teaching: how, for example, analysis 
is aqvanced and intuitive methods denied, and how this is at odds with real 
world functioning. What is called for is training in lateral thinking 
(de Bono, 1971) and creative activities such as role playing. 
Mintzberg states: 
l I 
11 As long as management schools focus exclusively on cognitive learning I 
and ignore developments of student skills through systematic experiential 













This contention of Mintzberg's finds support in a report by Graves on a 
training progra1T111e which he organised for a group of managers. After a 
week of training at a centre they were given a practical on-the-job project 
to do. In evaluating the programme they were asked whether they would have 
preferred the full time to be spent at the centre. They unanimously answered 
'no'. Graves concludes that the results support his proposition that: 
"Training should be based upon managerial needs as perceived by the 
managers rather than development needs perceived by the trainers. 11 
(1976:15) 
and that only by practising their skills of fact-finding, analysing, and 
problem-solving were these managers able to learn. 
Of course practice has always been 'out of step' with teaching and Knowles 
and Saxeberg point to the inevitability of this fact: 
"Managers in their leadership and behavior are reluctant to take 
radical steps beyond what they learnt from those under whom they 
trained. Managerial behavior and attitudes tend, therefore, to 
reflect those of a past generation··and to be permanently out of step 
with the requirements of the present. 11 (1971:5) 
But in reviewing the evidence we find that there is a strong indication that 
the 'lag• is at present a reverse one: That organisation theory is trailing 
behind practice whereas the reverse should be true. To correct this situation 
we are going to have to make another commitment and that is to recognise that 
there is only one type of 'laboratory' in which we can gather data and that 
is the organisation itself. No more must we tolerate findings which emanate 
from.contrived and thus artificial settings. How can we ever hope to stay 
ahead in the field of explaining organisational phenomena unless we gather 
field data only? 
We are also going to have to learn that not all data is quantifiable, that some 
of it will have to be descriptive and anecdotal in nature and to learn tolerance 
of ambiguous findings. Initially our explanations will lack the clarity and 
crispness to which we have been used, but I would rather have an explanation 
in general terms as to how everything really works than a neatly packaged 
theory which explains to me only how some of the things might work. 












SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
What direction should this future research take and how should it be done? 
Work on strategic decision and policy-making by the McGill Group continues. 
Any further comment on my part would be presumptuous. Also, Mintzberg 
discusses a number of research implications in his original work.* This 
study is an investigation of but one of them and therefore their repetition 
would here be out of place. I shall therefore confine myself to a discussion 
of suggestions generated by my own role investigation. 
The focus of this study has been extremely broad in the sense that it has 
ranged over the whole spectrum of organisational variables. At the same 
time it has had a narrow focus in that it has concentrated on a few of the 
roles (mainly Leader and Monitor) perfonned by one level of manager (top 
executive) in one type of organisation (private : commercial). .The first 
question then is how does role performance differ for managers at other 
levels in different types of organisation? 
·Earlier we saw that there was an indication of differences in role emphasis 
and Table 3 (page 93) listed the variations across public and private 
organisations. 
Mintzberg 1 s (1978) 'Structuring of organisations' suggests 5 types of 
organisation each with its own unique structural configurations. These 
are briefly: 
1. Simple Structure The small business 
2. Machine Bureaucracy The classic bureaucratic organisation -
public sector enterprises 
3. Professional Bureaucracy A hospital, school or university 
4. Divisionalised Fonn The large decentralised firm 
5. Adhocracy The professional firm or project organisation 
I propose that using this typology and perhaps employing the same assumptions 
used in the study to categorise role activity (Appendix 2), research is undertaken 












amongst managers at various levels. In this way we can build a portfolio 
of 'nonns' of role activity and work characteristics for managers across 
different types of organisation. This will provide us with a yardstick 
against which we can thereafter compare any given manager and give us an 
indication of his success in terms of his role performance. However, the 
collection of data from such large samples will probably necessitate the 
development of a simple self-recording instrument. 
There is another direction in which the research could proceed and that is 
to investigate the role interactions. Throughout the empirical study I 
pointed to the linking and sequencing between the roles which we remember 
form a gestalt. In addition the manager performs several roles simultaneously. 
An investigation along these lines will not only give us additional insight 
into managerial behaviour, but it might also provide very useful information 
about the cognitive processes which underly this behaviour. 
Thus this suggestion should not be seen as an alternative to the above 
recommendation but as a very valuable adjunct. Research could be undertaken 
in the two directions in parallel. 
This unravelling of the performed role 'packages' is going to necessitate 
the use of videotape because the record will have to be played over and over 
again with the researcher concentrating on looking for different role activities 
on each run. 
Another general question is to what extent does the role activity of any 
given manager change over time? We have seen that role performance is a 
function of the communication patterns in the organisation and that this in 
turn reciprocally influences structure. It therefore follows that role 
perfonnance is not stable over time and an investigation of the changes in 
terms of other organisational variables should prove very interesting. 
Concurrently with this there are a number of questions within the individual 












Looking first at the Decisional roles, we defined Entrepreneur as including 
all improvement projects initiated by the manager, and no distinction was 
made between the different types. We need to know how much time a manager 
spends on small improvements such as improving an existing system and how 
much on what might be called global projects such as the establishment of 
completely new facilities? What is the lead time involved in these? 
Then it would be useful to try and establish some sort of upper limit of 
efficiency in this role: whilst we can safely surmise that Foodman's 
3% was too little, was Clothingman's 19% an over-concentration? Or are 
Phannacyman and Steelman (11%) not giving innovative aspects enough 
attention? I labelled Steelman the 'All-Rounder' and thus {by inference) 
felt that his time distribution was optimal. But this is only a tentative 
thought and certainly needs confinnation. 
Similarly, Resource Allocation contains a number of decisional categories 
which include allocation of organisational and the manager's own (mainly 
time) resource. We need first of all to draw a distinction between the 
two and then to seek answers to questions such as to what extent does 
delegation or decentralising decision-making free the manager from spending 
his time progra11111ing the work of his subordinates: what is the ratio of 
delegation to time saved? We shall have to probe and analyse deeply but 
the answer in terms of the effect upon the manager's other roles as well as 
the co11111unication patterns will prove very valuable. 
It is readily easy to identify Disturbance Handler activity and the role is 
fairly self-contained, but we still know very little about the detail of the 
act itself. Handling crises amounts to decision-making under pressure and 
an in-depth look at this single role would give information as to how the 
normal decisional pattern is altered under these circumstances. We saw 
Lewis in this situation and the one outstanding feature was his neglect of 
certain areas of his 'empire'. But he is such an unusual man that I am 
hesitant to draw even a tentative generalisation from his behaviour. 
In fact if we look at these 3 decisional roles we can identify a certain 
incompleteness in the categorisations. This being so, there is in all 














Mi ntzberg readily admits this and says that he has "no objections to taking 
these roles as a package and seeing how else they can be chopped up or 
re-arranged. 11 * 
There is an inherent danger here though: my study, by splitting the Leader 
and Monitor roles into 2, expanded the role set from 10 to 12. If the 
decisional roles are split into a greater number care must be taken to 
maintain a certain integrity so that the role set does not grow so large 
as to become a meaningless list: Analysis must be followed by careful lf 
re syn thesis. I 
The two most interesting interpersonal roles are of course Leader and Liaison. 
We have seen how successful performance of each by the manager brings him 
valuable information from respectively within and without his organisation. 
Further, that performance of the purely motivational aspect of leadership 
is integral to the manager's success. Flexibility of style was demonstrated~ 
We need far more in-depth observation to produce descriptive answers to : 
what type of interaction by the manager with his subordinates is most 
motivation-producing and information-evoking? Under what conditions do 
managers most consistently show the greatest flexibility of style? What 
is the purpose behind a manager adopting a certain behaviour and does he 
achieve it? 
One glaring omissio  from my study is that it fails to show how much external 
information the manager gleans from performance of the Liaison role. Whilst 
I am sure that my subjects did 'pick up' information, it went unreported. 
Further knowledge of this role will enable us to split the external component 
of the monitor role into solicited and unsolicited in the same way as was 
done with the internal. 
Liaison role activity varied widely between the subjects and we need to know 
why some successful managers spend so little (6%) and some so much (28%) 
time in this role. Also, where is the line between efficient time usage and 
pure socialising: what activities are really worthwhile for the manager? 












QUESTIONS FOR THE COGNITIVIST 
Judgement rather than analysis or bargaining is the preferred 
method by which the manager makes decisions. To do this he 
employs not facts but his own interpretation of those facts. 
What cognitive processes underly the judgmental process? 
Following from this, why does he use only limited categories 
of information to arrive at a decision? 
What decision processes are involved in the manager choosing 
between roles? What determines his role behaviour? Do 
outside events dictate the role choice - is he manipulated 
or does he exercise free volition? 
Both bargaining {for resources inside the firm) and negotiation 
(with outsiders) involve 'trade-offs' and compromise which is 
by definition non-rational. What is the nature of compromise 
situations? What commonalities can be isolated which would 
help us to pinpoint the stage at which an individual is 
"sati sfi ced 11 • 
What is the nature of the decision which takes place between 
the monitoring of information and its dissemination? What 
determines the categories of information which a manager will 
select? 
Information storage capacity is limited. 












It is of course the Monitor role which generates the most questions. Amongst 
the many gaps in our knowledge are : 
The successful manager has trained himself to 'tune into' the correct categories 
of information: his cognitive filtering selects out that which is important 
to him. So what categories of information does he select and which does 
he discard? 
He trains his subordinates to bring him unsolicited information and he also 
solicits from them. How much of this informational input is about internal 
organisational happenings and how much is about external events? Is the 
successful manager one who efficiently scans the external world via his 
subordinates, or is he largely his own external monitor? 
We saw that the manager often receives unsolicited information together with 
information which he has solicited. Does success revolve in part around asking 
the right questions of subordinates so that the bonus unsolicited information 
is given? Does the manager ask questions with this purpose in mind? 
All these issues should prove to be worthwhile avenues of investigation~ 
This is also the area in which the cognitivist's work will be of most help. 
(see Box). 
At the present stage of our knowledge there are still more questions than 
answers, but we have at last made some meaningful progress towards solving 
the puzzle of managerial functioning. 














It is time to return to the starting point. I began by outlining the history 
of organisational psychology and questioning whether there was any difference 
between the aims of this discipline and organisation theory derived from ~he 
management school. 
We have seen in reviewing the actuality findings of the various empiricists 
that if we ask questions of organisations in terms of strategy it produces an 
answer in terms of relationships, if we ask in terms of psychological interaction 
it produces an answer in terms of structure. We have reached a stage where 
the knowledge of each cannot be further advanced without reference to the other. 
Therefore there can be no doubt left in our minds that the two are in fact 
synonymous. They have reached the same endpoint along different paths. But 
both do have a common ancestor in F.W. Taylor and it is time for a reconciliation 
in the family. 
For the future we can draw on the words of advice given on a completely different 
subject: Prior to writing 'Le Mal Francais' Peyrefitte went to the historian 
Le Senne and told him that intuitively, he imagined two kinds of society, the 
one a society of confide ce and the other a society where defiance seemed to 
dominate. Which, he asked, was correct? He records that Le Senne told him: 
"The subject needs a multi -di sci pl inary research approach. It forces 
you to assimilate the techniques of the ethnologist, of the sociologist, 
of the geographer, of the historian, of the psychologist, of the economist; 
in short of the anthropologist. You must break the artificial barriers 
which separate the 'private hunting grounds' of science. Either you 
must grasp the whole of Man, or you will grasp only wind." (1976:24) 
If we heed these words then we shall be in a position of being able to build 
on the considerable body of empirical evidence already gathered by Mintzberg, 
Hunt and others. 
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MINTZBERG'S PROPOSITIONS ABOUT MANAGERIAL ROLES 
1. Managerial activities and managerial roles may be grouped in three 
categories - those concerning primarily with interpersonal relationships, 
those that deal primarily with information processing, and those that 
involve the making of significant decisions. 
2. The work of managers of all types may be described in terms of ten 
observable roles: figurehead, liaison and leader (interpersonal roles), 
monitor, disseminator, and spokesman (information roles), and entrepreneur, 
disturbance handler, resource allocator, and negotiator (decisional roles). 
3. TMse ten roles form a gestalt - an integrated whole. The three inter-
personal roles derive from the manager's formal authority and status; 
these give rise to the three informational roles;and these in turn enable 
the manager to perform the four decisional roles. 
4. The simplest of managerial roles, that of figurehead, identifies the 
manager as a symbol, obliged to carry out a number of social, inspirational, 
legal, and ceremonial duties. In addition• the manager must be available 
to certain parties that demand to deal with him because of his status or 
authority. 
5. The leader role identifies the manager's relationship with his subordinates. 
He defines the milieu in which they work, motivates them, probes into their 
activities to keep them alert, and takes responsibility for hiring, training 
and promoting them. The manager attempts to bring subordinate and 
organisational needs into a common accord to promote efficient operations. 
The leader role pervades virtually all the manager's activities in which 
subordinates are involved, even those whose main purpose is not inter-
personal. The power of the manager is most clearly manifested in the 
leader role. 
6. In the liaison role the manager develops a network of contacts outside 
. of his organisation, in which information and favors are traded for mutual 
benefit. Managers spend considerable amounts of time performing this 
role, first by making a series of commitments to establish these contacts, 
and then by carrying out various acti vi ti es to maintain them. 
7. Evidence suggests that the manager serves as "nerve center" of his 
organisation's information. His unique access to all subordinates and 
to special outside contacts (many of them nerve centers of their own 
organisations) enables the manager to develop a powerful data base of 
external and internal information. In effect, the manager is his 












8. As monitor the manager continually seeks and receives information from 
a variety of sources in order to develop a thorough understanding of 
the organisation and its environment. Information arrives on internal 
operations, external events, ideas, and trends, and in the form of 
analyses and pressures. 
9. A good part of the manager's information is current, tangible, and 
nondocumented. Hence the manager must take responsibility for the 
design of his own, information system, which he does by building liaison 
contacts and by training subordinates to bypass their superiors in 
delivering information to him. · 
10. The manager uses his information to detect changes, to identify problems 
and opportunities, to build up a general understanding of his milieu 
for decision-making, to determine organisational values, and to inform 
outsiders and subordinates. 
11. As disseminator the manager sends external information into his 
organisation and internal information from one subordinate .to another. 
This information may be of a factual or value nature. 
12. The manager serves as the focal point for his organisation's value 
system. Influencers direct their statements of preference to him; 
he, in turn, assimilates and combines these according to the power of 
the source, and disseminates information on overall organisational 
values to subordinates who use it as a guide in decision-making. The 
dissemination of values occurs in terms of specific statements on 
specific issues, not in terms of global preferences. 
13. The manager faces a "dilemma of delegation." Only he has the 
information necessary to make a great many important decisions. But 
the information is in the wrong form - verbal and in memory rather than 
documented. Hence dissemination of it is time-consuming and difficult. 
The manager must overload himself with tasks or spend a great amount of 
time disseminating information, or delegate with the understanding that 
the job will be done with the use of less information than he has. 
14. As spokesman the manager must transmit information to various external 
groups. He must act in a public relations capacity;lobby for his 
organisation;keep key influencers (board of directors or boss) informed; 
inform the public about his organisation's performance, plans, and 
policies;and send useful information to his liaison contacts. 
15. As spokesman, furthermore, the manager must serve outside rs as an 
expert in the field in which his organisation operates. 
16. The manager must take full responsibility for his organisation's 
strategy-making system, the system by which important decisions are 
made and interrelated. He has the necessary authority and information, 












17. As entrepreneur the manager initiates and designs much of the controlled 
change in his organisation. He continually searches for problems and 
opportunities. When a situation requiring improvement is found, the 
manager initiates an 11 improvement project" - a series of related decisions 
and other activities, sequenced over a period of time, that leads to 
the actual improvement. 
18. The manager may involve himself in an improvement project on one of 
three levels. He may delegate all responsibility to a subordinate, 
implicitly retaining the right to replace him ; he may delegate 
responsibility for design but retain responsibility for choice via 
authorisation; or he may supervise the design phase himself. 
19. At any one time senior managers appear to maintain supervision over 
a large inventory of improvement projects. These vary widely in 
stage of development, with some under active development, some in 
l~mbo, and some nearing completion. Each is worked on periodically, 
with each step followed by a period of delay during which the manager 
waits for the feedback of information or the occurrence of an event. 
Occasionally, a project is completed or a new one added to inventory. 
20. As his organisation 1 s generalist, the manager must take charge when 
his organisation meets with an unexpected stimulus for which there 
is no clear programmed response. In effect, he assumes the role of 
disturbance handler. Disturbances may arise from conflicts between 
subordinates, conflicts between the manager's organisation and another, 
and losses of resources or threats thereof. Disturbances arise both 
because "poor" managers are insensitive and because innovation by 
"good" managers inevitably leads to unanticipated consequences. 
Faced with a disturbance, the manager gives it priority and devotes 
his efforts to removing the stimulus - to buying time so that it can 
be dealt with leisurely by an improvement project. 
21. In his resource allocator role the manager oversees the allocation 
of all forms of organisational resources (such as money, manpower, 
reputation). This involves three essentials - scheduling his own 
time, programming the work of the organisation and authorising actions. 
22. In scheduling his own time the manager implicitly sets organisational 
priorities. What fails to reach him fails to get support. Thus, 
his time assumes a significant opportunity cost. 
23. The manager takes responsibility for establishing the basic work system 
of his organisation and programming the work of subordinates - deciding 
what will be done, who will do it, what structure will be used. 
24. Basic continuing control over resource allocation is maintained by 
the manager by authorising all significant decisions before implementation. 
This enables him to interrelate decisions. Some decisions are authorised 
within a regular budgeting process; most are authorised on an ad hoc 












are complex and subordinates' proposals cannot be dismissed lightly. 
In some cases the manager decides on the proposer rather than the 
proposal. 
25. To help in evaluating proposals, managers develop loose models and 
plans in their heads. The models describe a great variety of internal 
and exte'rnal situations. The plans - in the form of improvement 
projects to be initiated - serve to provide a common basis against 
which to evaluate proposals. The plans are loose, flexible, and 
implicit, so that they can be updated with the arrival of new 
information. 
26. As negotiator the manager takes charge when his organisation must engage 
in important negotiation activity with other organisations. He 
participates as figurehead, as spokesman and as resource allocator. 
27. The ten roles suggest that managers, while generalists when viewed 
within their organisations, are in fact specialists required to 
perform a particular set of specialised roles. 
28. Organisations require managers not only because of imperfections in 
the system and unexpected changes in the environment, but because 
a formal authority is required to carry out certain basic, regular 
duties. The ten roles suggest six basic purposes of the manager -
to ensure the efficient production of the organisation's goods and 
services, to design and maintain the stability of organisational 
operations, to adapt the organisation in a controlled way to its 
changing environment, to ensure that the organisation serves the ends 
of those persons who control it, to serve as the key information link 
between the organisation and its environment, and to operate the 
organisation's status system. 













ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING ROLE ACTIVITY 
No difficulty was experienced with the Figurehead role and inconsequential 
requests or attendance at a ceremonial occasion was usually 'pure' activity. 
Similarly, there was little difficulty experienced with the Disseminator role. 
Where the subject reported: 'I phoned Fred and told him', I took this to 
be pure dissemination of information in the absence of it being reported 
that the conversation took another twist: The main purpose was the passing 
on of information. --
Performance of the Liaison role takes place exclusively outside of the 
organisation and time spent 1n activities which logically fit into this 
role (such as attendance at conferences and social events) was ascribed 
exclusively to this role unless the subjects reported etherwise. 
Performance of the Liaison role is of course extremely important but the 
external contacts which the executive builds up are not geared to providing 
instant 'reward' to him. He attends some social events at which he knows 
his peers wi 11 be present not in the primary hope that he wi 11 pick up ·the 
latest information which i"S"""relevant to his organizational purpose at that 
particular time, but in order that he will reap a reward at some later 
date. In other words, performance of the monitor role as a result of 
adequate performance of the Liaison role takes place at some time in the 
future. 
Spokesman role activity also takes place outside the organization via the 
dissemination of expert information to, for example, the press and 
customers. Identification of this role activity was reasonably straight-
forward and no assumptions had to be made. 
The decisional roles of Entrerreneur, Disturbance Handler and Resource 
Allocator presented some prob em. · 
Firstly, the Entrepreneur and Disturbance Handler roles: If a neglected 
problem area is brought to the manager's attention he can decide either 
to take steps to restore it to the position that it would/should have been 
in had it not been neglected in the first place, or, taking into account 
new information which he has at his disposal this time but did not have 
in the past, he might decide to guide this problem in a novel direction. 
In the first instance he would have been performing a Disturbance Handler 
role, in the second, that of Entrepreneur, and so a decision had to be as 
to how to handle cases such as this. 
Here I was guided by the fact that entrepreneurial activity is that of 
innovation or initiation and also by Mintzberg's rather strong contention 
that all improvement projects should fall into the entrepreneurial 
category. 
I see Disturbance Handling as attention to crises or 'fire fighting' and in 












Resource Allocator (insofar as it refers to programming and assigning or 
delegating work to subordinates} presents no problems. There is also no 
difficulty in recognising those activities that relate directly to the 
manager's intention of apportioning resources and deciding which of them 
should be conserved or expended. 
There is however a small grey area between authorising the action of 
subordinates which had been taken on improvement projects delegated to 
them (resource allocation) and supervision of the project itself which 
remains entrepreneurial activity. I here adopted the viewpoint that 
authorising action on delelated responsibility for improvement projects be 
ascribed to the resource a locator role. (Mintzberg, 1973:79} 
No difficulty was experienced with the Negotiator role. It is a hybrid 
and as we have seen, consists of Figurehead, Spokesman, and Resource 
Allocator elements. 
Information comes to the manager from inside and outside the organization 
in a variety of ways. It can be verbal, written, formal or informal, 
requested or unrequested, programmed or ad hoc. There is a Monitor 
element in "every activity involving information input to the manager, 
no matter what the main purpose of any of these activities" (Mintzberg, 
1973:268}. 
It therefore follows that (with the possible exception of Figurehead, 
Disseminator and Spokesman), there is a degree of monitoring activity 
in practically every role which the manager perfonns. 
For example, if he attends a meeting with an outside supplier in the role 
of Negotiator, it is almost certain that he will receive information during 
the course of the discussion which is new to him. Also, it can quite 
easily be seen that every Disturbance Handler role activity has a 
monitoring element in it. This is often fleeting as when the manager 
goes on tour and sees something which is not to his liking or which he 
knows to be incorrect. A telephone call begins with an outsider infonning 
the manager of some recent environmental event. The caller asks for his 
reaction and he spends the next 10 minutes perfonning the role of Spokesman. 
It is hard to conceive of any one instance where the manager, in performing 
his roles of Resource Allocator, Disseminator or particularly that of 
Leader, does not receive some informational input simply because he is 
in interactive communication with other people. Often though, this 
monitoring is so fleeting and occupies so little time relative to the 
main purpose of the activity that it is not really possible to record 
it accurately. 
Therefore rather than guess I decided to adopt a rigid policy of only 
ascribing to the monitoring ,ale that time which was used specifically in 
the reception of information such as when the manager reported that 
'I was told ... ' or 1 he reported that ... 1 One can draw a distinction 
* 11 The amount of time spent expressly receiving information will probably 
provide a reasonably accurate estimate of the manager's attention to the 












between informational input which comes to the manager from within the 
organization (from his subordinates) as opposed to the input which he 
receives from external sources. Also, it.can quickly be seen that · 
information given to him from his subordinates logically falls into 2 
main categories: that which is expressly requested by the manager such 
as 'please tell me how' (verbal, as well as any written memos and analyses 
of reports which have been asked for), volunteered. These two categories 
were recorded separately. 
The greatest difficulty was of course the apportionment of the time spent 
in the Leader role. Many management writers - some very prominent - regard 
any activity which is not in fulfillment of the leader role as essentially 
non-managerial. We have also seen that traditional leadership theories 
concentrate wholly on this role and exclude or ignore decision-making. 
It was argued that this was fallacious. 
Even concentrating on the 10-Role Set of managerial leadership, Leader role 
performance pertains to all activity which involves subordinates. Thus the 
manager can strictly be said to be performing as leader not only when he 
is for example improving relations with subordinates and guiding them in 
their work, but also when performing the Monitor, Disseminator, Figurehead, 
as well as all three decisional roles. He spends a fairly large proportion 
of his time programming the work of his subordinates: Resource Allocation. 
Here he also interacts with subordinates and therefore performs a leadership 
function. · 
Mapping of the activities into roles therefore produces a fundamental 
dilemma: if we are to define the other roles according to the criteria 
which have been outlined above and also recognise that every time the 
manager interacts with one of his subordinates he is partially fulfilling 
his leadership function, then we would either end up 'under costing' some 
of the other roles such as Disturbance Handler or Disseminator, or we would 
end up accounting for some of his time twice. 
Neither of these alternatives seemed particularly appealing, and so I 
decided to credit only those activities which were used expressly for 
interpersonal purposes to the leadership role: where his primary purpose 
was for example encouragement or criticism or the maintenance of the 
organizational climate. I reasoned that what was needed was a relative 
rather than a absolute indication of the time that subjects spent 
performing in the leader role. 
At the same time I was particularly interested in the special group of 
leader activities comprising staffing, hiring, firing, training and 
promoting: what we might call the 'personnel' function and took particular 














THE RISK RATING 
THE RATIOS 
1. Shareholders Interest 
This is the all-important debt/equity ratio which is accorded the highest 
weighting in our Survival Rating. It is calculated by showing total equity 
(inclusive of preference and minority interests, but excluding intangibles) 
as a percentage of total liabilities. Generally speaking, the higher 
the figure for shareholders' interest the lower the risk factor. 
2. Return on Capital Employed 
In our Survey this is calculated as the percentage of pre-interest profits 
to capital employed - Our definition of capital includes, equity + reserves 
net of intangibles, preference, minority interest, convertible loans, 
deferred liabilities and all borrowings both long and short. With the 
exception of deferred liabilities, all the items included in capital 
employed require to be serviced either by way of interest or a participation 
in profits. 
By calculating the pre-interest return on capital employed we achieve a 
further measure of a company's ability.to borrow money and can also assess 
the effectiveness with which it is using its funds. We consider this 
a particularly important ratio and consequently have accorded it a high 
weighting in our survival rating. The importance of this is fairly 
basic since companies may be losing money on their borrowings. 
3. Total Borrowings as a percentage of Total Liabilities 
This ratio is almost self-explanatory as it is simply long-term borrowings 
plus short-term borrowings and overdrafts expressed as a percentage of total 
liabilities. To a lesser extent it is another way of looking at the debt/ 
equity ratio. 
4. Cash Flow to Borrowings 
This ratio measures the ability of a company to repay its debt assuming 
no dividends are paid to shareholders. The arithmetic is simply: 
cash flow (earned for ordinary + depreciation) divided by total borrowings 
(long and short). If the ratio is 1,0 then the company could repay 
all its borrowings (both long and short) with exactly the latest year's 
cash flow. If the ratio is 0,33 that indicates it would take 3 years 












5. Profit and Loss Gearing 
This is the percentage of trading profits that reaches the pre-tax 
level, i.e., it is trading profit less depreciation, less interest 
paid and plus dividend and other income received. This is in part 
a measure of business gearing because if a company is very capital 
intensive it will have heavy depreciation commitments as a fixed 
overhead. Secondly, it shows the effect of the balance sheet gearing 
in the form of the interest paid on long and short term borrowings. 
The greater the percentage of trading profit reaching the pre-tax 
level the better. There is a strong correlation between a high 
return on capital employed and a high percentage of profit getting 
through to a pre-tax level. 
6. Current Ratio 
This is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities and is an 
indicator of group liquidity. We accorded this ratio the lowest 
number of points in our Survival Rating as many companies which are 
in a precarious state often have good current ratios but this may be 
because they are over-stocked or have a particularly long debtors 
book. Our experience has been that this ratio can be misleading. 
Gains and Losses 
If a Company has revalued its assets then it will have boosted shareholders 
interest and score higher than it otherwise would have. But the return 
on capital will be reduced by revaluing assets thus offsetting the 
higher shareholders interest score. 
If a company is heavily dependent on creditor finance it will show 
a low shareholders interest figure and a poor current ratio, but it 
will probably gain good points for a low dependence on fixed interest 
capital by having a high return on capital employed and hence high 
profit and loss gearing. 
Criticism of the Ratio 
The ratio of cash flow to borrowings is meaningless unless the repayment 
period of loans is known. Also, the debt/equity ratio can be misleading 
unless a company's total debt capacity is known. The higher the earning 
power the greater the capacity for the company to carry a given debt. 
Accounting Methods 
The Authors point out that, whilst there is nothing that they can do 
to compensate for various 'accounting gymnastics' such as Off-Balance-
Sheet Financing and the fact that the debt/equity ratio and return on 
capital employed are not strictly accurate, they have compensated for 
the more accepted variations in accounting practice such as LIFO and 












1. Shareho 1 de rs Interest 2. Return on CaEital EmEloyed 
Points Points 
85%+ 25 +40% 20 
80-85 24 35-40 19 
75-80 23 30-35 18 
70-75 22 25-30 16 
65-70 20 20-25 13 
60-65 18 18-20 12 
55-60 16 16::.18 10 
50-55 14 14-16 8 
45"-50 11 12-14 5 
40-45 8 10-12 2 
35-40 6 8-10 1 




3. Total Borrowings as % of 4. Cash Flow to Total Borrowings 
Total [ i aoil i ti es 
Points Points 
Zero 15 +2 15 
0-5 14 +l 14 
5-10 13 0.9-1.0 13 
10-15 12 0.8-0.9 12 
15-20 10 0.7-0.8 11 
20-25 9 0.6-0.7 10 
25-30 7 0.5-0.6 9 
30-35 5 0.45-0.50 8 
35-40 3 0.40-0.45 7 
40-45 1 0.35-0.40 6 
45-50 0 0.30-0.35 5 
0.25-0.30 4 
0.20-0.25 3. 
0. 15-0.20 2 
0.10-0.15 1 
-0.10 0 
5. Profit and Loss Gearing 6. Current Ratio 
Points Points 
+100% 15 +3 10 
90-100 14 +2 9 
80-90 13 1. 8-2.0 8 
75-80 12 l.6-1.8 7 
70-75 11 l. 4-1. 6 6 
65-70 9 l. 3-1. 4 5 
60-65 7 1.2-1.3 4 
55-60 5 1.1-1.2 3 
50-55 3 l.0-1. l 2 
45-50 2 0.9-1.0 l 













They have also attempted wherever possible to recalculate and add back 
any excess provision to earnings. Here they also include the total 
provision as part of shareholders' funds. They comment on the use 
of equity accounting; where a company employs this method they have 
only included in their calculations of earnings those dividends received 
from investments. They define earnings per share as 'earnings available 
for distribution, net of miscellaneous adjustments.' 
Omissions 
The Risk Ratings of certain companies were not calculated for a variety 
of reasons. 
Mining Companies: Mines cannot afford to carry a high degree of 
financial risk as they carry enough risk in their deposits, the 
mining conditions, and the price of the commodity mined. However, 















Pyramid and Holding Companies are excluded. 
The Banking, Insurance and Investment Trust sectors are also excluded 
because the method of analysis used is not appropriate for the accounts 
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UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
(WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE SOUTH AFRICAN COLLEGE) 
Phone : 69-8531 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
RONDEBOSCH. 
7700 
RECORD OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
I am asking that you provide me with a fairly specific record of all 
your activities for a period of l week. 
This data will to some extent be an amplification of your appointment 
diary, but it will be necessary to record meetings, conversations, and 
dictation periods~ so accounting for the total time spent i  a given 
d~. . 
The record should therefore include 
1. Starting Time : whenever this is on a particular day. 
2. Type of Activity: meeting, telephone call, etc. 
3. Nature or Purpose of 
the Activity : (in general terms only) 
Meetings : Scheduled or unscheduled 
What was discussed 
Who initiated it 
Tel call : Was it from or to 
Did you--receive-,nformation or give orders 
4. Who participated in each activity. 
5. Duration of each acti'vity. 
6. Stopping Time : whenever this is on a particular day. 
A note on after-hours or other evening activities : 
Please record anything which is not purely social. 
Thus entertainment of peers, charity functions, etc., 
should be noted. 
I emphasise that it is not necessary for you to impart any confidential 
information or figures and the identity of subordinates and of other 
people with whom you liaise can be given in general terms - Marketing 
Manager, Banker, Supplier. 
I fully realise that you might be put to considerable inconvenience in 
the provision of the material and I thank you for your cooperation. 
At the same time I assure you that your identity will not be revealed to 
anyone and that the data will be treated with the utmost discretion. 
13 DEC 1978 
